{"id":27101,"date":"2016-06-15T10:00:19","date_gmt":"2016-06-15T00:00:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=27101"},"modified":"2016-06-10T11:53:30","modified_gmt":"2016-06-10T01:53:30","slug":"indonesias-2015-defence-white-paper","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/indonesias-2015-defence-white-paper\/","title":{"rendered":"Indonesia\u2019s 2015 Defence White Paper"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Image<\/p>\n

Indonesia\u2019s latest Defence White Paper was issued in November last year and<\/span> was publically released on 31 May<\/span><\/a>. It supersedes the 2008 White Paper. Although a replacement paper was produced in the dying days of the Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono presidency, ultimately, it wasn\u2019t adopted by the Jokowi government.<\/span><\/p>\n

White papers can be an integral part of the defence planning process or they can be little more than public relations and propaganda. The latest Indonesian paper is a cosmetic addition to a defence planning process that\u2019s independent of the White Paper and remains largely opaque. The Paper describes the planning process but gives few clues about how Indonesia links threat assessments with defence policy, doctrine, strategy and resource constraints to produce the most effective and efficient force it can afford.<\/span><\/p>\n

That\u2019s driven by a concern for security and by the fact that it isn\u2019t just a defence white paper\u2014it\u2019s also a national security paper outlining the responsibilities of all arms of government for defence and security more generally.<\/span><\/p>\n

Nevertheless, if you\u2019re looking for confirmation of Indonesia\u2019s foreign and defence policy, its threat assessments, its international partnerships and its general priorities for the future, you\u2019ll gain some comfort from this 130-page process\u2014rather than outcome\u2014oriented document.<\/span><\/p>\n

Threat perceptions remain holistic here and elsewhere, covering the spectrum from juvenile delinquency and the LBGT community to terrorism and WWIII. Threats are classified as military, non-military or hybrid and further subdivided into known and not yet known threats with priority given to the former.<\/span><\/p>\n

A serious external threat is deemed by Indonesia to be unlikely and the known threats are primarily domestic including terrorism and radicalism, separatism, revolt, natural disasters, border violations, piracy, theft of natural resources, pandemics, cyber warfare, espionage, and narcotics. Most of those are the first priority of other arms or agencies of government and provide little guidance for determining force structures or dispositions.<\/span><\/p>\n

There\u2019s been no fundamental change in Indonesia\u2019s defence policy. It adheres to the historic non-aligned no alliances policy and its continuing support for the United Nations. Indonesia\u2019s neighbours are reassured that it has no aggressive intent and seeks peaceful solutions to outstanding problems related to the definition of borders and other cross border tensions. The White Paper lists the contestants in the South China Sea conflict\u2014not including Indonesia\u2014and calls for a peaceful solution while simultaneously nominating the development of its bases in the Natuna Islands as a priority.<\/span><\/p>\n

The White Paper advocates global partnerships to create the \u2018dynamic equilibrium\u2019 promoted by SBY to form the conditions in which no one nation dominates the region. In the absence of alliances, this is to be achieved though the development of partnerships embracing all the major regional players. That\u2019s illustrated by the classification of both China and the US as strategic partners followed by the lesser lights. But just to be safe, Indonesia\u2019s maritime forces will be strengthened to secure Jokowi\u2019s Global Maritime Axis that would see Indonesia become a major production and shipping hub on the maritime cross roads of the Indian and Pacific oceans.<\/span><\/p>\n

Indonesia can\u2019t compete with other major regional powers so the White Paper retains a total people\u2019s war policy and strategy that would see the whole human and material resources of the nation mobilised to deal with internal and external threats. That in turn normalises its concern and involvement in policy matters outside the remit of defence in a democracy.<\/span><\/p>\n

Future plans seek qualitative improvements in defence capability without any addition to its current force of about 435,000 uniformed personnel. That will be based on three defence areas covering the three major maritime approaches to Indonesia from the north, including joint command and control of allotted forces and the army\u2019s territorial commands. The army\u2019s territorial commands remain the last ditch of defence and its political and internal security infrastructure. Defence industry will also be boosted to include funding the building of more ships, submarines, aircraft, and armoured vehicles, and the production of consumables.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Paper is deeply concerned with creating the responsible citizen, a concern stemming from the fear of terrorism and radicalism that might gain enough support to cause internal strife that would undermine the economy or even overturn the historic compromises enshrined in the preamble to the constitution, commonly known as the Pancasila. Consequently, the Paper outlines the program begun last year to indoctrinate 100 million citizens over the next ten years as well as incorporating it in educational curricula and professional training courses.<\/span><\/p>\n

In a dig at the last government, leading its agenda of defence priorities is the Paper\u2019s declared support for the government\u2019s election pledge to reassert the responsibility of the state in protecting all citizens; creating clean, effective, and respected democratic government; and creating a strong state through the reform of the justice sector.<\/span><\/p>\n

The inclusion of such matters in the Paper is a reminder that security sector reform, as distinct from military reform, stopped in Indonesia in 2004 and hasn\u2019t progressed much since because the executive and parliament lack the confidence to carry it to completion and\/or find that having the TNI on tap remains politically expedient and convenient. It demonstrates a lack of confidence in the people and the competence and capacity of the relevant institutions and agencies, especially in the justice sector, to perform their functions effectively. Some of those concerns are justified and need serious attention but they\u2019re also self-serving.<\/span><\/p>\n

Like white papers around the world, it laments that the government hasn\u2019t lived up to its past spending commitments. It seeks defence spending of 1% of GDP now, with undefined increases over the next ten years, to achieve the \u2018minimum effective force\u2019. The paper doesn\u2019t discuss what \u2018minimum\u2019 or \u2018effective\u2019 means. The only specific capabilities mentioned are the use of satellites and drones to support maritime security.<\/span><\/p>\n

The Paper does little to convince Indonesians of the purpose and composition of their future defence forces or to justify the money that has to be spent on them. However, it does reassure neighbouring countries of Indonesia\u2019s benign intent.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Indonesia\u2019s latest Defence White Paper was issued in November last year and was publically released on 31 May. It supersedes the 2008 White Paper. 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