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Donald Trump\u2019s recent comments on America\u2019s alliances, coinciding with the Republican convention last week, have further raised the anxiety levels of US allies about Washington\u2019s global role after the US presidential election.<\/span><\/p>\n Trump<\/span> told <\/span>The New York Times<\/span><\/i><\/a> that the US needs to be \u2018properly reimbursed\u2019 by allies, and he would be \u2018prepared to walk\u2019 away from alliance obligations if he can\u2019t make that deal. If Russia invaded the Baltic states he said he would first assess whether they had paid their dues before honouring NATO obligations and defending them.<\/span><\/p>\n Trump\u2019s alliance skepticism is long standing and deep seated, so perhaps it\u2019s no surprise it hasn\u2019t moderated with the rigours of the presidential campaign\u2014especially given how little else has moderated during his candidacy. He\u2019s also tapping into a popular strain in the US\u2014reflected in Bernie Sanders\u2019 candidacy as well\u2014questioning the value of US global engagement. <\/span><\/p>\n Irritation with the level of allied contributions isn\u2019t new. Since the post-WW2 creation of the US alliance system, US strategic protection has lessened allies\u2019 need to build their own capability.<\/span><\/p>\n Increasing burden sharing has been a hallmark of the Obama administration\u2019s alliance policy, as evident in then-Defence Secretary Bob Gates\u2019 2011<\/span> chastisement of NATO<\/span><\/a> member states and President Obama\u2019s expression of irritation with free riders in<\/span> this year\u2019s <\/span>Atlantic<\/span><\/i> interview.<\/span><\/a> The Obama administration\u2019s frustration has been fuelled by several years of US defence budget constraints and concerns about allied reliability, including patchy defence spending within NATO: only five NATO states (including the US) have met the defence budget target of 2% of GDP.<\/span><\/p>\n The Obama administration has made efforts to reduce alliance asymmetry and has expected allies to contribute more to their own security. However, the administration has reconciled its heightened expectations of allies with the imperative of tackling pressing security challenges. That\u2019s apparent in the US reinvigoration of NATO at the recent Warsaw summit, including bolstering NATO\u2019s deterrent and counter-terrorism capability. And some NATO countries are now raising their defence spending in the face of Russian assertiveness.<\/span><\/p>\n Mr. Trump\u2019s strategy to address burden sharing by using alliance obligations as a negotiating chip is unprecedented. It represents an enormous potential discontinuity in US alliance policy.<\/span><\/p>\n So US allies are unsettled. It\u2019s difficult to plan for such wildly different outcomes as the considerable policy continuity of a Clinton presidency and the<\/span> known and unknown unknowns<\/span><\/a> of a Trump presidency. The Obama administration recognises this: hence Vice President Joe Biden\u2019s reassurance about the enduring US commitment to the Asia\u2013Pacific during his Australia visit.<\/span><\/p>\n The Washington foreign and defence policy community, with its traditional bipartisan agreement on the sanctity of alliance treaty obligations, is also rattled. Republican establishment figures such as Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell have stressed the importance of honouring alliance commitments.<\/span><\/p>\n It\u2019s legitimate to question allied contributions, but alliances cannot be viewed solely through an economic prism. Making alliance obligations conditional would undermine alliance credibility and robust deterrence. As with other comments Mr. Trump has made, it\u2019s hard to determine whether they\u2019re purely for negotiating purposes\u2014and how much \u2018properly reimbursed\u2019 actually means. But allies couldn\u2019t do anything other than take him at his word, and potential aggressors might be emboldened by those comments. That makes them highly destabilising.<\/span><\/p>\n The US global alliance network is manifestly in the US national interest: it amplifies the US capacity to project power and secure global energy and trade routes. Its force multiplier effect is particularly significant at this time of international tumult. Alliances serve as frameworks to address an array of security challenges which require collective response and from which the US can\u2019t insulate itself\u2014 including ISIS, Russian assertiveness and the North Korean nuclear threat.<\/span><\/p>\n When managed carefully, alliances contribute to regional and global stability (and therefore allow prosperity to be maximised). They deter aggression, provide some predictability and restrain allies from destabilising postures. Dismantling US alliances or diluting them by retreating from a forward presence could make it difficult for the US to reinsert itself into theaters and rebuild allied trust in a crisis.<\/span><\/p>\n In addition, US alliance policy has evolved to suit the current security environment. There has been creative thinking on \u2018networked security\u2019, with the promotion of bilateral, trilateral and multilateral linkages between allies, partners and others, according to each region\u2019s requirements and existing strategic architecture.<\/span><\/p>\n There has also been some thinking on offsetting potentially destabilising effects of alliances, including tensions fuelled by exclusivity. For instance, US Defence Secretary Ash Carter has<\/span> stated that the Asia\u2013Pacific security web is inclusive<\/span><\/a>, so there\u2019s space for China to rise. The spiraling costs of defence technology can make alliances even more useful: the<\/span> US can increasingly pool high-tech resources with high-capability allies<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n A Clinton presidency would probably be even more supportive of allies than the Obama administration, though it would likely retain a burden sharing dimension. But if Donald Trump is victorious in November, it could upend decades of US alliance policy, as allies reassess their security postures\u2014with all the instability that would engender. It would be up to other Republicans, bureaucrats, military leaders, and US allies to present a compelling case for alliances, including a description of their enduring benefits in a complex security environment.<\/span><\/p>\n For now, allies must watch events unfold. The stakes are high.<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Donald Trump\u2019s recent comments on America\u2019s alliances, coinciding with the Republican convention last week, have further raised the anxiety levels of US allies about Washington\u2019s global role after the US presidential election. Trump told The …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":217,"featured_media":27883,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[40,1428,261,1606],"class_list":["post-27882","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-alliance-2","tag-donald-trump","tag-nato","tag-presidential-election-2016"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n