The Australian<\/em>. He urged the government to direct \u2018its economic departments, intelligence agencies and Defence [to] develop a shared baseline understanding of China\u2019s growing power in both its economic and strategic dimensions\u2019. That would be a great step forward. Structured, focused and evidence-based policy is the best kind. Jennings is right to suggest that this appears to be missing in the public domain in respect of Australia\u2019s relations with China.<\/p>\nIf such assessments exist inside government, and they almost certainly do, the government needs to refer to them more consistently and coherently, and in greater detail. The claim to secrecy around keeping such assessments from the public eye does appear to create unwanted and avoidable problems.<\/p>\n
In trying to understand China, the first step for the Australian public is to ignore Chinese government propaganda. It\u2019s often shrill, extreme and ideologically tainted. China isn\u2019t a normal government in the way it conducts its diplomacy. Its foreign ministry is now one of the best in the world but it\u2019s also one of the least powerful of its kind. It\u2019s the Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party that sets the tone for public discussion, and even diplomatic discussion, of the significance to be attached to international events.<\/p>\n
Thus, when people cite a public threat from Chinese officials to retaliate against Australia for national interest decisions in reviewing foreign investment proposals, that consideration isn\u2019t one that should be taken seriously. China has its own national security restrictions for foreign investment and they\u2019re tougher than those applying in Australia. In private, the calmer heads in Beijing will see such decisions by Australia as falling within Canberra\u2019s prerogative.<\/p>\n
We need to take an equally critical view of the Chinese propaganda line about \u2018peaceful rise\u2019. This was always a purely propagandistic line developed by the Central Party School to reconcile China\u2019s growing power with some competing and contradictory policy considerations. On the one hand, internationally, China needed to reassure its neighbours. On the other hand, at home, China had to constrain growing hawkish voices demanding to know why Beijing wasn\u2019t being more forceful in relations with Taiwan, Japan and the United States.<\/p>\n
The \u2018peaceful rise\u2019 thesis was also directed at channelling Chinese public opinion towards a nationalist mindset in order to keep their attention on the economic growth achievements of the Communist Party and away from the steady deterioration in social welfare conditions and the environment. It was a convenient way for the Chinese leaders to conceal an inconvenient truth that it didn\u2019t want to admit to its own people: China wasn\u2019t as powerful as many of its military leaders believed and if Beijing were more combative internationally it would put at risk many of the international public goods (investment, technology, market access) considered essential to continued national prosperity.<\/p>\n
There\u2019s a conundrum here. In recognising that the line about China\u2019s peaceful rise was mostly propaganda, we don\u2019t have to conclude at all that China was secretly intent on a bellicose foreign policy. In fact, we can safely conclude the exact opposite. Under Xi Jinping, China has, as Peter Jennings has noted, abandoned the peaceful rise thesis. But the replacement policy isn\u2019t necessarily militarism, as Jennings seems to imply. It may be something else. And the new levels of militarisation by China in the South China Sea don\u2019t necessarily define the new policy, they may be merely one tangential manifestation of it.<\/p>\n
That brings us back to a key question posed by Jennings. How then do we evaluate China\u2019s power and its foreign policy direction? I would urge the government to act on his recommendation for new baseline studies. I would also encourage ASPI take a lead in the research community by setting up a task force or study group of scholars with differing China specialisations and divergent views of the China problem.<\/p>\n
There are two challenges here for the research community in Australia. The first is to redress the collapse in the past two decades in the country\u2019s universities and think tanks of detailed studies of China\u2019s security policies. Second, we need to achieve a broad consensus on a policy framework to deal with China that can be transparent, durable and effective in an era of almost inevitable uncertainty about just where China\u2019s national security strategy is heading.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The \u2018China choice\u2019 debate has flared up again in recent weeks with the Turnbull government displaying signs of confusion about where we draw the line between defending national security interests and promoting economic relations with …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":428,"featured_media":28411,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[143,52,889,1778,204],"class_list":["post-28410","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-asia-pacific","tag-china","tag-china-choice","tag-propaganda","tag-xi-jinping"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
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