{"id":27752,"date":"2016-07-19T11:00:01","date_gmt":"2016-07-19T01:00:01","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=27752"},"modified":"2016-07-19T10:07:53","modified_gmt":"2016-07-19T00:07:53","slug":"puzzle-security-sector-reform-indonesia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/puzzle-security-sector-reform-indonesia\/","title":{"rendered":"The puzzle of security sector reform in Indonesia"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
In his book on the transformation of the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Lieutenant General (Retired) Agus Wijojo\u2014now Governor of the National Resilience College in Jakarta\u2014outlined the security sector reforms (SSR) undertaken by the TNI since the fall of Suharto and which of the reforms are still to be completed.<\/span><\/p>\n The major steps that still need to be taken include a comprehensive review of the policy, strategy and structure of the TNI and the completion of a legislative agenda that would, among other measures, regulate the employment of the TNI in assisting the police and civil community.<\/span><\/p>\n Agus concluded that the TNI had gone as far as could be expected to modernise and reform and it was now up to the executive and parliament to carry the SSR forward\u2014but neither institution has shown much interest in the matter. President Jokowi and the TNI appear to be in an alliance of necessity which will unlikely be broken before the next elections.<\/span><\/p>\n In searching for answers as to why the SSR haven\u2019t progressed since 2004, there\u2019s little point placing the blame solely on the TNI. We have to ask why there\u2019s no constituency for reform.<\/span><\/p>\n The issue that most fixates observers is the continuing dominance of the army, despite Jokowi\u2019s maritime focus, and its retention of a bloated territorial command structure that Agus suggests could be radically pruned.<\/span><\/p>\n If there\u2019s no change in Indonesia\u2019s foreign policy, an objective review would probably conclude that Indonesia\u2019s underlying defence policy and strategy of total people\u2019s defence and guerrilla war, with a progressively more capable conventional military deterrent, remains valid. Regardless of how likely or imminent an external threat seemed \u00a0a review would suggest radical changes in the territorial commands and their supporting units in light of the social and technological changes that have occurred over the last 20 years.<\/span><\/p>\n So why has the executive and legislature not insisted on such a review? The first reason is that former president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had other priorities, especially resolving the Aceh separatist struggle and fostering economic growth, beginning reform of a corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy, and promoting Indonesia\u2019s place in the world. He had no desire to pick a fight with the military and was adept at keeping them at bay while he pursued his other priorities.<\/span><\/p>\n In the absence of strong parliamentary support and a near revolt by the police in February 2015, Jokowi came to see the military as both Praetorian Guard and useful instrument to push and secure his economic development agenda at the grass roots level.<\/span><\/p>\n The absence of a reform constituency can also be attributed to a military that has successfully sold the notion that Indonesia is a weak and vulnerable nation likely to be overwhelmed by debilitating foreign influences or split asunder by domestic tensions<\/span>\u2014<\/span>or some combination thereof<\/span>\u2014<\/span>if the TNI isn\u2019t immediately at hand.<\/span><\/p>\n