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The recent award handed down by the Arbitral Tribunal through the Permanent Court of Arbitration<\/span> undoubtedly favours the Philippines<\/span><\/a> (PDF) and is unlikely to end Beijing\u2019s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea. Beijing has wasted no time in rejecting the ruling, claiming it to be \u2018<\/span>null and void<\/span><\/a>\u2019, but the superpower isn\u2019t likely to go running away with its tail between its legs. In fact,<\/span> China has vowed to<\/span><\/a> \u2018take all necessary measures to protect its sovereignty in the South China Sea\u2019, including potentially establishing an ADIZ<\/span> across the region<\/span><\/a>. But how other claimant and non-claimant states act in response to the Tribunal\u2019s ruling will set an important precedent for dealing with behaviour that challenges the rules-based global order.<\/span><\/p>\n Despite<\/span> the Tribunal concluding that<\/span><\/a> \u2018there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the “nine-dash line”\u2019, China\u2019s fishermen militia will continue to fish in areas where China believes it has overlapping maritime claims. Such challenges will be hard to counter, since Southeast Asian claimants have only limited capability to enforce their sovereignty, and a fluctuating willingness to confront China. Ideally, Southeast Asian nations would present a united front that\u2019s both aligned with international law and remains cognizant of where the red lines lay.<\/span><\/p>\n That course poses a particular challenge for Philippines president Rodrigo Duterte, who<\/span> faces the dilemma<\/span><\/a> of continuing with his plan to \u2018reset\u2019 the Philippines\u2019 relationship with China or coming down hard on the Philippines\u2019<\/span> largest two-way trade partner<\/span><\/a>. Actually, China might decide that its best prospect for blurring the Tribunal\u2019s decision lies in its achieving a bilateral deal with Manila that recognises some of China\u2019s claims in exchange for concessions elsewhere. So Duterte\u2019s course of action could be formative.<\/span><\/p>\n How the Philippines acts in response to the Tribunal\u2019s award could also set a precedent for both claimants\u2019 and non-claimants\u2019 responses to future disagreements with China. And with China flying<\/span> nuclear-capable H-6K bombers and fighter jets<\/span><\/a>\u00a0near the contested Scarborough Shoal last week, Beijing\u2019s signaling there\u2019s still much to play for.<\/span><\/p>\n Indonesia, which also gained from the Tribunal award, is a case in point. Its formal position\u2014 that it has no border dispute with China\u2014has now been given legal reinforcement by the Tribunal\u2019s ruling. But that won\u2019t stop Chinese fishermen from encroaching on Indonesia\u2019s EEZ, nor will it prevent Chinese naval vessels from offering them protection. If Duterte doesn\u2019t firmly enforce the sovereignty of the waters surrounding his country, it could not only indicate that claimant states will bend to Chinese pressure, but also serve to discourage Jokowi from continuing with his more assertive stance on Chinese incursions on Indonesian waters.<\/span><\/p>\n Indonesia recently ramped up its efforts against China\u2019s behaviour in its waters, in particular slamming a<\/span> recent statement from China\u2019s foreign ministry<\/span><\/a> espousing \u2018overlapping claims for maritime rights and interests\u2019 in the waters off the Natuna Islands. After the third confrontation between Indonesia and China this year in Natuna waters, President Joko Widodo<\/span> signalled<\/span><\/a> to Beijing that his country wouldn\u2019t be cowed. He visited the Natunas and hosted a limited Cabinet meeting aboard the Indonesian Navy vessel that fired warning shots at Chinese trawlers the week before. And following the ruling, Indonesian Defense Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu<\/span> detailed plans<\/span><\/a> to deploy warships, fighter jets, SAMs, and drones\u2014as well as construct port facilities\u2014around the Natunas.<\/span><\/p>\n Now, as the <\/span>de facto<\/span><\/i> head of ASEAN, Indonesia\u2019s challenge will be to encourage a regional response that sets a precedent on how to address future Chinese territorial incursions. In<\/span> its formal statement on the Tribunal\u2019s ruling<\/span><\/a>, Indonesia\u2019s Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterated the importance of refraining from any escalatory actions in its near region, as well as resuming peaceful talks with a basis in international law on any existing overlapping claims. The Ministry also emphasised the important role that a zone of peace and neutrality would play in strengthening ASEAN\u2019s political and security communities. Indonesia has requested states to respect international law, with the statement<\/span> spurring criticism<\/span><\/a> from Chinese experts for being less \u2018objective, just and fair\u2019 than its traditional non-claimant stance on the South China Sea.<\/span><\/p>\n Cultivating that uniform response across ASEAN states\u2014or even across claimants\u2014is no simple task.<\/span> Some expected<\/span><\/a> the award to help ASEAN achieve a consensus position, but the evidence so far has been weak. The 49th ASEAN Foreign Ministers\u2019 and Post Ministerial Conference meetings in Vientiane this week provide another opportunity for China to ‘divide’<\/a> and\u00a0<\/span>\u2018coerce\u2019<\/span><\/a> member states<\/span>.<\/span><\/p>\n A united ASEAN could produce and finalise an ASEAN\u2013China Code of Conduct for Parties in the South China Sea that would soothe tensions after the arbitration and establish precedents for the future of the region\u2019s maritime security. But the challenges of coordinating such a diverse grouping of states, all with differing levels of economic dependence on China, has been demonstrated in<\/span> last month\u2019s spectacular failure<\/span><\/a> by ASEAN to stick to a firm position on China\u2019s aggressive island-building. And with a traditionally non-aligned foreign policy and a now legitimised stance as a non-claimant on the issue, there\u2019s little reason for Indonesia to seize ASEAN\u2019s reins over a unified position.<\/span><\/p>\n If states in the region move towards<\/span> no longer seeing ASEAN and its regional architecture<\/span><\/a> \u2018as the vehicle through which to resolve territorial disputes\u2019, Indonesia might seek to engage its neighbours in new forms of defence diplomacy to build confidence and concord. Those could take the form of finalising the terms of the<\/span> proposed Indonesia\u2013Malaysia\u2013Philippines joint patrol<\/span><\/a> of the Sulu and Celebes seas.<\/span><\/p>\n Whatever the outcome, the coming months might well prove pivotal in shaping the future of the South China Sea. Both claimant and non-claimant ASEAN policymakers should use the confidence gained from the ruling to assert their sovereignty and commitment to the rules-based order. Inaction could prove a dangerous precedent as China attempts to save face and seize the initiative once more.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The recent award handed down by the Arbitral Tribunal through the Permanent Court of Arbitration undoubtedly favours the Philippines (PDF) and is unlikely to end Beijing\u2019s assertive behaviour in the South China Sea. Beijing has …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":303,"featured_media":27866,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[189,8,819,1739,471,25],"class_list":["post-27865","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-asean","tag-indonesia","tag-natuna-islands","tag-pca","tag-south-china-sea","tag-southeast-asia"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n