{"id":30663,"date":"2017-02-23T14:30:57","date_gmt":"2017-02-23T03:30:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=30663"},"modified":"2017-03-14T15:57:08","modified_gmt":"2017-03-14T04:57:08","slug":"alliance-management-trump-administration","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/alliance-management-trump-administration\/","title":{"rendered":"Alliance management and the Trump administration"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
If the Trump\u2013Turnbull call illustrated the operatic nature of the early Trump administration, then the Trump\u2013Abe long weekend presented an alternative picture of US alliance management under the new President.<\/p>\n
Both episodes demonstrate how leader-to-leader relations play a role in maintaining forward momentum of an alliance and shaping how it is viewed. Any leaders-level changing of goal posts\u2014on not tweeting opinions about preexisting deals, say\u2014undermines public, as well as official, trust and risks amplifying divergent interests. Conversely, a rapport based on extended interaction and a focus on the overall relationship can consolidate a relationship and help smooth over past problems and divergent interests.<\/p>\n
Regarding the Trump\u2013Turnbull call: disagreements are far from unheard of in the US\u2013Australia relationship. But the leaking of the truncated call and President Trump\u2019s \u2018dumb deal\u2019 focus and tweet helped transform it into a metaphor for the broader dysfunction in the early days of this White House: the disruption and volatility, significant leaking and limited agency involvement.<\/p>\n
It certainly blindsided both Canberra and Washington (beyond the Oval Office), because if any ally had been well positioned with the alliance-sceptical President Trump, it was Australia. Australia pulls its weight more than many other US allies: it\u2019s helping to combat ISIS in the Middle East and increasing defence spending to 2% of GDP\u2014in addition to Australia\u2019s valuable intelligence partnership with the US, high-capability military and key role in US force dispersal strategy.<\/p>\n
Prime Minister Abe\u2019s visit built on his initial meeting with then President-elect Trump as the first foreign leader to visit after the election. President Trump emphasised the \u2018very, very good bond<\/a>\u2019 between himself and Abe, and the opening hug, discussion and long handshake at the White House were followed by a Mar-a-Lago weekend of business, golf, and dinner. Both Trump and Abe appeared eager to build good will and make the visit a success. Abe announced Japan\u2019s increased investment in the US<\/a>, and Trump reaffirmed America\u2019s security commitment to Japan\u2014including the disputed islands\u2014and thanked Japan for hosting American troops.<\/p>\n President Trump clearly values face-to-face meetings, and this visit focused more on the overall US\u2013Japan relationship rather than a purely transactional, individual-deal-based approach. Both sides sought to subsume problems\u2014not least Trump\u2019s previous provocative comments about Japan\u2019s value as an ally\u2014within the broader context of a robust alliance.<\/p>\n But it\u2019s still too early to view the Abe visit as the start of a new trajectory for Trump\u2019s alliance management. Athough the Trump\u2013Trudeau meeting<\/a> seemed positive, Secretary of State Tillerson, Defence Secretary Mattis, and Vice President Pence\u2019s European trips indicate how messages of reassurance to allies can be undercut by confusing signals from the President himself.<\/p>\n