{"id":28120,"date":"2016-08-11T06:00:49","date_gmt":"2016-08-10T20:00:49","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=28120"},"modified":"2016-08-11T17:06:44","modified_gmt":"2016-08-11T07:06:44","slug":"security-dilemma-south-china-sea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/security-dilemma-south-china-sea\/","title":{"rendered":"The security dilemma and the South China Sea"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
In a seminal article<\/a> in 1978 Robert Jervis outlined the concept of the security dilemma. Jervis observed that \u2018many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decreases the security of others\u2019. Where \u2018one state gains invulnerability by being more powerful than most others\u2019 its advantage \u2018provides a base from which it can exploit others\u2019.<\/p>\n The problem of the security dilemma in the South China Seas has several dimensions. Relative to its East and Southeast Asian neighbours, China is now very powerful and can exploit that situation to increase its own security relative to that of the US. The US, on the other hand, sees itself as invulnerable with respect to China and with the ability to leverage its invulnerability to pursue its own security and economic interests and those of its allies irrespective of China\u2019s.<\/p>\n As Allan Behm<\/a> noted, \u2018it\u2019s a strategic and political impossibility for China meekly to accept the Court of Arbitration\u2019s ruling and withdraw its claim\u2019. In part, that\u2019s simply a matter of security policy. The US has tried to ring China with allies<\/a>, especially allies hosting US forces, so for China, forward deployment of its forces and surveillance assets to the South China Sea is an obvious force posture move. This is a good example of the security dilemma in action.<\/p>\n There\u2019s another element of China\u2019s stance on the South China Sea. In his address to the UN<\/a> Xi Jinping began by observing, \u2018Only by drawing lessons from history can the world avoid repeating past calamity\u2019. Although referring to WW2, that idea has far greater resonance with the Chinese and the CCP leadership. Most pertinent for present day Chinese are older lessons from Chinese history<\/a>.<\/p>\n National psychology is a powerful driver of China\u2019s refusal to back down over the South China Sea. China\u2019s history and in particular its sensitivity around the \u2018century of humiliation\u2019 suffered while they were comparatively weak reinforces their policy<\/a>. That notion is central to modern China\u2019s founding narrative and to the legitimacy of the CCP leadership.<\/p>\n The century from 1839, when British gunboats forced China to open up to the opium trade<\/a>, to the CCP victory in 1949 is known as the \u2018century of humiliation\u2019. Alison Kaufman<\/a> writes that for many Chinese this period provides the \u2018historical lessons that are taken as indicative of how strong Western powers tend to behave toward China\u2019. The massive rebellions that wracked China, fanned by \u2018the imperial government\u2019s acquiescence to foreign demands\u2019, also influences the strategic thinking of China\u2019s leaders.<\/p>\n The Chinese leadership nourishes the narrative that the CCP saved China from the suffering and indignities imposed by foreign powers, and \u2018this narrative has become a key legitimiser for CCP rule, because the CCP is portrayed as the only modern Chinese political party that was able to successfully stand up to foreign aggression\u2019. Behind it all lies a \u2018profound sense of shame and humiliation<\/a>\u2019 so deeply embedded in the Chinese psyche that it still sees itself as a victim. For China to back-down from the South China Sea strategy would be to submit again to a hegemon.<\/p>\n