{"id":30209,"date":"2017-01-13T06:23:08","date_gmt":"2017-01-12T19:23:08","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=30209"},"modified":"2017-01-13T06:24:39","modified_gmt":"2017-01-12T19:24:39","slug":"jokowi-and-the-general","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/jokowi-and-the-general\/","title":{"rendered":"Jokowi and the General"},"content":{"rendered":"
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After the debacle over Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) commander General Gatot Nurmantyo\u2019s short-lived unilateral suspension of military co-operation with Australia<\/span><\/a>, can President Joko Widodo afford to let his military chief serve through until his mandatory retirement next year?<\/p>\n It wasn\u2019t the first time that the 56-year-old Nurmantyo has blindsided the country\u2019s commander-in-chief and it mightn\u2019t be the last given his growing reputation as a loose cannon and his apparent ambition to run in the 2019 presidential election.<\/span><\/p>\n Lacking any political party support, it isn\u2019t that he\u2019s shaping up as a genuine election threat at this stage. And the lesson of his predecessor is notable: General Moeldoko had the same misguided ambition before melting into obscurity after he handed over command in July 2015.<\/span><\/p>\n But Nurmantyo has clearly unsettled Widodo because of his alleged links to the hardline Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) and other Muslim groups which staged the two recent mass demonstrations<\/span><\/a> against Jakarta\u2019s ethnic-Chinese governor, Basuki Tjahaya Purnama. Insiders say the president suspects Purnama, now on trial for blasphemy<\/span><\/a>, wasn\u2019t the only target of the protests and that political rivals are using the case to weaken him ahead of 2019 when he\u2019s expected to run for re-election.<\/span><\/p>\n Nurmantyo may have done some damage to relations with Canberra, but the impact won\u2019t be far-reaching thanks to the efforts of Widodo, political coordinating minister Wiranto and even nationalistic Defence Minister Ryamizard Ryacudu to help\u00a0smooth things over<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n Firing senior figures for insubordination is rarely done in Indonesia, but Nurmantyo\u2019s actions are making Widodo look weak and ineffectual\u2014something he can ill-afford at this stage of the political game.\u00a0Short of dismissing him, the president may do the next best thing and apply police pressure on FPI leader Habib Rizieq, the racist firebrand who has become increasingly emboldened in his campaign to turn Indonesia into an Islamic state<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n As army chief of staff in the early 2000s, Ryamizard was equally problematic, openly opposing the 2005 Aceh peace agreement and expressing suspicions about Indonesian officers who were being trained abroad\u2014just as Nurmantyo is doing now. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono did nothing at the time, but he subsequently sidelined Ryamizard, who despite all the misgivings at the time of his appointment to the defence portfolio, has mellowed with age.\u00a0\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The days when the military seemed to be a conduit to higher office in Indonesia are long gone, even if Yudhoyono rose to the rank of a three-star general during his 27-year military career. It was only after president Abdurrahman Wahid plucked him from the military to become mines and energy minister and later political coordinating minister that he started on the path to the Presidential Palace.<\/span><\/p>\n Unlike Nurmantyo and Moeldoko, Yudhoyono is highly-educated and, for all his many faults, brought Indonesia back onto the world stage after languishing in the shadows through the early chaotic years of democratic rule. Nurmantyo is a throwback to an earlier era, an ultra-nationalist who has never had outside experience and believes Australians and other foreigners are engaged in a so-called \u2018proxy war\u2019 aimed at eventually taking over Indonesia.<\/span><\/p>\n A 1982 military academy graduate, Nurmantyo would have only been a captain\u00a0when the US suspended all military co-operation with Indonesia over the 1991 Dili massacre<\/span><\/a>, a ban that stayed in place until 2005. As a result, a generation of Indonesian officers were deprived of the opportunity to train overseas, an education that would have widened their horizons and perhaps stifled a national tendency to buy into wild conspiracy theories.<\/span><\/p>\n