{"id":30779,"date":"2017-03-06T06:00:18","date_gmt":"2017-03-05T19:00:18","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=30779"},"modified":"2017-03-04T12:31:20","modified_gmt":"2017-03-04T01:31:20","slug":"australias-guarantee-south-pacific","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australias-guarantee-south-pacific\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia\u2019s guarantee to the South Pacific"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
Over five decades, Australia has expanded its defence and security guarantee to stretch from Timor-Leste through Papua New Guinea to all of the South Pacific.<\/p>\n
Today Australia offers its strategic weight, proximity and resources to be the South Pacific\u2019s \u2018principal security partner\u2019. At key moments\u2014in Bougainville, Timor and Solomon Islands\u2014actions have followed words.<\/p>\n
The Oz guarantee is a bipartisan consensus with deep roots in history. Coalition and Labor proclaim the peril that\u2019d confront Oz if a hostile power got undue influence in the Islands. A constant strategic denial mindset drives policy map creep.<\/p>\n
The first three Defence White Papers in 1976, 1987 and 1994, treated Papua New Guinea as the vital and enduring defence relationship. The rest of the region got a polite assurance of Oz readiness to help.<\/p>\n
Public language ramped up in Gareth Evans\u2019 1989 statement on Regional Security discussing Australia\u2019s \u2018disproportionately large\u2019 military power in the South Pacific. That was Gareth\u2019s Brezhnev Doctrine<\/a> moment, with the statement proclaiming, \u2018we would not want, and could not implement, an Antipodean Brezhnev Doctrine for the South Pacific, in which we were the arbiters of political legitimacy or moral acceptability\u2019.<\/p>\n The disavowal of intent, of course, implies the capacity to act, and Gareth set out the \u2018unusual and extreme circumstances\u2019 for Australia to use force: unfriendly Island government acting against Oz nationals; direct threat to major interests; finite timeline and clear objective; and \u2018if possible the cooperation and participation of other states in the region\u2019.<\/p>\n Then came John Howard\u2019s government which built security guarantees reaching beyond PNG to the rest of Melanesia and East Timor. The 1997 Strategic Policy declared Australia was capable of \u2018exerting considerable influence\u2019 in the South Pacific and would maintain its position as the \u2018strongest strategic presence in this region\u2019.<\/p>\n Interests in PNG were \u2018especially compelling\u2019:Australia \u2018would be prepared to commit forces to resist external aggression against PNG\u2019. The PNG promise was relevant to \u2018defence relationships and objectives in the Solomon Islands and Vanuatu and, with less force, to other more distant Pacific Island countries.\u2019<\/p>\n Having elevated Solomons and Vanuatu to share a treaty pledge with PNG, the \u201997 policy promised \u2018substantial support\u2019 to the rest of the South Pacific to deal with external threats, civil disruption or breakdown of law and order. Then came a classic statement of the Oz strategic denial instinct. Australia’s approach to the security of all South Pacific nations \u2018recognised that \u2018any attack on them – or penetration by a potentially hostile power – would be serious for our security and that, as with PNG, we would very likely provide substantial support in the unlikely event that any of them faced aggression from outside the region\u2019.<\/p>\n The 2000 White Paper repeated the intention to be the region\u2019s key strategic player: \u2018Australian interests in a stable and secure Southwest Pacific are matched by significant responsibilities as leader and regional power.\u2019<\/p>\n The 2009 and 2013 white papers toned down the language if not the intent. The 2013 paper boasted of Australia\u2019s \u2018central role\u2019 in the South Pacific but cautioned that the \u2018growing reach and in\ufb02uence of Asian nations\u2019 introduced new external players: \u2018Australia\u2019s contribution to this region may well be balanced in the future by the support and assistance provided by other powers.\u2019<\/p>\n Come the 2016 White Paper, Australia goes in harder and is more detailed about its role as strategic guarantor. It\u2019s a striking note in an important minor key. In Southeast Asia, Australia promises to strengthen engagement and help build regional organisation, but in the South Pacific we will help governments build and strengthen security. The pledge is to ensure government and social stability, not just freedom from military threat.<\/p>\n The paper declares it\u2019s \u2018crucial\u2019 that Australia help create national resilience and reduce the chances of instability – \u00a0a guarantee with much more than a military flavour.<\/p>\n Australia has built military and security muscle: air lift, a couple of quasi aircraft carriers, the next Pacific Patrol Boat<\/a>, and the Army\u2019s growing marine-type qualities.<\/p>\n