{"id":31872,"date":"2017-05-16T06:00:23","date_gmt":"2017-05-15T20:00:23","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=31872"},"modified":"2017-05-15T16:53:40","modified_gmt":"2017-05-15T06:53:40","slug":"intercontinental-ballistic-missile-defence-futile","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/intercontinental-ballistic-missile-defence-futile\/","title":{"rendered":"Intercontinental ballistic missile defence is futile"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
Australians need to face reality. There\u2019s no viable defence against ICBMs fitted with nuclear warheads. If North Korea develops this technology it will have the capability to devastate cities in South Korea, Japan, Australia, the United States and other parts of the globe. A nuclear first strike by Pyongyang would have devastating consequences.<\/p>\n
Let\u2019s look at missile defence as an option. There\u2019s been much talk of THAAD<\/a> and Aegis<\/a>. These are very advanced capable systems but they can\u2019t protect against a determined ICBM strike. These systems are designed for theatre defence to protect against shorter-range ballistic missiles than ICBMs. The US currently does have an ICBM defence called the Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD)<\/a> based in Alaska and California but this has proven to be largely inadequate to protect US cities from an ICBM strike. A total of 17 trials<\/a> conducted since 1999 resulted in only 9 successful intercepts. One wouldn\u2019t be placing much hope in this system if a single ICBM were to be launched against New York or Washington, let alone a number of ICBMs.<\/p>\n The threat of assured destruction or mutual assured destruction has traditionally helped prevent nuclear powers from launching a first strike. Great powers possessing ICBM capability such as Russia, China and the US, have generally acted responsibly and rationally knowing there is more to lose from launching a first strike than there is to gain. Nuclear strategy throughout much of the nuclear age has been about maintaining deterrence. The concept has worked. The problem with applying nuclear deterrence theory to a rogue state such as North Korea is that it is openly threatening<\/a> to devastate the US in a nuclear strike while developing the means to initiate that attack. It is acting neither responsibly nor rationally so relying on deterrence is a big gamble.<\/p>\n The age old concept, \u2018the best defence is a good offence\u2019 is relevant in this situation. If diplomacy and sanctions fail, the US and its allies, including Australia, will have little choice but to use military action to eliminate the threat. We now live in an age where the bipolar stability of the Cold War has given way to regimes increasingly capable of developing offensive nuclear arsenals which could potentially reach cross the world.<\/p>\n