{"id":31936,"date":"2017-05-19T06:00:57","date_gmt":"2017-05-18T20:00:57","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=31936"},"modified":"2017-05-22T11:21:01","modified_gmt":"2017-05-22T01:21:01","slug":"australia-war-day","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia and War To-day"},"content":{"rendered":"

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Sometimes events move quickly. In December 1998, John Howard wrote to his Indonesian counterpart B.J. Habibie, suggesting that East Timor should vote on self-determination. Fewer than ten months later, Australia was leading a UN sanctioned mission to East Timor involving 23 troop-contributing nations, with around 6,500 ADF personnel deployed on land, sea and air.<\/p>\n

The INTERFET operation couldn\u2019t have come at a worse time; the Australian Defence Force (ADF) had fewer active duty personnel than at any point since 1964, and long-stagnant funding had rendered the force hollow and poorly equipped. To add insult to injury, Defence was in the grip of a highly disruptive efficiency drive that was attempting to get blood from a stone.<\/p>\n

Events were set in motion in late January, when Habibie wrote to the United Nations requesting an autonomy vote for the province. Less than ten days later, the Chief of the Defence Force issued a Warning Order for possible unilateral and multilateral ADF operations in East Timor. There followed a whirlwind of activity within Defence. In March, the government announced that the Army\u2019s Darwin-based 1st Brigade was being brought up to 28 days\u2019 operational readiness. Across the ADF, inventories were checked, warehouses scoured, warstocks replenished, and training began in earnest.<\/p>\n

By June, a high-speed civil catamaran had been commissioned into the RAN to fill a critical gap in the ADF\u2019s amphibious lift capacity. And soldiers finally got the body armour and modern helmets they\u2019d been asking for. In a parallel track, our diplomats worked overtime to secure a UN resolution and muster international support before any ADF personnel set foot in East Timor.<\/p>\n

The operation was a success, largely because no time was lost in preparing (though Indonesian cooperation was also critical).<\/p>\n

Four White Papers and $435 billion later, you\u2019d expect the ADF to be ready for anything that might be thrown its way. In many scenarios, you\u2019d be correct; the ADF is now larger, better equipped, and more integrated than in 1999, and it has almost two decades of hard-won operational experience. Anything that the ADF has done over the past 18 years\u2014from East Timor to Syria\u2014it could repeat tomorrow with confidence.<\/p>\n

But the future won\u2019t be like the past\u2014it never is. The world is changing rapidly and unexpectedly. I fear that the gap between today\u2019s preparedness and tomorrow\u2019s challenges may be even greater than that faced by our \u2018fitted for but not with\u2019 defence force back in 1999.<\/p>\n

Throughout this century, the ADF has been busy in keeping the peace close to home, and assisting the United States further afield.\u00a0 But, as costly as these operations have been in human and financial terms, they are not comparable with conventional interstate conflict\u2014which I believe is a more pressing risk today than at any time since at least the end of the Cold War. The ground is shifting beneath our feet.<\/p>\n

Don\u2019t believe me? Here\u2019s what some prominent thinkers are saying:<\/p>\n