Figure 1: Age of the Russian Navy<\/strong><\/p>\n It\u2019s immediately clear that most vessels in service were built in the waning days of the Cold War; roughly two-thirds of Russia\u2019s current surface combatants and submarines were commissioned between 1985 and 1994. There\u2019s been a recent flurry of activity, but at well below Cold War levels.<\/p>\n Of 21 surface combatants delivered since 2000, 17 are corvettes and four are frigates. Further frigate construction efforts have been hampered since 2014, when Ukraine ceased exporting naval turbines to Russia in retaliation against Moscow\u2019s role in the Crimean crisis. The Russian Navy will be lucky to receive another four frigates by the end of the decade.<\/p>\n Retaining large surface combatants in the fleet has depended on efforts to upgrade and sustain old Soviet-era ships. And Russia\u2019s ambitions for the construction of a new large surface combatant (Leader-class<\/a>) in the 2020s may never be realised, especially if economic conditions don\u2019t improve.<\/p>\n Russia has commissioned just seven diesel\u2013electric submarines (SSKs) since the end of the Cold War. Problems in the first Lada-class boat (Sankt Peterburg<\/em>, 2010) resulted in production being suspended after just one launch. The remaining two are expected for completion by 2019<\/a>, after which a new class is planned. To fill the SSK gap, the Russian Navy accepted six \u2018Improved Kilo\u2019 submarines between 2014 and 2016. Foreign sales of the Improved Kilo have provided steady work for shipbuilders: 18 boats have been delivered to foreign navies since the late 1990s.<\/p>\n Nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN) production has been more troubled: since the last of 10 Akula-class SSNs was commissioned in 2000, only one new SSN has entered service: the Severodvinsk <\/em>(Yasen class). The new submarine was so plagued by problems that the second boat in the class is designated as a new sub-class (Yasen M), and is expected to cost twice as much<\/a> as the first. The new Borei-class SSBNs have been very successful by comparison: three were delivered in 2013\u201314, and another six are planned for completion by 2020.<\/p>\n As noted on The Strategist<\/em> back in November<\/a>, Russia\u2019s trying to reconcile its plans for significant military modernisation with the harsh economic realities of low oil prices and continuing sanctions. Figure 1 paints a picture of a country that\u2019s struggling to restore its naval industry to even a shadow of its Soviet-era glory.<\/p>\n China stands in stark contrast to Russia\u2019s shipbuilding struggles. Spurred on by its economic growth and a growing maritime consciousness<\/a>, China\u2019s been building ships at a frenetic pace. Figure 2 shows the pace and scale of the growth of the People\u2019s Liberation Army \u2013 Navy (PLAN).<\/p>\n Figure 2: Age of the Chinese Navy<\/strong><\/p>\n Most of China\u2019s recent builds are surface vessels of various sizes. Since 2000, China has built 19 large surface combatants (destroyers and aircraft carriers) and 63 small surface combatants (frigates and corvettes). Of the 124 surface vessels currently in service, 53% have been built since 2010, at an average of almost nine surface vessels commissioned per year. The PLAN has invested heavily in corvettes to replace its fleet of ageing coastal patrol craft, as well as larger air warfare vessels to enhance its ability to counter airborne threats\u2014an area in which the PLAN has been deficient for decades.<\/p>\n Interestingly, the PLAN\u2019s submarine fleet is adding vessels at a much slower pace. The bulk of its SSKs were built in the 1990s and 2000s, while its SSN and SSBN boats are coming back online after a production pause. While the exact cause or causes of the pause are unclear, it\u2019s likely that they were to either implement new features into the design (the likely addition of a vertical launch system to the Type 093A)<\/a>, or to remedy known defects (China\u2019s nuclear propulsion systems are notoriously underpowered<\/a>). What\u2019s clear is that China isn\u2019t putting all its eggs in the nuclear-powered basket, as it\u2019s continuing to build SSKs along with SSNs and SSBNs.<\/p>\n The data shows that China is modernising at an incredible rate, and that trend doesn\u2019t appear to be slowing much. Reports<\/a> suggest that a further eight Type 052D destroyers are to be built by 2020, along with the completion of China\u2019s next aircraft carrier<\/a> and the continuation of the Type 056\/056A corvette line. That\u2019s probably just a taste of what\u2019s to come, although shipyard overcapacity<\/a> (and subsequent consolidation) mean that it\u2019s unlikely that PLAN shipbuilding will reach the heights seen in the 2010\u20132014 period.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Most discussions of \u2018near-peer\u2019 conflicts in the modern context include some reference to both a \u2018resurgent Russia\u2019 and a \u2018rising China\u2019. We thought it\u2019d be interesting to compare the navies of the two nations as …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":392,"featured_media":31734,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[52,71,130,163],"class_list":["post-31733","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-china","tag-maritime-security","tag-naval-capabilities","tag-russia"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n![\"\"](\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/05\/JMCC1.png\")
<\/a><\/figure>\n<\/a><\/p>\n