Andrew Phillips\u2019 expansive and carefully argued report<\/a> is an important corrective to what has thus far been enthusiastic but often superficial advocacy of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic frame of reference. Andrew rightly identifies the concept\u2019s principal analytic weakness: the significant disconnect between the strategic environments of the Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean region. But I think that this disconnect requires more than the move from a hyphen to a forward-slash\u2014his ideas are powerful and should become a key point of reference for policy development in Australia and beyond.<\/p>\nEven though it\u2019s an expansive concept, my concern with the idea of the Indo-Pacific is the ultimately partial way in which it responds to the big forces reshaping the region\u2019s security environment. The Indo-\/Pacific is a maritime concept, yet the region is being reshaped in both maritime and continental ways. One of the useful components of the Asia\u2013Pacific construct (one that remains the norm in most regional countries in spite of what Indo-Pacific boosters may claim) is the way it linked the maritime with the continental. The Indo-Pacific focuses too much on the maritime and insufficiently on the larger security complex of which it is, most assuredly, a crucial part.<\/p>\n
China\u2019s revival is the most important development in world politics of the past 25 years. It\u2019s significant not only because of the explosion of growth, consumption and production, but also because of the way it\u2019s fundamentally restructuring the political economy of Asia and the continent\u2019s strategic geography. Powers like China don\u2019t come along every day, but when they do, they have a gravitational impact on their neighbourhood.<\/p>\n
It\u2019s often said that the idea of Asia is a creation of the European imagination. In its origin that may be so, but like the Middle East, \u2018Asia\u2019 has become a term embraced by the people of the region. More importantly, because of China it\u2019s becoming an increasingly integrated continent which has economic and security complexes centred around the People\u2019s Republic. And like all significant regions it has different sub-regional elements.<\/p>\n
As a synonym for maritime Asia, Indo-Pacific is a perfectly acceptable if somewhat redundant label. My concern with fixing the terminology currently en vogue<\/em> in Canberra is that we\u2019ll miss the larger trends at work in the region. A case in point is China\u2019s \u2018One Belt, One Road\u2019 initiative\u2014the biggest and most ambitious plan of Xi Jinping\u2019s foreign policies. At first glance it seems to be cut from the Indo-Pacific cloth. But upon closer inspection, the policy\u2019s most important element isn\u2019t the maritime Silk Road but the overland infrastructure building plans that have multiple ends, one of which is to dilute China\u2019s vulnerability to maritime blockades and choke-points. Fixation on the Indo-Pacific will lead us to overlook China\u2019s crucial Western pivot.<\/p>\nOne advantage of the Indo-Pacific concept is that it doesn\u2019t point the finger at China. That allows a useful degree of neutrality in the public debate about strategic geography. Yet the megatrends changing Australia\u2019s international environment are being shaped most profoundly by China. One of the biggest issues confronting Australian strategy is the growing gap that exists between the country\u2019s public diplomacy and its private policy convictions. In public, governments of both hues exude a \u2018she\u2019ll be right\u2019 approach with the facile formulation that the country doesn\u2019t have to choose between China and the US. But in private, policy elites acknowledge the profound disruption China is causing. The impulse to the Indo-Pacific formulation reflects an understandable desire to reduce the short-term costs of grappling, both domestically and internationally, with the fact that China is fundamentally changing Australia\u2019s operating environment.<\/p>\n
The Australian government must accept that an increasingly Sino-centric regional security order will mean some hard choices for the country. By describing its region as the Indo-Pacific, not only does the government miss the bigger forces at play, but it ultimately shirks that responsibility.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Australia\u2019s strategic antennae are highly sensitive. In recent years those antennae have had many reasons to twitch, chief amongst them being China\u2019s rise and the disruption it\u2019s causing to the region. One of the most …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":230,"featured_media":29612,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[143,416,52,56,142],"class_list":["post-29610","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-asia-pacific","tag-australian-government","tag-china","tag-indo-pacific","tag-regional-security"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Indo-Pacific: the maritime and the continental | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n