{"id":30685,"date":"2017-02-27T06:00:48","date_gmt":"2017-02-26T19:00:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=30685"},"modified":"2017-02-26T21:12:30","modified_gmt":"2017-02-26T10:12:30","slug":"australias-long-dread-france-south-pacific-part-3","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australias-long-dread-france-south-pacific-part-3\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia\u2019s long dread of France in the South Pacific (part 3)"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Australia\u2019s dread of France in the South Pacific in the 20th century has slowly turned into a new desire\u2014that France stay and play and help pay.<\/p>\n

As the quintessential status quo power in the South Pacific, Australia today embraces France as a new bastion of the existing, preferred order. The shift in Canberra\u2019s thinking acknowledges how France has adapted its ways and adopted regionalist colours. No longer is France the feared as the outsider prone to blowing up\u2014both bombs and its own interests.<\/p>\n

Australia can embrace France as a fellow status quo power in the South Pacific because this is the region where the colonial powers stayed. Unlike Asia and Africa, decolonisation around here didn\u2019t always equate to departure. Only Britain did a full exit\u2014handing off to Australia and New Zealand as it left.<\/p>\n

New Zealand set the decolonising-without-departing model by moving first, showing smarts and creativity. Wellington used a different model for each of its four colonies: Samoa became the first island state to get independence in 1962, with free movement to NZ for 20 years; Cook Islands got self government in 1965 (NZ sharing control of defence and foreign affairs); Niue got self government in free association with NZ in 1974 and Tokelau is a dependent territory of NZ.<\/p>\n

Less deftly, but with equal determination, the US managed the same trick: America Samoa is an unincorporated territory, and America has compacts of free association with Marshall Islands, Micronesia and Palau (although it took eight referendums to get Palau\u2019s compact ratified).<\/p>\n

Compared to the Kiwis, France has taken nearly 50 years to decipher the decolonising-without-departure memo; perhaps the longest of long games was the only option, given the baggage Paris carried.<\/p>\n

France has already scored a major win in the stay-and-play stakes: full membership of the Pacific Islands Forum. Even before New Caledonia votes next year, the South Pacific has rewarded France for its long game. The Forum last year announced the decision to admit New Caledonia and French Polynesia as full members (they\u2019ve had associate membership since 2006). Two French controlled territories have joined the peak Island club that was created as an expression of Pacific independence.<\/p>\n

Nic Maclellan\u00a0<\/a> rightly judges this \u2018a momentous change\u2019. The Forum which hammered out much of its identity and cohesion in fighting France, now accepts that \u2018France seems to be in the Pacific to stay\u2019. Theo Ell<\/a> calls Forum membership the prize for \u2018a marked change in French Pacific strategy, which was previously strongly individualistic and isolationist\u2019. To normalise and reinforce its presence, Paul Soyez<\/a> writes, France has embraced South Pacific regionalism, giving Noumea and Papeete enough autonomy to join in.<\/p>\n

The Forum is the institutional expression of Australia and New Zealand as insiders, both \u2018of\u2019 and \u2018in\u2019 the South Pacific. For the Islands, the Forum is a mechanism to manage relations with Australia and New Zealand, as well as other big players outside the South Pacific. Equally, Australia and New Zealand use the Forum as a vehicle not just for regional consensus, but as a mechanism to create and police norms. The nature of the club reflects Island polities which are conservative, pro-Western, capitalist and Christian. That suits Australia wonderfully\u2014as it will France.<\/p>\n

France\u2014through New Caledonia and French Polynesia\u2014gets two seats at the top table for what will be a protracted argument about the nature of the Forum and the future of the Islands. More than a diplomatic debate, the wrangle goes to issues of power and identity, pitting Oz status quo interests against Fiji\u2019s revisionism<\/a>.<\/p>\n

A key aim of Fiji revisionism is to strip Australia of its rights as an insider, to redefine regionalism so that Australia isn\u2019t part of the South Pacific. In Fiji\u2019s reimagining, Australia and New Zealand would be kicked out of the Forum. In that argument, Australia counts France a welcome reinforcement to the established order.<\/p>\n

Proclaiming Australia\u2019s \u2018leadership role\u2019 to deal with instability, natural disasters and climate change in the South Pacific, the 2016 Defence White Paper<\/a> named a set of partners: New Zealand, France, the United States, and Japan. The hierarchy of lists always matters in White Papers and this is high rating for what France can deliver.<\/p>\n

The White Paper\u2019s discussion of France offered these three layers of history, international approach and new South Pacific partnership:<\/p>\n