{"id":28282,"date":"2016-08-23T14:30:33","date_gmt":"2016-08-23T04:30:33","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=28282"},"modified":"2016-08-23T15:54:33","modified_gmt":"2016-08-23T05:54:33","slug":"wins-war-east-asia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wins-war-east-asia\/","title":{"rendered":"Who wins a war in East Asia?"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/a><\/p>\n Under what circumstances would Australia join in a war against China? RAND\u2019s report War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable<\/a> (WwC) illuminates the gravity of that decision.<\/p>\n WwC explores \u2018two variables: intensity (from mild to severe) and duration (from a few days to a year or more)\u2019. It models a number of conventional war scenarios confined to East Asia\/Western Pacific between 2015 and 2025 and waged with maritime assets\u2014surface and submarine\u2014and aircraft, missiles, space assets and in cyberspace. The US homeland isn\u2019t attacked but assets in China are.<\/p>\n WwC finds the military and economic costs to China and the US are high and increase rapidly with intensity and duration. WcC doesn\u2019t quantify costs to allies like Australia though economic costs are forecast to be \u2018immensely costly for the belligerents, East Asia, and the world\u2019. As a minimum, as Paul Dibb has observed<\/a>, China mightn\u2019t spare Australia\u2019s critical infrastructure especially intelligence capability.<\/p>\n Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper says that \u2018major conflict between the United States and China is unlikely\u2019. Maybe so, but the US is preparing for a high intensity battle. Benjamin Schreer\u2019s analysis<\/a> has provided an overview of the \u2018US AirSea Battle\u2019<\/a> strategy in East Asia. Although that strategy has now been swept up into the Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons (JAM\u00adGC)<\/a>; the contingency planning for a war continues. China is also planning for contingencies<\/a> in East Asia and is intent<\/a> on being able to defeat US power projection capabilities.<\/p>\n Australia\u2019s experience with direct armed attack on its soil is limited to one instance<\/a>. Since 1945 the major conventional wars involving Australian forces\u2014Korea, Vietnam, Gulf War, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria\u2014have been distant with no accompanying threat of a conventional attack on Australian territory. Australia\u2019s reasons for entering into these wars were disparate, and complex. In none of those cases did the government have to consider the level of threat to Australia\u2019s territory, economy or its forces as that involved in a war with China.<\/p>\n Is Australia now inextricably entwined with US military planning in East Asia: because of ANZUS, or as a consequence of US expectations created through combined planning, capability cooperation, intelligence sharing and exercising, and US basing? Is automatic Australia will entering a conflict with China if the US does? Technically ANZUS commits Australia<\/a> to \u2018act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes\u2019 to an attack on the US. But the intimate nature of the alliance probably would make it politically difficult for any Australian government not to join in most circumstances.<\/p>\n