![\"Image](\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/05\/6324061533_78acc5c684_z.jpg\" "\\"Image")
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Taiwan\u2019s new government already faces two major foreign policy challenges. The first is China\u2019s<\/span> disappointment<\/span><\/a> over President Tsai Ing-wen\u2019s inauguration speech last week. The second\u2014which has hardly been mentioned in the strategic debate\u2014is Taipei\u2019s position on the upcoming ruling of the<\/span> Permanent Court of Arbitration<\/span><\/a> (PCA) in the <\/span>Philippines versus China<\/span><\/i> case.<\/span><\/p>\n In April 2016, the government-linked Chinese (Taiwan) Society of International Law<\/span> submitted<\/span><\/a> evidence to the PCA, arguing that Itu Aba (Taiping), located in the Spratly Islands chain, is an island with the right to an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and that it belongs to Taiwan. Two days before Tsai\u2019s inauguration last week, Taiwan\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs<\/span> warned<\/span><\/a> that the Taiwanese government wouldn\u2019t accept the PCA ruling unless the five PCA arbitrators and the Philippines\u2019 representatives visit Itu Aba. Yet despite Taiwan\u2019s vested interest in the matter, its intervention in the arbitration could have an adverse effect on its strategic and political interests.<\/span><\/p>\n Itu Aba is the largest feature in the Spratlys. Taiwan has occupied the island since 1945 when it became <\/span>terra nullius <\/span><\/i>after Japan renounced its claims in the<\/span> Treaty of San Francisco<\/span><\/a> and the<\/span> Treaty of Taipei<\/span><\/a>. Taipei\u2019s claim dates back to 1947 when it published its<\/span> U-dash line<\/span><\/a>, strikingly similar to China\u2019s infamous<\/span> nine-dash line<\/span><\/a> covering almost the entire South China Sea.<\/span><\/p>\n The PCA will rule on two issues: first, it will decide which features in the Spratlys are a low-tide elevation (LTE), a rock or an island. That has implications for the range of nautical miles of territorial waters granted around the features\u2014EEZs can claim 200nm of territorial waters, rocks can claim 12nm, and LTEs can claim neither. Second, it will reach a verdict on the validity of the claims of China\u2019s nine-dash line\u2014that is, determining whether claims within a country\u2019s EEZ are enforceable. The court, in line with the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea, doesn\u2019t have any jurisdiction over sovereignty.<\/span><\/p>\n Arguably, Taiwan has the strongest claim to an EEZ within the disputed area. Taiping Island is dry land with \u2018<\/span>a weak water lens\u2019<\/span><\/a>\u2014meaning it has fresh water, and therefore potential for agriculture and permanent residency. Added to Taiwan\u2019s continuous presence, it\u2019s therefore the only feature in the Spratly island chain likely to be ruled an island and granted an EEZ. Taiping\u2019s EEZ could also include an additional 150nm under Article 7 of UNCLOS, due to the rights of the coastal state over the continental shelf. Currently, Taiping is also home to one of only two airstrips in the area long enough to accommodate larger aircraft. As<\/span> I<\/span><\/a> have previously written on <\/span>The Strategist<\/span><\/i>, Taiwan has increased military and economic investments on Taiping. This month it also completed a<\/span> US$100 million port upgra<\/span><\/a>de and the installation of a<\/span> new lighthouse<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n There are two key reasons Taiwan maintains an interest in Taiping: first, the geostrategic location supports its maritime awareness in the South China Sea. In the future, Taiping could serve as a base for Taiwan\u2019s upgraded P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Second, the island is critical to Taiwan\u2019s assertions as a sovereign state. Taiwan\u2019s <\/span>de facto <\/span><\/i>sovereignty is<\/span> under increasing pressure<\/span><\/a> from Beijing. Relinquishing its claim over Taiping would be a blow to Taiwan\u2019s national pride, erode its informal independent status and undermine its sense of security. Indeed, in her inauguration speech, Tsai<\/span> stated<\/span><\/a> that it was her \u2018responsibility to safeguard the sovereignty and territory of the Republic of China\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n However, Taiwan\u2019s claim in the South China Sea is a double-edged sword. Despite China challenging the PCA\u2019s jurisdiction and the Philippines\u2019 right to bring the case to court, China has backed Taiwan\u2019s submission. The reasons are obvious: Taipei\u2019s challenge to the Philippines implicitly supports Beijing\u2019s claims, and should China one day wrestle back control over Taiwan, Taiping and its EEZ would fall under Beijing\u2019s jurisdiction. China\u2019s control of its<\/span> \u2018near seas\u2019<\/span><\/a> would also complicate the ability of the US Navy to operate in the South China Sea.<\/span><\/p>\n Although Taiwan\u2019s political leadership has made it clear that its claim over Taiping is incompatible with that of China, its submission to the PCA could paradoxically benefit China and damage the new government\u2019s goal of increased engagement with ASEAN through its<\/span> ‘New Southbound policy’<\/span><\/a>. Moreover, while Taipei shouldn\u2019t relinquish Taiping, a PCA ruling in favor of the Philippines would strengthen the regional rules-based order underpinned by Washington and its allies. Taiwan\u2019s submission threatens to undermine that result. Consequently, Washington\u2019s de facto embassy in Taipei<\/span> called<\/span><\/a> former President Ma Ying-jeou\u2019s January 2016 visit to Taiping \u2018extremely unhelpful\u2019. The PCA process will also pressure Taiwan to<\/span> legally interpret<\/span><\/a> its own claim over Taiping, and thus its U-dash line, which would implicitly support China\u2019s own nine-dash line due to the historical contest over Taiwan\u2019s independence. At the end of the day Taiwan might have best secured its interests in maritime Asia by keeping quiet.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Taiwan\u2019s new government already faces two major foreign policy challenges. The first is China\u2019s disappointment over President Tsai Ing-wen\u2019s inauguration speech last week. The second\u2014which has hardly been mentioned in the strategic debate\u2014is Taipei\u2019s position …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":159,"featured_media":26745,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,471,392],"class_list":["post-26744","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-south-china-sea","tag-taiwan"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n