{"id":27159,"date":"2016-06-16T06:00:06","date_gmt":"2016-06-15T20:00:06","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=27159"},"modified":"2016-06-15T17:39:27","modified_gmt":"2016-06-15T07:39:27","slug":"newzealand-wolf-in-sheeps-clothing","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/newzealand-wolf-in-sheeps-clothing\/","title":{"rendered":"A New Zealand wolf in sheep\u2019s clothing"},"content":{"rendered":"
It\u2019s funny how the same document can be perceived so differently. In his demolition job on New Zealand\u2019s latest<\/span> Defence White Paper<\/span><\/a>, Peter Jennings sees Wellington plumbing \u2018<\/span>new depths of vacuity<\/span><\/a>\u2019 in its \u2018desperation to say nothing offensive to outsiders\u2019. This includes, he asserts, a reluctance \u2018to say that Chinese assertiveness is undermining security\u2019 in the South China Sea.<\/span><\/p>\n But those aware of Wellington\u2019s increasing willingness to comment on South China Sea matters will see in the White Paper a formalization of positions that have already<\/span> complicated the Key government\u2019s relationship with Beijing<\/span><\/a>. Those positions include a statement designed specifically for China regarding the international tribunal case launched by the Philippines:<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018New Zealand supports the rights of states to seek recourse to international dispute settlement\u2026It is important that all states respect the final outcomes of such processes.\u2019 <\/span><\/p><\/blockquote>\n Nobody in their right mind would expect New Zealand to have matched the Australian White Paper\u2019s depiction of China as a serial challenger to international rules in Asia (<\/span>which I explore elsewhere<\/span><\/a>). And Wellington\u2019s treatment of China as an \u2018important strategic partner\u2019 has a higher profile in its White Paper.<\/span><\/p>\n But Beijing, Washington and Canberra will have noticed New Zealand\u2019s enthusiastic reference to Japan as a country \u2018with common democratic values and a shared commitment to maintaining regional peace and security\u2019 and the endorsement of \u2018Japan\u2019s recent moves to make a more proactive contribution to international security\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n Similarly, while Peter detects \u2018no expression of Wellington\u2019s willingness to exercise freedom of navigation or overflight rights\u2019 in the South China Sea, a careful reader will spot the White Paper\u2019s assertion that New Zealand\u2019s Defence Force \u2018makes an important contribution to international efforts towards freedom of navigation\u2019 including \u2018maritime surveillance in the South Pacific and South East Asia\u2019. Match that with<\/span> recent comments<\/span><\/a> by Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee about the role of New Zealand\u2019s P3 Orions and Wellington isn\u2019t keeping as quiet on those matters as Peter wants to make us think.<\/span><\/p>\n I also wonder if Peter has misread New Zealand\u2019s strengthened focus on Antarctica and the southern oceans \u2018as a useful secondary task, but nothing more than that.\u2019 The reader of a<\/span> very thoughtful piece<\/span><\/a> by David Capie might conclude that Antarctica + New Zealand\u2019s vast EEZ + the South Pacific could be just the combination to cement cross-partisan political support for significant defence investment. After all, the report from the<\/span> public submission process<\/span><\/a> reveals particular concern \u2018about New Zealand\u2019s ability to protect and monitor its vast Exclusive Economic Zone, and other strategic areas of interest like the Ross Dependency.\u2019<\/span><\/p>\n That takes us to capabilities. Peter is on firmer ground in asking for more specifics on what NZ$20 billion of capital investment will purchase New Zealand. Like him, I\u2019m very keen to see what the forthcoming Defence Capability Plan says (and what it doesn\u2019t say). But the big point is that this money buys New Zealand planners some flexibility. It was big news at the end of 2013, as<\/span> I explained<\/span><\/a> over two years ago in these pages, when the Key government injected extra money into defence as part of its Mid-Term Review. This capital commitment is even bigger news still.<\/span><\/p>\n What the promise of extra cash doesn\u2019t buy New Zealand is extra time. The White Paper notes that the Ministry of Defence has been expanded to \u2018deliver\u2019 on the replacements for the Hercules, the Orions and the frigates. And as I have argued in<\/span> a New Zealand newspaper<\/span><\/a>, by the time the next White Paper is out in five or six years time, the decision points on at least one of these major capabilities will have passed.<\/span><\/p>\n But even here things aren\u2019t as bleak as Peter\u2019s cherry-picked quotations suggest. As for airlift, the most urgent priority, the Key government is giving the impression it wants to look at options with greater capacity and range than the present combination of the C130s and 757s allows. On surveillance, the White Paper does more than Peter claims. Comments on the current<\/span> upgrading of the Orions<\/span><\/a>, including for \u2018underwater surveillance, reconnaissance and intelligence\u2019, (the first of these words, especially telling), are clearly intended by the White Paper\u2019s drafters as a sign of further things to come.<\/span><\/p>\n That leaves the frigates as the third and last of the major replacements. There is a certain vagueness in the statement that \u2018Work on options for the replacement of the frigates will begin well before they reach the end of their service life in the 2020s\u2019. To what extent that might mean New Zealand\u2019s involvement in Australia\u2019s future frigates will depend partly on whether the latter are of a size and expense that works for Wellington.<\/span><\/p>\n But having such a capability in general terms is <\/span>not <\/span><\/i>optional for the Key Government. The White Paper establishes as a requirement for the defence force \u2018naval combat and air-surveillance capabilities to secure sea lines of communication, conduct counter-piracy and sea control operations within a coalition\u2019. And it connects these capabilities to New Zealand\u2019s requirement to meet its \u2018commitment to Australia\u2019 and \u2018make a credible contribution in support of peace and security in the Asia-Pacific region\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n How future New Zealand governments reconcile this wider ambition well beyond the South Pacific with a clearer local focus remains to be seen. That tension will deserve continuing attention. But the big news for Australia is that its neighbour across the Tasman is more ambitious about its defence force than it has been for several decades. There\u2019s a wolf in that sheep\u2019s clothi<\/span>ng.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" It\u2019s funny how the same document can be perceived so differently. In his demolition job on New Zealand\u2019s latest Defence White Paper, Peter Jennings sees Wellington plumbing \u2018new depths of vacuity\u2019 in its \u2018desperation to …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":25,"featured_media":27178,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[606,73,369],"class_list":["post-27159","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-defence-white-paper","tag-new-zealand","tag-nzdf"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n