{"id":26836,"date":"2016-05-27T10:00:22","date_gmt":"2016-05-27T00:00:22","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=26836"},"modified":"2016-05-27T09:44:47","modified_gmt":"2016-05-26T23:44:47","slug":"reconciling-sykes-picot","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/reconciling-sykes-picot\/","title":{"rendered":"Reconciling with Sykes-Picot"},"content":{"rendered":"
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This month marks the centenary of the Sykes-Picot Agreement, the secret British-French accord that launched a decade-long series of adjustments to the borders of the post-Ottoman Middle East. Most commentary on the anniversary has been negative, suggesting that the agreement bears considerable blame for the frequency and durability of the region\u2019s conflicts.<\/span><\/p>\n
That interpretation, however, borders on caricature. Mark Sykes and Fran\u00e7ois Georges-Picot aimed to devise a plan that would enable Great Britain and France to avoid a ruinous rivalry in the Middle East. They largely succeeded: Their design kept the region from coming between the two European powers, and it managed to survive for a century.<\/span><\/p>\n
To be sure, many of the Sykes-Picot borders reflected deals cut in Europe rather than local demographic or historical realities. But that hardly makes the Middle East unique: Most borders around the world owe their legacy less to thoughtful design or popular choice than to some mixture of violence, ambition, geography, and chance.<\/span><\/p>\n