{"id":27253,"date":"2016-06-24T06:00:19","date_gmt":"2016-06-23T20:00:19","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=27253"},"modified":"2016-06-21T16:14:46","modified_gmt":"2016-06-21T06:14:46","slug":"alliance-management-spending-strategy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/alliance-management-spending-strategy\/","title":{"rendered":"Alliance management: spending as strategy"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
\u2018<\/b>If you aren\u2019t talking dollars, you aren\u2019t talking strategy.\u2019<\/span><\/i> While that well-known Arthur Tange saying is often used in the context of defence budgets, it can also be applied to alliance management.<\/span><\/p>\n One of the most interesting takeaways from Peter Chalk\u2019s fine new ASPI report on<\/span> the US \u2018rebalance within the rebalance\u2019 to Southeast Asia<\/span><\/a>, was the increased size of US Foreign Military Financing. At the 2014 Shangri-La Dialogue, then-Defence Secretary Chuck Hagel<\/span> announced the US would increase<\/span><\/a> financing by 35%. As Chalk details, November 2015 saw the US announce a $140 million package for Southeast Asia, with allies such as the Philippines getting additional funds for maritime domain awareness and the construction of training and logistic bases.<\/span><\/p>\n Simply giving money to allies is never a popular strategy, and in an era of Donald Trump demanding that \u2018<\/span>the countries we defend must pay for the cost of this defence<\/span><\/a>\u2018, it\u2019s an even tougher sell. Still, the point at which the Obama Administration\u2019s \u2018Deep Engagement\u2019 philosophy and counter \u2018Offshore Balancing\u2019 clearly converge is building up the capacity and strength of US allies and partners. The easiest and possibly most effective way to do that is simply to give them cash.<\/span><\/p>\n There are plenty of precedents for such a policy. Financing the weaker side was a fundamental part of England\u2019s balance of power strategy over the 17th and 18th centuries\u2014for instance, supporting the Grand Alliance against France in the 1680s. Likewise the US spent 17% of its total costs in World War Two helping Russia, the UK and other allies through the Lend Lease program.<\/span><\/p>\n In both cases that approach was partly taken because of the challenges of supplying forces to remote theatres. Yet it also stemmed from a recognition that sometimes those on the ground know their own needs better than outsiders do.<\/span><\/p>\n Indeed, many<\/span> foreign aid<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> domestic welfare<\/span><\/a> workers are increasingly coming to the same conclusion. At its heart, poverty stems from a lack of money. Though we all remember the \u2018teach a man to fish\u2019 parable, sometimes it\u2019s better to just give others resources and let them decide how to use them. Inevitably that will lead to some moral hazard problems and waste or corruption. But what\u2019s the point of spending decades trying to improve the quality of Asia\u2019s militaries if their small size will be the central problem in a future conflict?<\/span><\/p>\n To do that properly, the US would have to substantially increase the Foreign Military Funding it makes available. But it wouldn\u2019t need to be endless. Power is of course relative, and there\u2019s no way the US can fund its own $600 billion defence budget, as well as bring the rest of the region up to anywhere near China\u2019s $200 billion defence budget.<\/span><\/p>\n But the US doesn\u2019t need to do that. Countries either can or can\u2019t have strong surveillance of their territory and landmass. Countries either can or can\u2019t provide ready response forces to immediate crisis situations. Countries either can or can\u2019t resupply troops they\u2019ve located on the remote edges of their territory\u2014<\/span>or in contested environments.<\/span><\/a> As Israel\u2019s experience shows, moderate consistent support from outsiders can help countries build viable defence industries and establish substantial military capacity.<\/span><\/p>\n While many have worried about crowded sea lanes in Asia, it\u2019s still remarkable how few craft most nations have.<\/span> When it comes to large combatants<\/span><\/a> (frigate-sized or larger), Indonesia has nine large combatant ships. The Philippines has five, Malaysia four and Vietnam just two. For small, Corvette-sized combatants, Indonesia has 26, Vietnam 24, the Philippines nine and Malaysia seven. Compare that to China\u2019s 79 large combatants and 107 small combatants. Or China\u2019s 64 submarines, versus Vietnam\u2019s three.<\/span><\/p>\n Building up those forces won\u2019t solve everything. As Nick Bisley<\/span> rightly points out<\/span><\/a>, the US\u2013China clash is ultimately a political dispute about rules, order and influence in Asia. Most of the day-to-day changes which obsess us are peripheral to solving those dilemmas.<\/span><\/p>\n But the stronger Asia is at managing its own affairs, the less politically sensitive the US and allies will be about China trying to create some elbow room. A region where countries have some comfort in their basic protection will be far less worried about slippery-slope arguments about territorial change. That still leaves perplexing identity, history and resource issues, but it does help allay some of the more fundamental concerns.<\/span><\/p>\n Perhaps the strongest reason why the US isn\u2019t going to lose its global position in the hierarchy is because of the strength of its economy. It\u2019s time to put that strength to greater work on behalf of US interests.<\/span> The TPP is part of the story<\/span><\/a>, but it won\u2019t do it alone. The simplest answer may also be the most direct. If the US wants to help Asia get stronger, if it wants allies who can do more on their own, then maybe the simplest answer is to show them the money.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" \u2018If you aren\u2019t talking dollars, you aren\u2019t talking strategy.\u2019 While that well-known Arthur Tange saying is often used in the context of defence budgets, it can also be applied to alliance management. One of the …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":36,"featured_media":27256,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[40,143,52,786,31],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n