{"id":26589,"date":"2016-05-13T11:00:37","date_gmt":"2016-05-13T01:00:37","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=26589"},"modified":"2016-05-12T16:26:01","modified_gmt":"2016-05-12T06:26:01","slug":"what-comes-after-the-non-proliferation-treaty","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/what-comes-after-the-non-proliferation-treaty\/","title":{"rendered":"What comes after the Non-Proliferation Treaty?"},"content":{"rendered":"
2016 has so far been an interesting year for those of us with an eye on the world of nuclear politics and proliferation. To ring in the New Year, North Korea conducted its<\/span> fourth<\/span><\/a> nuclear test on 6 January\u2014the<\/span> claimed<\/span><\/a> detonation of a hydrogen bomb. In the months since, it\u2019s disguised a<\/span> long range missile test<\/span><\/a> as a satellite launch, tested<\/span> medium range<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> intermediate range<\/span><\/a> ballistic missiles,<\/span> fired<\/span><\/a> a submarine-launched ballistic missile and claimed to have<\/span> miniaturised<\/span><\/a> nuclear warheads. All those developments suggest a North Korean nuclear program that\u2019s gaining traction and speed (as I\u2019ve<\/span> argued<\/span><\/a> previously).<\/span><\/p>\n There are a number of<\/span> issues<\/span><\/a> with Pyongyang\u2019s flurry of activity in this area. First, each test\u2014whether a success or failure\u2014is a useful learning experience for DPRK scientists and engineers. Second, the further North Korea develops in nuclear capability, the more difficult it becomes to reverse. And third, a more nuclear capable DPRK puts pressure on Japan and South Korea to adapt their deterrence strategies accordingly.<\/span><\/p>\n Add to the mix recent<\/span> comments<\/span><\/a> by Donald Trump\u2014currently the presumed Republican nominee for the US presidential election\u2014about the costs and risks associated with America\u2019s military commitments to Northeast Asia. His suggestion that Tokyo and Seoul might need to start protecting themselves, via proliferation if necessary,<\/span> contradict<\/span><\/a> half a century of US foreign policy. Trump\u2019s remarks saw some pundits<\/span> justifying<\/span><\/a> the value of those commitments and others<\/span> considering the merits<\/span><\/a> of his argument.<\/span><\/p>\n These developments call into question something often taken as \u2018fact\u2019: US extended nuclear deterrence to Northeast Asia. The extension of America\u2019s nuclear umbrella has previously deterred South Korea from pursuing its own nuclear capability and underpins Japan\u2019s non-nuclear stance. But the actions of North Korea and developments in the US have threatened to undermine the credibility of this deterrent. In Japan, we\u2019ve witnessed the head of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau<\/span> state<\/span><\/a> that the Japanese constitution doesn\u2019t necessarily ban the use of all kinds of nuclear weapons. Whilst there are a number of<\/span> normative<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> cultural<\/span><\/a> barriers to pursuing an actual nuclear capability in Japan, a US that walked away from the doctrine of extended nuclear deterrence would open the floodgates to a serious reconsideration of Japan\u2019s nuclear identity.<\/span><\/p>\n South Korea\u2019s an even more pressing case. Seoul has<\/span> pursued<\/span><\/a> a nuclear weapons program in the past\u2014in the mid-1970s under President Park Chung-hee\u2014but was eventually deterred by US pressure and assurances. After the DPRK\u2019s fourth nuclear test, however, conservatives in South Korea have been increasingly<\/span> vocal<\/span><\/a> about reconsidering the nuclear option. The former leader of the governing Saenuri Party, Chung Mong-joon, said that South Korea should consider<\/span> breaking away<\/span><\/a> from the<\/span> Non-Proliferation Treaty<\/span><\/a> (NPT) and highlighted the contradictions in its system which failed to prevent North Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons.<\/span><\/p>\n The NPT is the most widely adhered to multilateral disarmament agreement. It entered into force for a period of 25 years in 1970, was extended indefinitely in May 1995 and has a total of 190 parties. North Korea is the only country to have joined the NPT, withdrawn under<\/span> Article X<\/span><\/a>\u2014which allows parties the right to withdraw if its national interests are threatened\u2014and gone onto develop a nuclear capability. India, Pakistan and Israel currently sit outside the NPT and all have acquired nuclear weapons.<\/span><\/p>\n If the credibility of US extended deterrence is seriously undermined in Seoul or Tokyo, or let alone removed altogether, we would need to think much more seriously about the possibility of another state \u2018going nuclear\u2019. If that happened, the number of states with nuclear weapons outside the NPT will equal the number in it (five and five). And regardless of who the next proliferator might be, any new nuclear state could push others to follow. In Northeast Asia, a nuclear weapons program in South Korea might lead Japan and Taiwan to consider their options. What happens to the NPT when there are more nuclear weapon states outside than inside?<\/span><\/p>\n If we\u2019re going to start thinking seriously about the future of nuclear proliferation, we also need to start thinking about the future of the NPT. It\u2019s debatable whether the NPT (and the non-proliferation regime that supports it) can survive another country crossing the threshold; but it\u2019s hard to assume that such an event wouldn\u2019t seriously undermine its already cracked foundations. Still, cracked foundations might be better than none. Despite its<\/span> problems<\/span><\/a>, the regime codifies both a principle and an objective\u2014nuclear minimalism and eventual disarmament\u2014that the vast bulk of its signatories take seriously. Moreover, the NPT and its associated structures are important to ensuring the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the control of dual-use technologies and the safety and security of nuclear materials. Even in a more densely proliferated world, that\u2019s a set of principles, objectives and controls we shouldn\u2019t lightly throw aside.<\/span><\/p>\n Given the developments of the first few months of 2016, the grim truth is that we can no longer take the future of the global nuclear non-proliferation regime for granted. We can, however, explore where it can be strengthened\u2014and, maybe, what might come after.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" 2016 has so far been an interesting year for those of us with an eye on the world of nuclear politics and proliferation. To ring in the New Year, North Korea conducted its fourth nuclear …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":469,"featured_media":26593,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[206,116,423,85],"class_list":["post-26589","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-non-proliferation","tag-nuclear-deterrence","tag-nuclear-strategy","tag-nuclear-test"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n