2. A single agency doesn\u2019t fix communication problems<\/strong><\/p>\nIt\u2019s tempting to imagine that a single agency will more easily engage, communicate and share information, but unless the plan is to physically collocate the agencies those tasks will be no easier than what happens right now. Intelligence agencies and police forces have strong cultures built around their professional disciplines and won\u2019t easily bend to social engineering that promotes a surface-deep \u2018one team\u2019 approach to complex problems. As we\u2019ve seen with recent attempts to undertake major structural changes to institutions\u2014amalgamating Customs\/Border Force and Immigration; pushing AusAID back into DFAT, and Defence\u2019s First Principles Review\u2014big organisational changes are difficult to achieve, slow and prone to recidivism. And again, what\u2019s the problem here? Communications can always be improved, but our domestic security agencies had their come-to-Jesus moment about inter-agency cooperation after the Bali bombings.<\/p>\n
3. Building new structures doesn\u2019t guarantee behavioural change<\/strong><\/p>\nAgencies going through big organisational change programs rapidly become obsessed with internal problems and risk losing focus on delivering key outputs. Defence\u2019s First Principles Review starts by listing the 35 significant reviews the Department has been through since 1975. Few reviews after Tange in 1975 changed any real behaviour. Government shouldn\u2019t visit the same blight on the internal security agencies unless they\u2019re convinced that there\u2019s something fundamentally broken in the system. Beyond counterterrorism our internal security agencies have responsibility for a range of activities from fighting crime to counterespionage. With any organisational redesign will come a time-consuming rewrite of reporting responsibilities, authorities and legal frameworks\u2014none of which should be started lightly.<\/p>\n
4. Reorganisations can mask the need for deeper reform<\/strong><\/p>\nWhile administrators go about the business of developing implementation programs\u2014drawing up traffic light indicators to map progress and writing talking points for Estimates Committee hearings\u2014it\u2019s often the case that deep reform in the form of cultural change doesn\u2019t happen. If there\u2019s a problem about communication and information-sharing between national security agencies, it has more to do with the ingrained habits about \u2018how we do things around here\u2019\u2014the formal and informal culture of the organisations. Of course, it\u2019s hard for change-managers to alter workplace behaviours, which is why one can live through constant organisational redesign and actually see little real change.<\/p>\n
5. In counterterrorism, let\u2019s keep the focus on operational delivery<\/strong><\/p>\nA senior ADF colleague used to dryly observe that most major Defence reform plans had little effect 100 metres beyond the Headquarters compound at Russell Hill. It was true that, for all of the hours spent sweating over organisational redesign, the work seemed to have little impact on operations in Timor-Leste, Afghanistan and elsewhere. The essential task in counterterrorism is to keep delivering effective disruption operations. Organisational restructurings will garner limited interest outside of those who imagine some career win or loss\u2014often the real bureaucratic motivation for wanting change in the first place.<\/p>\n
While it\u2019s unlikely that a major reorganisation of agencies will take place, the government should consider whether ministerial roles and responsibilities need to be adapted to better manage counterterrorism policy. The challenge here is that significant numbers of ministers have responsibilities for different agencies relevant to the job. One possibility would be to create a counterterrorism sub-committee of the National Security Committee of Cabinet. Or, like the Indonesians, a senior minister could be given the responsibility of being Coordination Minister for Counterterrorism. There\u2019s a precedent here: although not using the title, Dan Tehan has effectively become the Coordination Minister for Cyber Security.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Recent reporting in News Limited papers suggests that the government is considering reorganising several domestic security agencies into a super department like the UK Home Office. The aim would be to \u2018bring together the AFP, …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":9,"featured_media":30225,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[805,1031,273,1170,1464,376],"class_list":["post-30224","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-afp","tag-asio","tag-counterterrorism","tag-department-of-immigration-and-border-protection","tag-malcolm-turnbull","tag-politics"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
Homeland security: if it ain\u2019t broke\u2026 | The Strategist<\/title>\n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n \n \n \n \n \n\t \n\t \n\t \n