{"id":26627,"date":"2016-05-17T06:00:58","date_gmt":"2016-05-16T20:00:58","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=26627"},"modified":"2016-05-16T14:02:24","modified_gmt":"2016-05-16T04:02:24","slug":"thinking-deeper-about-australias-offensive-cyber-capability","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/thinking-deeper-about-australias-offensive-cyber-capability\/","title":{"rendered":"Thinking deeper about Australia\u2019s offensive cyber capability"},"content":{"rendered":"
At the launch of Australia\u2019s new<\/span> Cyber Security Strategy<\/span><\/a> last month, the<\/span> Prime Minister confirmed<\/span><\/a> what many have been<\/span> guessing for years<\/span><\/a>: Australia possesses offensive cyber capabilities. The announcement, however, provided us with the barest of information about Australia\u2019s offensive cyber capability, and it remains largely unclear how its potential uses have been conceived by government and the national security community. Given the minimal discussion of Defence\u2019s approach to cyber capability in<\/span> the 2016 Defence White Paper<\/span><\/a>, it\u2019s unlikely that we\u2019ll see this information disclosed anytime soon.<\/span><\/p>\n What we do know is that Australia\u2019s offensive cyber capability provides an<\/span> additional option for government<\/span><\/a> when responding to serious cyber security incidents. We also know that it resides in the Australian Signals Directorate\u2014its natural home considering the Directorate\u2019s technical expertise\u2014and that it will only be used in accordance with stringent legal oversight and consistent with international law. The PM\u2019s announcement was carefully calibrated to clarify that Australia has a sophisticated capability at its disposal, but will exercise significant restraint in employing it.<\/span><\/p>\n Offensive cyber capabilities have<\/span> utility beyond<\/span><\/a> the responsive role outlined by the PM, but there\u2019s little detail of how that capability has been integrated into Defence\u2019s planning, operations and capability development processes. Its<\/span> exclusion from the Defence White Paper<\/span><\/a> was a glaring omission, and it\u2019s a shame that Defence and PM&C weren\u2019t able to better align the DWP and the Cyber Security Strategy. Publicly releasing a document that outlines Defence\u2019s thinking on Australia\u2019s cyber capability would grow the sophistication of Australia\u2019s cyber policy.<\/span><\/p>\n But what might be included in such a document? Given Australia\u2019s strong defence and intelligence<\/span> relationship with the US and the UK<\/span><\/a>, Australia should draw significantly on their experience to develop concepts and doctrine for offensive cyber operations, adapting them to our own unique requirements. The US and UK have already produced a<\/span> healthy public cache<\/span><\/a> on cyber operations, their use as a responsive capability and their potential to support conventional military operations. These documents give us some insight into how Australia may consider the development and use of its own offensive cyber capability.<\/span><\/p>\n US policy and doctrine characterises cyber operations as an instrument of power in broader conflict, as well as a response to cyber incidents, and seeks to integrate them seamlessly with conventional military operations. The<\/span> US National Military Strategy<\/span><\/a> characterises cyber operations primarily as a means to defend the US homeland, and defeat an adversary by projecting power across multiple domains. The Department of Defense\u2019s<\/span> Cyber Strategy<\/span><\/a> states that \u2018DoD must be able to provide integrated cyber capabilities to support military operations and contingency plans.\u2019 It goes on to note specific examples of cyber operations in support of this goal including disrupting an adversary\u2019s command and control networks, military-related critical infrastructure and weapons capabilities. US<\/span> doctrine on cyberspace operations<\/span><\/a> notes that cyber operations are most effective when integrated with other capabilities. The doctrine holds that commanders should seek to integrate \u2018cyberspace fires\u2019 with other capabilities to achieve their desired effects.<\/span><\/p>\n