{"id":29067,"date":"2016-10-10T11:00:00","date_gmt":"2016-10-10T00:00:00","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=29067"},"modified":"2016-10-10T10:58:57","modified_gmt":"2016-10-09T23:58:57","slug":"colombias-president-sells-skin-catching-bear","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/colombias-president-sells-skin-catching-bear\/","title":{"rendered":"Colombia’s president sells the skin before catching the bear"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
This year won\u2019t only be remembered by who gets elected to the Oval Office. It\u2019ll also be known as the year the Colombian public rejected a hard-fought peace deal with the leftist guerrilla group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).<\/p>\n
With the unexpected results in the plebiscite<\/a> (50.24% rejected the deal), I\u2019ve been constantly asked, what happened? Why did Colombians vote \u2018No\u2019 after 52 years of war?<\/p>\n The answer is that the plebiscite wasn\u2019t just about peace, but was also about President Juan Manuel Santos and his predecessor, \u00c1lvaro Uribe\u2019s, pursuit of power. It was about winning the people\u2019s hearts and minds ahead of the 2018 presidential elections, when both men\u2019s hand-picked successors will contest the presidency.<\/p>\n President Santos was the main proponent of the peace agreement, and his stunning defeat has brought the legitimacy of his leadership into question. Remarkably, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize<\/a> for his efforts to end the conflict last Friday, with the committee making it clear the award was didactic, based on the hope that he would achieve peace. While there\u2019s been a lot said about the reasons behind the peace deal\u2019s failure, Santos made a number of errors that also played a role.<\/p>\n Firstly, he was<\/em> overconfident<\/em>. Buoyed by significant political support, Santos underestimated Uribe\u2019s persuasive power. Santos enjoyed the support of 12 out of the 13 registered political parties in Colombia throughout the peace process and during campaigning ahead of the plebiscite. That political backing didn\u2019t transcend into public support, as Uribe\u2019s Democratic Centre Party\u2014Centro Democr\u00e1tico <\/em>in Spanish\u2014managed to convince Colombians that Santos\u2019 deal wasn\u2019t good enough.<\/p>\n Secondly, he<\/em> miscalculated<\/em>, which is easy to do when overconfident, and is something that Santos has done a lot during the past year. He announced in September 2015<\/a>, with much fanfare, that a definitive peace deal would be reached by March 2016. That didn\u2019t happen. In June he announced that peace talks would finish by 20 July<\/a>. That didn\u2019t happen either. And he ‘sold the skin before catching the bear’ late last month, hosting a pompous signing ceremony in Cartagena, more than a week before Colombians had their say on the agreement.<\/p>\n Finally, he<\/em> lacked focus. <\/em>The peace talks became the epicentre of Colombia\u2019s present and future, but you don\u2019t put all the eggs in one basket. Throughout the process, Santos linked a broad set of issues to the peace accords that had little or nothing to do with the agreed agenda<\/a>, including gender identity issues<\/a>.<\/p>\n Other possible explanations include miscommunication <\/em>and misinformation. <\/em>Both of the plebiscite campaigns were soaked in lies, catchy-slogans, and contradictions<\/a>. Reading the 297-page long agreement was a mammoth task given the 38 days between the announcement and the plebiscite. And even for avid readers, being well-informed was a challenge amid the plethora of polarised debates and opinions.<\/p>\n The result of the plebiscite has plunged Colombia\u2019s future into deeper uncertainty. Santos now needs to negotiate with a strengthened Uribe before re-negotiating with FARC. Santos is rushing to save the peace deal<\/a>, with the ceasefire with FARC due to end on 31 October. And even if Uribe and Santos can reach an agreement before that deadline, the country\u2019s stability will depend on how willing FARC is to negotiate.<\/p>\n Polarisation is another side effect of the vote, particularly if the Colombian government re-engages in conflict with FARC. Before the plebiscite, Colombia was split between Santos and Uribe\u2019s versions of peace. Now, it runs the risk of demonising Uribe and those who voted \u2018No\u2019.<\/p>\n