![\"Image](\"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2016\/07\/9554661504_0a98ec7fcb_z.jpg\" "\\"Image")
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Recent tumultuous political events\u2014including Australia\u2019s election\u2014seem likely to produce a troubling set of strategic consequences. Some of those consequences will be reflected in the strategic policies of key individual Western states. But they\u2019re also likely to be reflected in a broader sense, as part of the pattern of shifting weights and balances in global politics\u2014where we\u2019re likely to see a diminishing role for the Anglosphere in shaping strategic outcomes.<\/span><\/p>\n The Anglosphere is typically seen as a select group of countries: the US, the UK, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and\u2014sometimes\u2014Ireland. The group falls naturally into three geographic pairs, and in each pairing there\u2019s one extroverted strategic player (the US, Britain and Australia) and another less extroverted one (Canada, Ireland, New Zealand). Collectively, the group exercises an influence on international relations disproportionate to its small size.<\/span><\/p>\n Quite suddenly, though, an important question has arisen about the prospective future role of the Anglosphere. As anyone can now see, there\u2019s a problem. The three most extroverted players are all\u2014to a greater or lesser degree\u2014turning inward.<\/span><\/p>\n \u2018America first\u2019 is now the dominant theme in US politics, and\u2014with the Washington Metro broken and the US middle class resentful over its declining fortunes\u2014it seems likely that even a Clinton presidency might involve a step away from continuing global engagement rather than a step back towards it. A Trump presidency might easily result in Washington taking rather more than one step away.<\/span><\/p>\n Across the Atlantic, the UK is wrestling with life after deciding to leave the European Union. That\u2019s no small task. For the better part of a decade, British political leaders are likely to be absorbed in the all-encompassing task of \u2018reinventing\u2019 Britain. In short, the national enterprise is likely to trump (no pun intended) the regional or global one. It seems that the UK\u2014traditionally an active security contributor in many parts of the world\u2014will be playing a smaller role in coming years. Apart from activities deemed essential to national reinvention, foreign and strategic issues seem likely to receive fewer resources and less leadership attention.<\/span><\/p>\n And so we come to the third extroverted member of the Anglosphere\u2014Australia itself. After its election on 2 July, the outcome of which remains uncertain, we might well be staring down the barrel of a more hesitant Australia in regional and global affairs. Regardless of whether we end up with a minority government or a government clinging to a bare majority in the House of Representatives, the political climate is unlikely to be one to support a particularly venturesome strategic policy. That\u2019s somewhat ironic given the theoretical boldness of the most recent Defence White Paper\u2014the key internal policy parameters of which must surely be in doubt in the new post-election world.<\/span><\/p>\n The ruling on the South China Sea by the International Court of Arbitration, for example, seems likely to be issued (on 12 July) while Australia\u2019s still enjoying a period of caretaker government. And grander objectives that Canberra had been keen to explore\u2014including the question of whether the time is now ripe for a new, more action-oriented security structure in Southeast Asia\u2014seem more likely to wither than to flower.<\/span><\/p>\n True, there are a couple of questionable assumptions contained in the reasoning outlined above. Even a US standing a little further back from the world, for example, will remain a strong force for good. Even a Britain out of the European Union will remain a Britain inside of NATO. And even a minority Australian government could rely upon a tradition of bipartisanship\u2014at least amongst the two major parties\u2014to ensure the wheels didn\u2019t completely fall off its foreign and defence policy.<\/span><\/p>\n The argument, though, is over a difference of degree rather than a difference of kind. If we are facing a future where the US is stepping back from the international role it has played since World War 2, where Britain\u2019s absorbed in a project of national reinvention, and where Australia\u2019s more fixated upon domestic issues and politics, then we should expect strategic consequences to follow. In short, Western influence in the world is likely to be receding at a critical time in international affairs\u2014when the world stands at a new inflection point, and the old strategic verities are fading. Critics of the Anglosphere mightn\u2019t have liked it, but I suspect they\u2019ll rue the waning of its influence.<\/span><\/p>\n Is there a cure for introversion? Possibly. All three countries might be forced back into more extroverted roles by a major international crisis. On the other hand, I suspect they\u2019re not going to be dragged back into their traditional roles by a set of troubles that creep in on little cat feet.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Recent tumultuous political events\u2014including Australia\u2019s election\u2014seem likely to produce a troubling set of strategic consequences. Some of those consequences will be reflected in the strategic policies of key individual Western states. But they\u2019re also likely …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":27547,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[519,1631,1428,25],"class_list":["post-27546","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-anglosphere","tag-brexit","tag-donald-trump","tag-southeast-asia"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n