{"id":30219,"date":"2017-01-16T06:00:23","date_gmt":"2017-01-15T19:00:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=30219"},"modified":"2017-01-15T22:18:12","modified_gmt":"2017-01-15T11:18:12","slug":"poles-australias-png-policy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/poles-australias-png-policy\/","title":{"rendered":"The poles of Australia\u2019s PNG policy"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/em><\/p>\n \u2018So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back ceaselessly into the past.\u2019 <\/em>\u2013 F. Scott Fitzgerald<\/p>\n \u2018The past is a foreign country; they do things differently there.\u2019<\/em>\u00a0\u2013 L.P. Hartley<\/p>\n To delve into government archives is to confront the opposing forces of two poles. One is Fitzgerald\u2019s pole, where history pulls us back, repeating and rhyming. The other is Hartley\u2019s place where they think and act differently.<\/p>\n In Canberra every January, the release of Cabinet archives confronts those ways of understanding the past. This year the Keating Labor Cabinet documents<\/a> of 1992 and 1993<\/a> offer much on our nearest neighbour, Papua New Guinea. Mostly, Fitzgerald wins. The arguments are deeply familiar because they\u2019re still running today. But Hartley pops up in a few telling ways: facts shift and habits change.<\/p>\n Always, though, the fundamental questions ache, as they have since Australia hauled down its flag and PNG became independent in 1975. Reviewing how Australia thought about PNG in seven Defence White Papers<\/a> from 1976 to 2016, I summarised the consistent ache this way: \u2018What must we do? What can we do?\u2019 Hear the frustration and fear in that constant refrain about a vital relationship.<\/p>\n The Keating Cabinet worked hard grappling with what Oz can and must do with PNG. A key Hartley moment was when Australia turned its back on the old aid relationship. By 1992, PNG was in its teenage years as a nation. Australia\u2014the former master\/parent\/administrator\u2014was curtailing the cash allowance. Australia\u2019s colonial habits of mind and routines of financial responsibility were fading fast. The monthly transfer of cash from Australia\u2019s Reserve Bank to Port Moresby\u2014to be spent however PNG wanted\u2014was to be phased out. Canberra would stop all PNG \u2018budget support\u2019 by 2000.<\/p>\n The submission to Cabinet by the Minister for Trade and Aid, John Kerin, set the timeline to replace cash aid with program and project aid. Australia wanted control over what its money did in PNG. \u2018Conditionality\u2019 and \u2018accountability\u2019 arrived.<\/p>\n Running through the Kerin submission is the sense of frustration and failure about PNG that so often afflicts Oz governments: \u2018PNG\u2019s economic performance since Independence has been disappointing. Per capita income in 1991 was lower than 16 years earlier.\u2019 The familiar litany about \u2018serious development problems\u2019 and economic \u2018weaknesses\u2019 are all there, coupled with the hopes about PNG\u2019s bright future.<\/p>\n From 1975 to 1992, Australia had given PNG $5.2 billion\u2014$4.9 billion in cash \u2018budget support\u2019. \u2018No other donor has provided budget support to an ex-colony of the magnitude and for the duration that Australia has provided to PNG.\u2019<\/p>\n Cabinet was told that Australia has spent $5 billion yet got little of what it wanted. Cabinet then resolved to keep spending the same amount, just with more strings. Australia would keep pumping aid to continue as PNG\u2019s top donor. Back in the 1990s, the annual aid flow was $300 million; these days<\/a> it\u2019s $550 million. The frustrations endure.<\/p>\n PNG still pushes against Canberra\u2019s versions of conditionality and accountability. The doyen of Oz correspondents in PNG, Sean Dorney<\/a>, made rethinking the aid relationship a key recommendation of his new book on Australia and PNG, the wonderfully titled The Embarrassed Colonialist<\/em><\/a>. <\/em><\/p>\n