‘functionalists’, who focus on the critical maritime trade and energy flows linking the two regions.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\nAustralia\u2019s interest in the Indian Ocean has risen sharply in recent years, essentially because of four drivers: India\u2019s rise, the increasing importance of Southeast Asia, a greater interest in energy flows, and the growing maritime presence of new external players\u2014like China\u2014in that ocean. But the Indo-Pacific concept still joins at the hip two separate and distinct regions. To the west lies an ocean dominated by a single great power (India), with a diverse range of littoral states that have little in common save seawater. To the east is an ocean connecting several great powers (US, China, Russia and Japan), with high levels of strategic and economic interconnectedness, and a regional institution (APEC) that reaches out even to the Pacific littoral states of South America.<\/p>\n
The Pacific\u2019s the site of several critical bilateral relationships: US\u2013China, US\u2013Japan, China\u2013Japan. But what are the key bilaterals of the Indian Ocean? The obvious ones are the India\u2013US and India\u2013China relationships, but those involve the largest Indian Ocean power reaching out beyond the ocean. Those differences are important: for one thing, they imply that the Pacific is a strategic \u2018shaper\u2019 of events in a way that the Indian Ocean isn\u2019t. And that implication plays out in history: during both World War 2 and the Cold War, the Pacific loomed as a more important theatre than the Indian Ocean. Today, there are 5 US alliances in East Asia, and none in the Indian Ocean\u2014the \u2018cradle of the non-aligned movement\u2019, to use Andrew\u2019s term.<\/p>\n
It\u2019s hard to imagine that historical cradle nurturing a state which will prove a decisive balancer in the 21st century. But it\u2019s almost as hard to imagine a concert of great powers emerging from the two regions to become the principal security mechanism for the Asian strategic environment over the same timeframe. Asian great powers have traditionally been more introverted than extroverted, and their history of security cooperation is weak. Frankly, there\u2019s less to multilateral security cooperation in Asia than meets the eye.<\/p>\n
Australia, seeing itself as a two-ocean country, feels a degree of affinity for the Indo-Pacific concept. But it’d be difficult to argue that even we see both oceans as strategic equivalents. And the emphasis accorded the concept in both the 2013 and 2016 Defence White Papers owes at least something to the fact that the state of Western Australia has been unusually well represented in ministerial security portfolios in Australia in recent years (Stephen Smith, David Johnston and Julie Bishop). Indeed, from 3 December 2007 until today, MPs or Senators from Western Australia have been either Australia\u2019s defence minister or its foreign minister\u2014or both.<\/p>\n
So what does that mean for Australian policy? Andrew\u2019s strategy of regional differentiation\u2014treating the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean as distinct entities\u2014makes good sense. But I have my doubts about his proposal for an Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue. That sounds suspiciously like an attempt to talk an Indo-Pacific strategic order into existence\u2014and that\u2019d be a wearying mission to assign to even the most dedicated diplomat.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Let\u2019s cut to the chase. Few strategic assessments have ever recommended the deleting of a hyphen in favour of a dash as a principal policy recommendation. So Andrew Phillips\u2019 recent ASPI Strategy paper, From Hollywood …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":11,"featured_media":29199,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,69,56,8,236,549],"class_list":["post-29198","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-india","tag-indo-pacific","tag-indonesia","tag-regionalism","tag-strategic-policy"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
The Indo-Pacific and the nature of conjoinment | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n