{"id":26563,"date":"2016-05-12T06:00:06","date_gmt":"2016-05-11T20:00:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=26563"},"modified":"2016-05-11T19:45:16","modified_gmt":"2016-05-11T09:45:16","slug":"what-does-rodrigo-duterte-mean-for-south-china-sea-tensions","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-rodrigo-duterte-mean-for-south-china-sea-tensions\/","title":{"rendered":"What does Rodrigo Duterte mean for South China Sea tensions?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"4752601354_5fcca5dc55_z\"Rodrigo Duterte\u2019s<\/span> victory<\/span><\/a> in the Philippines\u2019 Presidential elections has introduced new uncertainty into Asia\u2019s security outlook.<\/span><\/p>\n

The populist strongman from Davao, which is the largest city in Mindanao, is nicknamed \u2018The Punisher\u2019 and \u2018Duterte Harry\u2019 for his alleged involvement in<\/span> extrajudicial killings<\/span><\/a> of around 1,000 criminals in that city during the late 1990s. Duterte secured 38.49% of the<\/span> presidential vote<\/span><\/a>, ahead of 23.46% and 21.66% for his rivals Manuel Roxas and Grace Poe, respectively. He won on a<\/span> populist message<\/span><\/a> that he\u2019ll clean up the<\/span> corruption<\/span><\/a> and criminality that plagues the Philippines and prevents its rapid<\/span> GDP growth of 6.7%<\/span><\/a>\u2014the fourth fastest economic growth rate in the world\u2014from benefiting the majority of its people.<\/span><\/p>\n

Duterte\u2019s record in Davao, and his rhetoric used during the campaign of \u2018death squads as a<\/span> political platform<\/span><\/a>\u2019, raise concerns that progress towards democratisation following the fall of the Marcos regime in 1986 could be rapidly undone, and that a<\/span> new period of authoritarianism<\/span><\/a>\u00a0(PDF) and human rights<\/a><\/span> abuses<\/span><\/a>\u00a0may emerge.<\/span><\/p>\n

Duterte\u2019s foreign policy rhetoric suggests that under his Presidency, the Philippines could suddenly shift its position on the South China Sea crisis in a manner that would generate uncertainty, and \u00a0weaken ASEAN\u2019s ability to develop a common position against an assertive China. The Philippines will be the<\/span> chair<\/span><\/a> of ASEAN in 2017, and so Duterte\u2019s position on the growing crisis in the South China Sea really matters. The problem is that his<\/span> rhetoric is confused<\/span><\/a>\u2014on one hand he suggests a willingness to engage China<\/span> bilaterally<\/span><\/a> over the crisis in exchange for Chinese economic investment, on the other he proposes a<\/span> multilateral<\/span><\/a> roundtable discussion that China would oppose. And then there is loose talk of confronting China at Scarborough Shoal on a<\/span> jet ski<\/span><\/a>\u2014the maritime equivalent of a shirtfront!<\/span><\/p>\n

The shifting policy position of the President-elect is likely to reinforce the risk of miscalculation on both sides of the dispute and generate further provocations. The Permanent Court of Arbitration (<\/span>PCA<\/span><\/a>) in The Hague is currently assessing a crucial legal<\/span> case<\/span><\/a> presented by the Philippines against China on the issue of disputed territories in the South China Sea. Its finding is likely to be handed down in June, and could favour the Philippines. China is vowing that it will<\/span> ignore<\/span><\/a> the<\/span><\/a> PCA\u2019s finding, and in doing so, weaken legal norms such as UNCLOS. Duterte has indicated he\u2019s not a strong supporter of international legal solutions to disputes<\/span> stating<\/span><\/a>: \u2018I have a similar position as China\u2019s. I don\u2019t believe in solving the conflict through an international tribunal\u2019. His stance could embolden China to be more assertive. Under Duterte, the dynamics of this crisis look set to change in China\u2019s favour.<\/span><\/p>\n

A Duterte government is also likely to pose challenges for the Philippines\u2019 key external partners\u2014the<\/span> United States<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> Japan<\/span><\/a> and Australia. Australia is already uneasy with the prospect of dealing with Duterte, given his<\/a><\/span> inappropriate comments<\/span><\/a>\u00a0about the tragic murder of an Australian missionary. Duterte has<\/span> threatened<\/span><\/a> to sever relations with Australia as a result of<\/span> criticism<\/span><\/a> by Australian diplomats over his comments related to the rape. Australia may be<\/span> uncomfortable<\/span><\/a> in seeking closer relations if Duterte continues the practice of extrajudicial killings and reverses progress towards democracy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Australia must also consider the broader implications for our defence diplomacy with the Philippines under Duterte. The 2016<\/span> Defence White Paper<\/span><\/a> notes the importance of the Philippines given its strategic location, and its approach to maritime security, counterterrorism and other aspects of regional security (5.58). If Duterte begins to shift the Philippines defence posture to one that\u2019s more accommodating of China in the South China Sea, perhaps through bilateral arrangements, or by side-stepping the outcome of the PCA, he would undermine efforts to strengthen the rules-based international order that fundamentally says \u2018might does not make right\u2019, and which is a key assumption underpinning Australian defence policy. That would lead to an erosion of ASEAN unity, and China would directly benefit from the probable fallout for the Philippines relations with Japan and the US. The US has just undertaken a<\/span> third<\/span><\/a>\u00a0Freedom of Navigation operation, near Fiery Cross Reef, and moved to<\/span> loosen<\/span><\/a> restrictions on arms sales to Vietnam. It comes as Chinese<\/span> survey vessels<\/span><\/a> have been sighted near Scarborough Shoal\u2014a mere 225 km from Manila\u2014a move that suggests Beijing may determine to militarise the disputed island in the near future.<\/span><\/p>\n

An unpredictable populist President in Manila could quickly undo a key component of regional counter-balancing against Beijing. The South China Sea crisis has just got a lot more complex.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Rodrigo Duterte\u2019s victory in the Philippines\u2019 Presidential elections has introduced new uncertainty into Asia\u2019s security outlook. The populist strongman from Davao, which is the largest city in Mindanao, is nicknamed \u2018The Punisher\u2019 and \u2018Duterte Harry\u2019 …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":147,"featured_media":26567,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[189,52,1053,370,471],"class_list":["post-26563","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-asean","tag-china","tag-freedom-of-navigation","tag-philippines","tag-south-china-sea"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nWhat does Rodrigo Duterte mean for South China Sea tensions? | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-rodrigo-duterte-mean-for-south-china-sea-tensions\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"What does Rodrigo Duterte mean for South China Sea tensions? | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Rodrigo Duterte\u2019s victory in the Philippines\u2019 Presidential elections has introduced new uncertainty into Asia\u2019s security outlook. The populist strongman from Davao, which is the largest city in Mindanao, is nicknamed \u2018The Punisher\u2019 and \u2018Duterte Harry\u2019 ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-rodrigo-duterte-mean-for-south-china-sea-tensions\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2016-05-11T20:00:06+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2016-05-11T09:45:16+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/05\/4752601354_5fcca5dc55_z.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"640\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"427\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Malcolm Davis\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Malcolm Davis\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"4 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-rodrigo-duterte-mean-for-south-china-sea-tensions\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/05\/4752601354_5fcca5dc55_z.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/05\/4752601354_5fcca5dc55_z.jpg\",\"width\":640,\"height\":427},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-rodrigo-duterte-mean-for-south-china-sea-tensions\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-does-rodrigo-duterte-mean-for-south-china-sea-tensions\/\",\"name\":\"What does Rodrigo Duterte mean for South China Sea tensions? 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