{"id":28172,"date":"2016-08-15T14:30:20","date_gmt":"2016-08-15T04:30:20","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=28172"},"modified":"2016-08-15T14:01:37","modified_gmt":"2016-08-15T04:01:37","slug":"nuclear-weapons-first-use","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/nuclear-weapons-first-use\/","title":{"rendered":"Nuclear weapons and first use"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Recent media reports suggesting that President Obama\u2019s considering embracing a no-first-use pledge in US nuclear declaratory policy have certainly rekindled the debate over the wisdom of such a move. The debate\u2019s not new, and resonances of its earlier rounds abound. Over at Arms Control Wonk<\/em>, Michael Krepon has penned a couple of thoughtful pieces (here<\/a> and here<\/a>), essentially supporting the notion of a no-first-use policy\u2014just not yet. On the other side of the debate, Elbridge Colby\u2019s argued that a no-first-use declaration would be a deep strategic error<\/a>. Andrew Shearer\u2019s argued a similar line<\/a> over at War on the Rocks<\/em>.<\/p>\n In arms control terms, no-first-use pledges have a superficial attractiveness. For one thing\u2014if they could be taken at face value\u2014they would imply an important raising of the nuclear threshold. If all nine current nuclear weapon states were to embrace them, none would ever use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. And the essential role of nuclear weapons would be limited to deterring, and responding to, an adversary\u2019s use of nuclear weapons in violation of that pledge.<\/p>\n But can they be taken at face value? One of the central problems with a no-first-use pledge is that it\u2019s inherently incredible. Such a pledge says that a nuclear weapon state is content to lose a war at the conventional level without resorting to nuclear weapons. Perhaps that\u2019s the case with some limited conventional conflicts fought over peripheral rather than core interests. But it\u2019s not true in relation to all conventional conflicts. All of the nuclear weapon states have some<\/em> interests the loss of which they would regard as intolerable. Such prospect of loss would excite resort to nuclear weapons. If it didn\u2019t, why would they have built them in the first place?<\/p>\n The second problem is one of strategic utility. If nuclear weapons are useful in deterring major war, why are we so anxious to ensure they deter only nuclear use? NATO strategists in the days of the Cold War used to argue plausibly that theatre- and tactical-range nuclear weapons helped offset the possibility of Soviet conventional aggression by making it more difficult for the Warsaw Pact to concentrate its tank armies. Any such massing of forward-deployed armour would be a potential target for a NATO nuclear weapon. In short, NATO\u2019s option of crossing the threshold first helped to lengthen<\/em> the odds that it would ever need to do so. NATO\u2019s logic then remains just as compelling today for any nuclear weapon state which feels itself conventionally outgunned.<\/p>\n Even those nuclear weapon states confident about their own conventional strength might well see a role for nuclear weapons in constraining an adversary\u2019s options. The US found itself in exactly that position in the early 1990s, leading the multinational force engaged in expelling Saddam\u2019s forces from Kuwait. Veiled US threats<\/a> then that Washington would regard any Iraqi use of weapons of mass destruction\u2014essentially chemical weapons\u2014as opening the door to possible US nuclear weapon use, were designed to constrain Iraqi options and leverage the multinational force\u2019s conventional advantage.<\/p>\n Then there\u2019s a third problem\u2014assurance. A US no-first-use pledge would play merry havoc with its extended nuclear assurances to its allies. Allies would worry about both of the first two problems: that a US which was serious about its no-first-use pledge might be more inclined to see their interests as peripheral rather than vital; and that they\u2019re more exposed to shifts in regional conventional force balances than is the US itself. That\u2019s broadly true for all US allies around the Eurasian rimlands, but the rapid growth of Chinese conventional power in Asia makes this factor particularly telling in Australia\u2019s own region.<\/p>\n