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July has been a busy month for North Korean diplomats, with<\/span> another round of US sanctions<\/span><\/a>, and confirmation that South Korea will<\/span> deploy US THAAD anti-missile systems<\/span><\/a>. The recent North Korean 7th Workers\u2019 Party Congress suggests that this more proactive approach isolating the DPRK both strategically and diplomatically might actually be causing a shift in Pyongyang\u2019s foreign policy.<\/span><\/p>\n The Party Congress\u2014the<\/span> first in 36 years<\/span><\/a>\u2014saw Kim Jong-un elevated from \u2018First Secretary\u2019 to \u2018Chairman\u2019 of the Supreme Workers\u2019 Party of Korea, following a tradition established at the 1980 Congress where Kim Jong-Il was announced as his father\u2019s successor. The Congress also reviewed the policy direction of the North since 1980, setting the country\u2019s official direction for the foreseeable future.<\/span><\/p>\n The<\/span> generally mundane<\/span><\/a> outcomes from the Congress means we may have to wait another three decades for fresh policy thinking. However<\/span> Kim\u2019s comments<\/span><\/a> give us some interesting insights into the North\u2019s planned foreign policies.<\/span><\/p>\n The Congress suggested a turning point with Kim\u2019s claim that, \u2018As a responsible nuclear weapons state, the DPRK will not use a nuclear weapon first unless its sovereignty is encroached upon by hostile aggression forces with nukes\u2019.<\/span><\/p>\n Is that a declaration of a nuclear no-first-use policy?<\/span><\/p>\n Whatever it is, the North has taken a page from the playbooks of China and the US respectively; it emphasises \u2018encroachment of sovereignty\u2019 as a security issue, but is ambiguous about what that actually means. So what would this mean for the region?<\/span><\/p>\n For the US: nothing much. The US is a nuclear weapons power, so the considerable uncertainty surrounding Kim\u2019s \u2018encroachment of sovereignty\u2019 terminology means that nuclear attack is still on the table.<\/span><\/p>\n The DPRK has, however, undermined its ability to<\/span> threaten pre-emptive nuclear war in retaliation to US\u2013ROK training exercises<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n For South Korea: in the case of an inter-Korean conflict, it looks like the DPRK has committed to not use nuclear weapons. However Kim\u2019s statement is unclear as to whether nukes would be used on US forces in South Korea. Further, while it\u2019s nice to know one\u2019s country won\u2019t be explosively irradiated, the statement does little to reassure those living in Seoul\u2014a city that lies within range of a plethora of the DPRK\u2019s non-nuclear destructive devices.<\/span><\/p>\n But why would the North take this stance, and why now?<\/span><\/p>\n Under Kim Jong-Il\u2019s regime, a<\/span> well-recognised<\/span><\/a> formula was to aggravate tensions in the region through threats, nuclear testing and missile testing. Then it would commit to behaving itself in return for financial or resource aid and diplomatic concessions. Rinse and repeat.<\/span><\/p>\n Well-known examples are the payment of<\/span> US$500 million<\/span><\/a> from the South to the North to host an inter-Korean summit, or the<\/span> demolition<\/span><\/a> of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities\u2019 cooling tower in return for sanctions and energy concessions (it appears that testing<\/span> has now resumed<\/span><\/a>).<\/span><\/p>\n However the aggravation\u00ad\u2013concession cycle has been broken. South Korea\u2019s election of hard-line President Park Geun-Hye in 2013,<\/span> days after a DPRK nuclear test<\/span><\/a>, brought a no-nonsense approach to inter-Korean relations. Park is sick of losing the same game. She doesn\u2019t trust the North, and US policy is in tandem, especially since the<\/span> failed food-aid deal of 2012<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n Instead, South Korea and the US are changing the rules. They\u2019ve achieved UN sanctions supported by the DPRK\u2019s long-time ally China. The US has also imposed more than one round of its own sanctions.<\/span><\/p>\n Further, South Korea and the US have flat-out refused to engage with Northern offers of action-for-action engagement. Last year, the US<\/span> declined<\/span><\/a> a DPRK offer to suspend nuclear testing in return for the cancellation of US\u2013ROK military exercises. Earlier this year, South Korea<\/span> rejected North Korea\u2019s offer<\/span><\/a> for an inter-Korean summit. Last month, President Park ramped up a diplomatic offensive, campaigning overseas to disrupt the DPRK\u2019s relationships with<\/span> African nations<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> Iran<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n That change hasn\u2019t been well-received. The North has ramped up its aggressive overtures, to no avail. In fact, Seoul has responded to Pyongyang\u2019s bad behaviour by restarting<\/span> counter-propaganda broadcasts<\/span><\/a> and<\/span> abandoning<\/span><\/a> the jointly-run Kaesong Industrial Complex.<\/span><\/p>\n Diplomatic and strategic isolation strategies may be working. Adoption of a policy of strategic ambiguity may be a signal that the North is adapting to its new reality.<\/span><\/p>\n However it\u2019s difficult to be optimistic. Assuming the DPRK\u2019s policy shift is a genuine attempt to adjust to international pressure, the past two decades of disappointment make it difficult to take Pyongyang at its word. It\u2019s also not a stretch to think the North will experience another policy-shift when it gains the ability to reliably deliver a nuclear warhead.<\/span><\/p>\n So no change to strategic calculations. For now at least, diplomats have a five-year policy document, affirmed at the highest levels, which can be read back to DPRK interlocutors during negotiations to bind them to a defined position.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" July has been a busy month for North Korean diplomats, with another round of US sanctions, and confirmation that South Korea will deploy US THAAD anti-missile systems. The recent North Korean 7th Workers\u2019 Party Congress …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":541,"featured_media":27827,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[86,935,211,1751],"class_list":["post-27825","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-north-korea","tag-nuclear-policy","tag-south-korea","tag-thaad"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n