{"id":27688,"date":"2016-07-14T14:30:33","date_gmt":"2016-07-14T04:30:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=27688"},"modified":"2016-07-14T10:37:02","modified_gmt":"2016-07-14T00:37:02","slug":"breathtaking-counterproductive-south-china-sea-arbitration-award","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/breathtaking-counterproductive-south-china-sea-arbitration-award\/","title":{"rendered":"Breathtaking but counterproductive: the South China Sea arbitration award"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
Anthony Bergin wrote here on <\/span>The Strategist <\/span><\/i>that The Hague award in <\/span>The Philippines v China<\/span><\/i> arbitration case is<\/span> a heavy defeat<\/span><\/a> for Beijing. The award is breathtaking in its overwhelming support for the Philippines\u2019s position, and comes as a surprise to many seasoned international maritime law experts. I\u2019ll just raise two such surprises.<\/span><\/p>\n First, although many<\/span> experts<\/span><\/a> expected the Tribunal to make general statements on China\u2019s so-called \u2018nine-dash line\u2019, few predicted a straightforward verdict declaring the line invalid when it comes to China\u2019s historical rights to resources.<\/span><\/p>\n Second, although<\/span> many<\/span><\/a> expected the Tribunal to rule on the status of some of the maritime features in the Spratly Islands, very few believed that Itu Aba (Taiping Island), the largest naturally formed feature in the South China Sea, would be ruled as a mere \u2018rock\u2019 rather than a fully-fledged \u2018island.\u2019 An \u2018island\u2019 is entitled to a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea, a 200-nautical-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and a continental shelf; a \u2018rock\u2019 only gets a territorial sea.<\/span><\/p>\n Of those two decisions, the ruling on the status of features is the more controversial in legal terms and also more consequential in terms of the political and diplomatic fallout. A significant part of the<\/span> international opinion<\/span><\/a> considers Itu Aba an\u2018island,\u2019 contrary to the Tribunal\u2019s judgment. No wonder the new pro-independence government in Taiwan categorically<\/span> rejected<\/span><\/a> the award, forging a truly rare agreement between Taipei and Beijing on an issue of such great importance. The Tribunal\u2019s rule on Itu Aba is careless and debatable to say the least.<\/span><\/p>\n Beijing made five immediate releases following the award: a Foreign Ministry<\/span> statement<\/span><\/a> about its position on the award;<\/span> remarks<\/span><\/a> by Foreign Minster Wang Yi on the award;<\/span> remarks<\/span><\/a> by People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC) President Xi Jinping on the award; a PRC government<\/span> statement<\/span><\/a> about China\u2019s territorial sovereignty and maritime rights in the South China Sea; and<\/span> a State Council white paper<\/span><\/a> on settling the disputes with the Philippines through negotiation: the PRC\u2019s first white paper on the South China Sea.<\/span><\/p>\n Of those five documents, the last two are the most important. Crucially, both mention the \u2018nine-dash line\u2019 map only in passing. Instead, the PRC government statement announces China\u2019s readiness to make practical temporary arrangements with the Philippines to reduce tension and seek cooperation. The white paper also reaffirms China\u2019s intention to seek regional peace and stability.<\/span><\/p>\n Those documents were clearly prepared beforehand. They show that the Foreign Ministry is engineering important policy changes in this vital area. In particular, the PRC government statement makes an important step in clarifying China\u2019s claims, stating that those include four areas: sovereignty over all the islands in the South China Sea; internal waters, territorial seas and contiguous zones of those islands; EEZs and continental shelfs of these islands; and historical rights.<\/span><\/p>\n Notice that the \u2018nine-dash line\u2019 doesn\u2019t figure at all in these claims. That suggests that Beijing may have come to the realisation that the line has become a historical burden rather than a strategic advantage. The quiet disappearance of the \u2018nine-dash line\u2019 from China\u2019s official claims is a major policy change.\u00a0Although it will be hard to ascertain the Chinese leadership\u2019s latest view on the \u2018nine-dash line,\u2019 this statement is ground-breaking in implying that China doesn\u2019t take it as a territorial demarcation line\u2014that is, China doesn\u2019t claim 90% of the South China Sea as \u2018a Chinese lake\u2019, as is so often alleged in international media. Such clarification, even if only deducible by implication, is probably the most important signal Beijing wants to send to the outside world following the award. <\/span><\/p>\n Also notice that although the claim to sovereignty and maritime rights over \u2018all the islands\u2019 appear sweeping, the claim doesn\u2019t specify the nature or scope of those islands. The ambiguity is likely meant to leave room for future negotiation with other countries. It\u2019s possible that Beijing may eventually bring those claims in line with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in some manner, subject to satisfactory negotiation outcomes.<\/span><\/p>\n These are important policy changes that Beijing has planned to announce at the conclusion of the arbitration case. Indeed, in the final months before the announcement of the award, there were already signs that the Chinese government\u2014at least the Foreign Ministry\u2014was looking for a way out of the arbitration case. Chinese diplomats privately complained about the costs of spending so much diplomatic energy and resources over this case. They were hoping that in the event of a more or less balanced award, Beijing could quietly ignore it while starting a new diplomatic negotiation process with the Philippines.<\/span><\/p>\n Unfortunately, the lopsided award has put the credibility of the Foreign Ministry\u2019s efforts on the line, especially in the eyes of growing domestic nationalistic criticisms. The counterproductive effect of the award is to stir up Chinese nationalism while undermining moderate voices represented by professional diplomats. Whatever its failings, the Foreign Ministry is still China\u2019s best hope for shaping a peaceful and responsible approach to the world.<\/span><\/p>\n