{"id":31318,"date":"2017-04-20T06:00:35","date_gmt":"2017-04-19T20:00:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=31318"},"modified":"2017-04-20T09:35:35","modified_gmt":"2017-04-19T23:35:35","slug":"one-belt-one-road-malaysia-chinas-strategic-enabler","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/one-belt-one-road-malaysia-chinas-strategic-enabler\/","title":{"rendered":"One Belt One Road in Malaysia: China\u2019s strategic enabler?"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Image<\/p>\n

As the recipient of more than US$200 billion<\/a> worth of Chinese infrastructure and real estate investment, Malaysia is fast becoming the principal ASEAN partner in China\u2019s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Malaysia\u2019s need to upgrade its infrastructure to attract larger foreign investors and boost its slowing economy dovetails with China\u2019s OBOR ambitions. But some of those investments have provoked suspicion<\/a> about their potential to enable a Chinese military presence. The Melaka Gateway is one such project, and provides a case study for a closer examination of the potential for OBOR investments in Malaysia to further Beijing\u2019s strategic objectives.<\/p>\n

Last October, the Malaysian government inked a US$6.8 billion deal<\/a> with three Chinese state-owned companies to construct and manage a deep-sea port and Maritime Industrial Park on three reclaimed islands off Malacca city, as part of the larger US$9.7 billion Melaka Gateway mega-development<\/a>. The facilities will include a container and bulk terminal, shipbuilding and repair services, and marine engineering and manufacturing services. Singapore\u2019s Straits Times<\/em><\/a> claims that China harbours military designs for the port, since an additional port on Malaysia\u2019s west coast will be redundant once the planned upgrade to Port Klang\u2014which handles 40% of the country\u2019s cargo<\/a>\u2014alleviates existing overcapacity issues. Also, the reclaimed islands will also enjoy freehold status and the port a 99-year concession.<\/p>\n

The Malaysian government denies claims that China would use the port as a naval base, asserting that it\u2019s never allowed foreign powers to \u2018set up\u2019<\/a> on Malaysian soil. Nevertheless, Sino-Malaysian defence diplomacy has<\/em> matured in recent years<\/a>\u2014a reflection of President Najib Razak\u2019s desire to maintain transparency<\/a> around China\u2019s military capabilities. The latest example came in January this year, when a Chinese nuclear-powered submarine visited Malaysia<\/a> for the first time, after the People\u2019s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was granted access<\/a> to Sabah\u2019s Kota Kinabalu port in 2015 by the Malaysian government.<\/p>\n

Examining China\u2019s other major investments in Malaysia brings the strategic picture into sharper focus. At Kuantan on Malaysia\u2019s east coast, China jointly owns an industrial park and a 40% stake<\/a> in the construction of a deep-sea port. Sand\u2019s being rapidly dredged there to facilitate the US$12.4 billion East-Coast Rail Link<\/a>, 85% of which is financed by China. The line will run from Port Klang on the west coast to Kuantan Port in the east, ending at Tumpat, near Malaysia\u2019s northwest border with Thailand. Once complete, the railway will be a land bridge between Klang and Kuantan, enabling China-bound goods to bypass Singapore and the southern Malacca Strait. That\u2019ll divert significant volumes of traffic<\/a> away from Singapore and enhance China\u2019s ability to control the flow of goods.<\/p>\n

Ports like the Melaka Gateway that can accommodate container ships and have maritime engineering facilities can also accommodate<\/a> the refuelling and replenishing of warships. Malaysia should be alert to the fact that China\u2019s making a habit of deploying the PLAN to protect its commercial activities as it brings its OBOR ports into operation. Last November, Chinese and Pakistani navies conducted drills<\/a> simulating the defence of Gwadar Port and the China\u2013Pakistan Economic Corridor. And China\u2019s recent decision to expand its Marine Corps personnel<\/a> from 20,000 to 100,000 also came with the announcement<\/a> that some would be stationed at Gwadar and its forthcoming naval base at Djibouti.<\/p>\n

China has strong motivations to leverage its OBOR investments in Malaysia for strategic purposes, consistent with the PLAN\u2019s revitalised focus. China\u2019s 2015 defence white paper<\/a> outlined a combination of \u2018near seas defense\u2019 and \u2018distant seas protection\u2019.<\/p>\n

China wishes to exercise strategic dominance<\/a> within the First Island Chain, which it considers its \u2018near seas\u2019. Having access to Malaysian ports facing the South China Sea, as do Kuantan, Kota Kinabalu and Samalaju<\/a>, would increase the PLAN\u2019s capacity to project power and deny access to adversaries, likely the US Navy, in that contested area. In particular, Kota Kinabalu\u2019s close proximity to the Spratly Islands would allow the PLAN to better defend its outposts there.<\/p>\n

China also wants to mitigate risk from its Malacca Dilemma<\/a>, whereby 80%<\/a> of its oil imports from Africa and the Gulf passing through that bottleneck could be obstructed by an adversary in a military blockade. The establishment of alternative energy routes throughout Central and Southeast Asia brings this objective closer. Beijing also wants to be in a position where it can militarily protect those lines of communication in the \u2018distant seas\u2019<\/a>. Access to Melaka and Penang ports would support PLAN deployments further south through the Lombok\u2013Makassar and Sunda Straits\u2014the alternative routes via which China can access the Indian Ocean. Those straits hold strategic value for PLAN because, unlike the Malacca Strait, Indonesia allows warships to conduct unchecked innocent passage<\/a> through its archipelagic sea lanes, and the Lombok\u2013Makassar strait is deep enough for submarines to pass through fully submerged<\/a>.<\/p>\n

As China\u2019s footprint along Malaysia\u2019s port network enlarges, Australian defence planners should get used to seeing the PLAN in their northern maritime approaches more often. The PLAN\u2019s recent 25-day flotilla tour<\/a> through the South China Sea, eastern Indian Ocean and Western Pacific is just the latest manifestation of its growing far-sea capabilities and ambitions. The strategic value of OBOR investments in Malaysia will not only increase China\u2019s economic clout, but would also provide a solid logistical foundation to enable Beijing\u2019s military aspirations.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

As the recipient of more than US$200 billion worth of Chinese infrastructure and real estate investment, Malaysia is fast becoming the principal ASEAN partner in China\u2019s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. Malaysia\u2019s need to …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":595,"featured_media":31319,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,23,102,471],"class_list":["post-31318","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-defence-economics","tag-malaysia","tag-south-china-sea"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nOne Belt One Road in Malaysia: China\u2019s strategic enabler? | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/one-belt-one-road-malaysia-chinas-strategic-enabler\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"One Belt One Road in Malaysia: China\u2019s strategic enabler? | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"As the recipient of more than US$200 billion worth of Chinese infrastructure and real estate investment, Malaysia is fast becoming the principal ASEAN partner in China\u2019s One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative. 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