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After months of campaigning, business mogul turned celebrity politician Donald Trump and former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have<\/span> clinched<\/span><\/a> the number of delegates needed to win their respective parties\u2019 nomination for the US presidency. With the nominees all but confirmed, global attention is now turning to the policies that will define a Clinton or a Trump presidency. Of particular interest is what will become of President Obama\u2019s policy legacies, including the<\/span> US rebalance to the Asia\u2013Pacific<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n The US \u2018pivot\u2019, later<\/span> relabelled<\/span><\/a> rebalance to avoid the negative implication that the US might avoid its responsibilities elsewhere, acknowledged the increasing importance of the Asia\u2013Pacific and signalled a new era of security policies focusing on US engagement with the region. Through diplomacy, military cooperation and stronger economic ties, it aimed to cement a broad balance of power that would allow the US to maintain and expand an inclusive and rules-based regional order.<\/span><\/p>\n Of the two, Clinton appears more inclined to continue the rebalance. During her time as Secretary of State, Clinton played a pivotal role in the creation and implementation of the policy shift, going so far as to<\/span> declare<\/span><\/a> \u2018America\u2019s Pacific Century\u2019 in 2011. During her four-year tenure, she made<\/span> 62 visits<\/span><\/a> to 26 Asia\u2013Pacific countries<\/span>\u2014<\/span>including her<\/span> well-publicised \u2018listening tour\u2019<\/span><\/a> of Japan, China, Indonesia and South Korea in February 2009<\/span>\u2014<\/span>pushing for enhanced diplomatic and economic ties with regional partners. Given her long history of diplomatic engagement in the region, Asia\u2013Pacific leaders will<\/span> likely be assured<\/span><\/a> that Clinton\u2019s personal commitment to the region will continue during her presidency.<\/span><\/p>\n As a product of the traditional Washington foreign policy establishment, Clinton is an<\/span> avid believer<\/span><\/a> that the US should maintain its position as the leader of world affairs. That view, combining humanitarianism with a hard-line willingness to use coercive force when necessary, will likely see her strengthen America\u2019s traditional and burgeoning partnerships in the Asia\u2013Pacific. On China, Clinton is widely<\/span> expected to be more assertive<\/span><\/a> than her predecessor and<\/span> apply greater pressure<\/span><\/a> on Beijing over maritime issues and its assertive behaviour in the region.<\/span><\/p>\n Clinton\u2019s position on the rebalance is markedly less clear from an economic perspective, compared with her position on diplomacy. Her view of the<\/span> Trans-Pacific Partnership<\/span><\/a> (TPP), considered by many to be a cornerstone of the rebalance, has changed significantly since she announced her presidential ambitions. Having slated the TPP as the gold standard in trade deals in 2012, she has since<\/span> voiced her disappointment<\/span><\/a> at the final deal, because it didn\u2019t meet her standard of guaranteeing more jobs and better wages for Americans.<\/span><\/p>\n Given the Democrats\u2019 middle-class voter base, that position during an election campaign isn\u2019t surprising. It\u2019ll be of interest to see if that position evolves if she\u2019s successful in November. Clinton hasn\u2019t detailed whether she\u2019d seek to renegotiate with the 11 other TPP nations as president, however, a foreign policy advisor has<\/span> suggested<\/span><\/a> that Clinton still supports the goals of the TPP that advance US interests in the region. While it would remain up to Congress to ratify any deal, this seems to suggest that the opening of trade links with partners in the Asia\u2013Pacific would be on Clinton\u2019s agenda in 2017.<\/span><\/p>\n The potential of a President Trump raises far more questions for the future of the rebalance. His<\/span> \u2018America First\u2019<\/span><\/a> strategy features a myriad of ideas that don\u2019t fall into any established foreign policy camp, or indeed appear to follow clear lines of reasoning. His nationalist isolationist tendencies, however, are a cause of deep concern for those in favour of the rebalance.<\/span><\/p>\n Trump\u2019s view of the US alliance structure within the Asia\u2013Pacific is at clear odds with the nature of the rebalance. He\u2019s previously<\/span> suggested<\/span><\/a> a withdrawal of US troops from Japan and South Korea,<\/span>\u00a0imply<\/span><\/a>ing that the US gets nothing from the US\u2013Korea alliance. On issues of the South China Sea, he has displayed an almost deliberate lack of interest in increasing the US military presence in the region. He has also derided engagement with the region\u2019s maturing multilateral institutions,<\/span> commenting<\/span><\/a> that he was \u2018sceptical of international unions that tie us up and bring America down\u2019. With those remarks, Trump could not only threaten the success of the rebalance, but also undermine the core principles of modern-day US strategic policy.<\/span><\/p>\n On relations with China, Trump appears singularly focused on economic issues, with the<\/span> constant affirmation<\/span><\/a> of a \u2018strong and smart America\u2019 that doesn\u2019t let China take advantage of it. In an attempt to boost the US manufacturing industry, he has<\/span> declared<\/span><\/a> China a currency manipulator,<\/span> proposed<\/span><\/a> a 45% tax on Chinese imports \u2018if they don\u2019t behave\u2019 and<\/span> called<\/span><\/a> for an end to Chinese export subsidies.<\/span><\/p>\n The TPP therefore seems doomed to fail under Trump. He has voiced dissatisfaction with the TPP,<\/span> labelling<\/span><\/a> it a \u2018horrible deal\u2019 that will \u2018lead to nothing but trouble\u2019 for Americans. Given that it\u2019s<\/span> commonly believed<\/span><\/a> the TTP was designed with the intention to exclude China and prevent it from benefiting from the preferable market access members will enjoy, this steadfast opposition seems contrary to his goals of restricting Chinese growth and indeed the traditional trade inclination of the Republican Party.<\/span><\/p>\n