{"id":31658,"date":"2017-05-05T11:00:59","date_gmt":"2017-05-05T01:00:59","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=31658"},"modified":"2017-05-03T13:11:48","modified_gmt":"2017-05-03T03:11:48","slug":"president-macron-ceremonial-figurehead","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/president-macron-ceremonial-figurehead\/","title":{"rendered":"President Macron: a ceremonial figurehead?"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Emmanuel Macron will most likely win the French presidency in the second round of the election process, much to the delight of those quaking in fear of populism and the threat it poses to the European Union, globalisation and NATO. The barometers of the status quo\u2014the stock markets<\/a> and the currency traders<\/a>\u2014both responded strongly and favourably to Macron\u2019s emergence as frontrunner from the first round. But the sense<\/a> that a high water mark has been reached and that reaction to the failures and disappointments of the international institutions of the post-Cold War era is receding is premature.<\/p>\n While the pro-globalization economist Macron topped the first round poll with 23.8% of the vote, the more significant figure in the longer term is the 46% that went to Eurosceptic candidates<\/a>. On the basis of the current polling results, Macron has a 20% lead over Marine Le Pen and even taking account of early stumbles<\/a> in his final campaign, expectations are that he\u2019ll win. Yet there\u2019s still a chance that the result will be much closer than anticipated if antipathy to Macron results in a low turnout of voters for the second round.<\/p>\n On top of the Eurosceptics\u2019 reluctance to endorse the internationalist neoliberal project of Macron, he remains vulnerable over perceptions of elitism and overconfidence and his past close association with the unpopular Hollande. His main advantage remains not his own project or popularity but the suspicion with which many French voters view the extremism and uncertainty of the National Front.<\/p>\n Given that Macron is most likely to be the next French President, it remains wishful thinking to believe that his election will represent a victory against the Eurosceptics and nationalists. Macron will be arguably the most constrained and powerless president<\/a> of the Fifth Republic. Depending on the outcome of the June National Assembly elections he could finish up as a largely ceremonial figurehead<\/a>.<\/p>\n France\u2019s constitution provides for a separation of powers between the executive (the president and the government), the legislature (the National Assembly and the Senate) and the judiciary. The president, as head of state, appoints the government\u2014the prime minister and ministers of state. In this system only the National Assembly, and not the president, can dismiss the prime minister or the government. This ensures that generally it is critical for prime ministers to have the support of the majority of the National Assembly.<\/p>\n Elections for the parliament follow the presidential election and deputies and senators are also elected for five years. One of the unusual features of Macron\u2019s En Marche progressive movement<\/a> is its disdain for traditional politics and party structures<\/a>. However, his lack of a formal political base and the combination of widespread Eurosceptic sentiment and resistance to many of the reforms he\u2019s signalled could produce a National Assembly that\u2019s at best opposed to many of his proposed initiatives and at worst hostile to his basic philosophy and platform.<\/p>\n The initial optimism over the prospect of a Macron presidency could soon dissipate\u2014particularly if Le Pen cuts Macron\u2019s campaign lead in the final days and generates momentum for the National Front going into the National Assembly elections. Moreover, those French electors who reluctantly vote for Macron to thwart Le Pen\u2019s presidential bid are likely to default in large numbers back to their traditional parties.<\/p>\n