{"id":27372,"date":"2016-06-28T11:00:52","date_gmt":"2016-06-28T01:00:52","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=27372"},"modified":"2016-06-28T11:13:40","modified_gmt":"2016-06-28T01:13:40","slug":"anzus-trumpland-seen-coming","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/anzus-trumpland-seen-coming\/","title":{"rendered":"ANZUS in Trumpland\u2014should we have seen it coming?"},"content":{"rendered":"
Andrew Davies\u2019<\/span> recent post<\/span><\/a> on the possibility of Donald Trump as US President presents an interesting alternative future that could cause a fundamental rewrite of our defence plans. In concluding, he noted<\/span> Andrew Carr\u2019s concerns<\/span><\/a> that the lack of deep thinking about such<\/span> potential black swan<\/span><\/a> events suggests our defence thinking is trapped within strongly institutionalised boundaries. There’s much truth in that, but first let’s unpack the matter.<\/span><\/p>\n Alternative futures are useful: the future starts here and spreads out into the<\/span> future cone<\/span><\/a> that most will be familiar with. You just need to decide what aspects of the range of possible futures form the left and right of arc for planning purposes.<\/span><\/p>\n The<\/span> Shell Oil Company<\/span><\/a> was a major early player in the field, and is credited with foreseeing, in the early 1980s, that<\/span> a seismic change<\/span><\/a> was coming in the Soviet Union. The alternative futures method gave Shell an inkling that something was up, while the vast intelligence agencies of the Western defence establishment missed it because the defence agencies dealt in what was <\/span>expected<\/span><\/i> to happen not what <\/span>might<\/span><\/i> happen.<\/span><\/p>\n The Trump phenomenon isn’t unexpected either. Not Trump personally\u2014albeit<\/span> Shell was tracking Gorbachev<\/span><\/a> before the CIA\u2014but rather the broader issues and deeper trend lines that underpin his worldview and its popularity with significant portions of the American public. I’ll claim a little credit here. Way back in 2004, I devised an<\/span> alternative future based on two axes<\/span><\/a>: America being deeply involved in the world or not, and globalisation deepening or not. There were reasons for that choice however, to cut to the chase, those two variables can also be found in a close reading of Hugh White’s<\/span> 2000 Defence White Paper<\/span><\/a> (PDF). Take a bow Hugh, but this also shows those were well-known variables even back then.<\/span><\/p>\n If you use those two variables as drivers you end up with an alternate future chart like this<\/a>\u00a0(see link for larger version):<\/span><\/p>\n If you haven\u2019t used these diagrams before, take a minute to understand what it’s telling you. There are four broad possible worlds described in the diagram. There’s no attempt to assign likelihoods, but they allow us to explore the differences between them. \u00a0(I haven\u2019t changed the words since its 2004 airing hence there are some anachronisms i.e. G7 might be the G20 now).<\/span><\/p>\n In the diagram, I’ve estimated where Trump\u2019s policies fall (red star) and where Hillary Clinton\u2019s policies fall (blue star).<\/span> Andrew Davies’ discussion of<\/span><\/a> alliance abandonment, nuclear proliferation, trade wars with China and putting \u2018America First\u2019 explains why Trump\u2019s star is situated where it is. In that world we might indeed find ourselves \u2018Home Alone\u2019\u2014with all the opportunities and worries that presents. The various issues noted in the diagram might be found in a Trump world, though not necessarily simultaneously. Even so, we can get a feeling for the overall ambience and texture of such a possible time.<\/span><\/p>\n Clinton\u2019s polices aren\u2019t without concerns, especially with her apparent conversion to oppose the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership. While the rebalance to the Pacific may continue and a tougher line be taken overall, globalisation may also be under threat in a future Clinton world. \u00a0The recent Brexit vote perhaps confirms this opposition to globalisation is more than just American. \u00a0The \u2018Cold War Redux\u2019 world retains a deeply engaged America but it\u2019s not all good news for us. Regardless who becomes President we mightn’t get today\u2019s world, as the two Andrews imply is the position the 2016 Defence White Paper assumes, but a different, unexpected one. <\/span><\/p>\n How would our new 20-year defence acquisition plans fare in either of the two worlds we might be on track for? The point of alternative futures for defence planning is that the force structure should be useful in whichever future emerges. Force structure isn’t based on the future you expect or wish for, but on the range of futures you think possible. The art is to invest across all possible worlds, rather than over or under-investing in any one future. The table below\u2014<\/span>derived from the earlier diagram<\/span><\/a>\u2014shows a balanced investment approach.<\/span><\/p>\n