{"id":29213,"date":"2016-10-31T12:30:47","date_gmt":"2016-10-31T01:30:47","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=29213"},"modified":"2016-10-31T17:23:10","modified_gmt":"2016-10-31T06:23:10","slug":"silver-bullet-conundrum-naval-losses-world-small-fleets","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/silver-bullet-conundrum-naval-losses-world-small-fleets\/","title":{"rendered":"The \u2018Silver Bullet\u2019 conundrum: naval losses in a world of small fleets"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
In the post-Cold War era, western navies have continued to seek the highest levels of technology and capability in an environment of declining defence budgets. This has caused a reduction in overall fleet sizes as unit costs increase<\/a>, and the creation of \u2018silver bullets<\/a>\u2019 in fleets that rely on a smaller number of more capable platforms. At the same time naval vessels face increasingly lethal and numerous anti-surface weapons. So the costs of losing even one vessel may be more significant than we imagine.<\/p>\n Losing ships is a likely (and therefore expected) part of naval conflict, but losses affect navies of differing sizes to different degrees. Most modern navies haven\u2019t lost a ship to enemy action since World War 2 so they haven\u2019t had to deal with the consequences first-hand in a long time. However, the Falkland Islands war in 1982\u2014one of the few examples of naval conflict in the missile age\u2014provides some interesting insights.<\/p>\n The UK deployed 37 warships (25 surface combatants, six amphibious ships and six submarines) as a part of the taskforce assembled to take back the Falkland Islands, supplemented by auxiliaries and civilian vessels. The Royal Navy (RN) at the time consisted of 92 combat vessels<\/a>, so 40% of its combat vessels were sent to the South Atlantic. During the conflict the RN lost four combat vessels<\/a>\u2014two destroyers and two frigates\u2014to Argentine air and missile strikes. Those losses accounted for 16% of its deployed combat strength but only 4% of its overall fleet combat strength. Additionally 11 combat vessels from the task force were damaged, accounting for 30% of its total deployed combat strength and 44% of its deployed surface combatant strength. Keep in mind, the losses inflicted upon the RN came from an Argentine military operating at the edge of its operational range, and using anti-ship missiles (and unguided bombs) that aren\u2019t nearly as accurate as their modern-day counterparts.<\/p>\n If the UK was to deploy a similar task force today\u2014assuming it can deploy a similar percentage of the fleet as it did in 1982\u2014it could assemble a meagre task force of 13 combat vessels from an overall fleet of 32<\/a>. Assuming losses in the same proportion as 1982, one or two vessels would be sunk and another four damaged, which would leave the task force with only 8 undamaged vessels. In fact, the UK may not be able to conduct such an operation today with such low numbers.<\/p>\n For smaller navies such as the Royal Australian Navy, taking similar losses would be devastating. It\u2019s unlikely that the RAN would unilaterally send a naval task force into a high-end conflict. However running the ruler over the fleet using the percentages noted above is illustrative of the risks that naval capability planners across the board are taking by investing in \u2018silver bullets\u2019.<\/p>\n