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The Arctic is a region where great power competition will play out<\/a> in coming years. Russia has significant strategic and economic interests in the region<\/a>, and for China the Arctic may prove to have important security and economic benefits bearing on East Asia and on energy and food security<\/a>. The US and its allies<\/a> \u00a0also have sovereignty, security and resource interests in the Arctic. And global warming is rapidly changing the playing field in the Arctic region.<\/p>\n The main contenders for a piece of the Arctic Ocean are NATO and Russia. The international Arctic governance mechanism\u2014the Arctic Council<\/a>\u2014is dominated by NATO members. While NATO members bordering the Arctic Ocean\u2014the US<\/a>, Canada<\/a>, Denmark<\/a>, and Norway<\/a>\u2014are also pursuing their own national claims, Russia and NATO still see each other as their greatest security threat. Russia\u2019s military build-up in the Arctic<\/a> and a call from the Atlantic Council <\/a>\u00a0for NATO to be \u2018prepared to defend its boundaries and interests in the region in the face of growing Russian capabilities\u2019 reflect this tension. Blunt references in NATO\u2019s Warsaw communique<\/a> to Russia\u2019s aggression and the undefined nature of the commitment \u2018to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack\u2019 sits behind Arctic relations.<\/p>\n This northern summer\u2019s seen an historically low minimum coverage of sea ice<\/a> in the Arctic. Temperatures in early September were up to 9 degrees Celsius above average along the coast of Siberia. Global warming in the Arctic is heating the \u2018ocean, soil, and air temperatures\u2019 and \u2018melting permafrost; shifting vegetation and animal abundances\u2019 and altering the \u2018characteristics of Arctic cyclones\u2019.\u00a0 The potential for access to abundant energy and food resources in the Arctic and the possibility of newer shorter shipping routes between East Asia and Europe will feed the competition for dominance in the Arctic in coming decades.<\/p>\n In August, the Russians presented scientific evidence<\/a> to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS) to support their extensive claims to in the Arctic. Russia is claiming the Lomonosov Ridge, the Mendeleev-Alfa High, the Chukotka Plateau, as well as the continuous extension of these elements from the shallow Eurasian shelf\u2014an undersea area of 1.2 million square kilometres where it would have sovereign rights<\/a> over the exploration, exploitation (including oil and gas<\/a> and fish stocks<\/a>), management and conservation of resources in the water, on the seabed and under the seafloor.<\/p>\n Russia\u2019s been at pains to stress its commitment to UNCLOS<\/a> and to adopt a pragmatic<\/a> and cooperative attitude in the Arctic. However, a negative response from CLCS on its Arctic shelf claims might see Russia\u2019s attitude harden. A Russian refusal to accept as legitimate a denial of its claims by the CLCS could seriously undermine the already weakened UNCLOS regime.<\/p>\n Russia has more immediate strategic problems as well. Post-Soviet Russia is effectively land-locked in its west. Russia\u2019s numerically superior land forces are advantaged in Europe by freedom to manoeuvre and unity of command but its maritime situation is parlous. Russia\u2019s lost its dominant positions in the Baltic and Black seas and its secure access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. In addition, the maritime approach to St Petersburg, its second city, is threatened by NATO. Russian access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic is now susceptible to blockade by NATO.<\/p>\n Access to the Atlantic through the Barents Sea for the Russian Northern Fleet at Severomorsk is also vulnerable to encirclement and interdiction by NATO<\/a>. As the ice retreats, secure year-round ice-free access to both the Atlantic and North Pacific from Arctic bases will also be a priority for the Russian Navy. Ominously, Russia\u2019s shown in Crimea that it\u2019s willing to act to protect its remaining strategic maritime assets. The Northern Fleet contains the main component of Russia\u2019s nuclear triad and is tasked with the protection<\/a> of the Russian economic zone, a vast area and long coastline that Russia sees as vulnerable<\/a>. Were the CLCS to reject Russia\u2019s seabed claims in the Arctic Ocean, threatening its economic and security interests, then Russia might\u2014like China in the South China Sea\u2014become less reasonable and more inclined to unilateral actions.<\/p>\n China isn’t an Arctic littoral state, but it has exhibited a growing interest in the Arctic, consonant with a growing strategic relationship with Russia and economic interests in Russia\u2019s control of the more promising Northern Sea Route to Europe and of Arctic resources. If China begins sending container ships to the EU<\/a> via the less costly Northern Sea Route<\/a> through Russia\u2019s Arctic EEZ over coming decade(s) combined with ramping up the economic use of extensive railway routes across Eurasia to Europe<\/a>\u2014such as the new Chengdu-Lodz line<\/a>\u2014the impact on South East Asian nations dependent on servicing maritime trade could be significant. A significant economic downturn would be unsettling in our nearer region.<\/p>\n