{"id":31978,"date":"2017-05-22T12:22:47","date_gmt":"2017-05-22T02:22:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=31978"},"modified":"2017-05-22T12:24:49","modified_gmt":"2017-05-22T02:24:49","slug":"australia-war-day-part-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia and War To-Day (part 2)"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Last week, I argued that Australia needs stronger defence<\/a>. Today I suggest how that might be achieved.<\/p>\n

Current plans strengthen Australia\u2019s defences slowly. For example, the first of our \u2018future submarines\u2019 won\u2019t enter service until the early 2030s, and we won\u2019t have twelve boats until the early 2050s. The glacial pace of strengthening the ADF is consistent with 2016 Defence White Paper<\/a>‘s assessment that \u2018the United States will remain the pre-eminent global military power over the next two decades\u2019\u2014a critical judgment that the latest US National Intelligence Council assessment<\/a> calls into serious question.<\/p>\n

That\u2019s giving the DWP more credit that it deserves. We know that neither the scale nor pace of plans for the ADF has anything to do with balancing strategic risks and costs, let alone soothsaying about where the US will be in 20 years. Instead, today\u2019s plans are the consequence of an ad-hoc decision to spend 2% of GDP<\/a> on defence by an arbitrary date. To pretend otherwise is to mistake numerology for strategy.<\/p>\n

What\u2019s more, today\u2019s plans are little more than a re-hash of the Rudd government\u2019s abandoned 2009 plan<\/a>. Not only do today\u2019s plans have their genesis in far less challenging times, but we\u2019re starting seven years late.<\/p>\n

There are limits to what can be done to adapt existing plans to looming challenges. Woe betide anyone who upsets the cosy political economy of naval shipbuilding. And Defence would strongly defend the current inter-service division of spoils. Absent a major crisis, existing misallocations and inefficiencies are baked in; our only option is to add to existing plans.<\/p>\n

The quickest and most cost-effective way to strengthen our defence would be to enhance the readiness and sustainability of existing capabilities. Stockpiles of munitions and spare parts should be made sufficient for prolonged independent operations, and additional personnel should be signed-up to increase the availability of existing platforms for deployment. We should analyse where and how we can get the most worthwhile boosts to capability for each extra dollar spent. Plans to upgrade the ADF\u2019s airfields and port facilities should be brought forward.<\/p>\n

Next, we should examine the feasibility of keeping selected existing platforms in service beyond their planned retirement date\u2014even if only as reserve capabilities. Our 71 classic Hornet fighters would be a perfect candidate, but we\u2019ve probably passed the point of no return. If only we\u2019d had the foresight to complete the centre-barrel replacement program.<\/p>\n

What about new capability? Naval platforms might seem an obvious solution, but they take too long to build. At the beginning of WWII, Australia planned to build eight 2,500 ton Tribal-class destroyers\u2014only three were delivered prior to war\u2019s end. And, although the Army can expand quickly, I think we have adequate land forces for the moment. So it\u2019s to the RAAF we must turn.<\/p>\n

Aircraft are supremely useful in our part of the world, and mature designs are available from existing production lines. We should investigate expanded purchases of current and planned ADF combat aircraft. Think of it as an insurance policy\u2014a contingency plan\u2014with any final decision contingent on a further deterioration in the strategic outlook.<\/p>\n

Even with the cautious approach outlined above, strengthening the ADF would cost money, and that would pressure the government\u2019s finances. But a triple-A credit rating will be of little solace if we enter a major conflict unprepared.<\/p>\n

Australia\u2019s security depends on more than its military defence. So, here are three further areas for priority action:<\/p>\n

First, we need to revitalise our diplomatic capacity. After years of cuts and growing demands for consular services, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade is stretched to the limit. Australia\u2019s diplomats are the government\u2019s eyes, ears and voice in foreign capitals. Now, more than ever, the government needs the unique insights and influence that only well-staffed and properly resourced embassies can deliver.<\/p>\n

Second, Australia\u2019s resilience to geopolitical disruption should be bolstered. Sophistry around Australia\u2019s non-compliance with the requirement to hold 90 days of fuel has gone on too long. If it\u2019s good enough for China, Japan, South Korea, the EU and the US to maintain strategic fuel reserves, what makes Australia think that it can rely on foreign markets in a crisis? A strategic reserve of oil and other critical commodities should be created without delay.<\/p>\n

Third, the government needs to practice its decision-making and crisis management skills. The National Security Committee should commence a program of structured simulations (wargames) to hone the government\u2019s response in a strategic crisis. No ADF unit would ever deploy without having competed an extensive exercise program to confirm its readiness, and no lesser expectation should prevail for the government\u2019s higher decision-making processes.<\/p>\n

Alongside a strengthened defence force, those three measures would better position Australia to deal with the challenges of an increasingly unstable and uncertain world. But there\u2019s one more thing: we need a strategy.<\/p>\n

For what it\u2019s worth, I\u2019d double down on the US alliance. It\u2019s true that the relative strength of the US in North Asia is declining, but the US will continue look to Australia as an anchor on the western side of the Pacific even if it is pushed from North Asia. Nothing would please me more than a squadron of US Virginia-class nuclear submarines operating from an Australian port, except perhaps the boats being dual-crewed by RAN sailors. But I know that a great many people would disagree with me; barely a day goes by without a call for Australia to take a \u2018more independent\u2019 position\u2014which is code moving away from the United States. We should be talking about the choices we might have to make. It\u2019s possible, and even likely, that in the \u2018dark and difficult near future\u2019 an Australian government will have to makes rapid decisions with profound consequences for generations to come.<\/p>\n

The forthcoming Foreign Policy White Paper is an opportunity for the government to put forward its narrative for Australia in the 21st century. I wish them luck. Even a half-truthful rendering of our current situation would include grave uncertainties and unpalatable truths. But anything less than that will be a missed opportunity to spur on the nation-defining debate we need to have.<\/p>\n

*In 1935, ex-prime minister William \u2018Billy\u2019 Hughes wrote a book with this title arguing against appeasement and in favour of rearmament, he was forced to resign from the Lyons government for his efforts.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Last week, I argued that Australia needs stronger defence. Today I suggest how that might be achieved. Current plans strengthen Australia\u2019s defences slowly. For example, the first of our \u2018future submarines\u2019 won\u2019t enter service until …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":7,"featured_media":31979,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[131,285,21,523],"class_list":["post-31978","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-anzus","tag-foreign-policy","tag-strategy-2","tag-white-paper"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nAustralia and War To-Day (part 2) | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Australia and War To-Day (part 2) | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"Last week, I argued that Australia needs stronger defence. Today I suggest how that might be achieved. Current plans strengthen Australia\u2019s defences slowly. For example, the first of our \u2018future submarines\u2019 won\u2019t enter service until ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2017-05-22T02:22:47+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-05-22T02:24:49+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/05\/web_130320-N-FG395-130.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"600\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"400\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Mark Thomson\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Mark Thomson\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/05\/web_130320-N-FG395-130.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/05\/web_130320-N-FG395-130.jpg\",\"width\":600,\"height\":400,\"caption\":\"130320-N-FG395-130 KINGS BAY, Ga. (March 20, 2013) The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) returns to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay after three months at sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class James Kimber\/Released)\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/\",\"name\":\"Australia and War To-Day (part 2) | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2017-05-22T02:22:47+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-05-22T02:24:49+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/cea5301d66288d1e898acb13e48f40cd\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Australia and War To-Day (part 2)\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/cea5301d66288d1e898acb13e48f40cd\",\"name\":\"Mark Thomson\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/bd29fe5d57ace7a0cb6fea66808c7e20?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/bd29fe5d57ace7a0cb6fea66808c7e20?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Mark Thomson\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/mark-thomson\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Australia and War To-Day (part 2) | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Australia and War To-Day (part 2) | The Strategist","og_description":"Last week, I argued that Australia needs stronger defence. Today I suggest how that might be achieved. Current plans strengthen Australia\u2019s defences slowly. For example, the first of our \u2018future submarines\u2019 won\u2019t enter service until ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2017-05-22T02:22:47+00:00","article_modified_time":"2017-05-22T02:24:49+00:00","og_image":[{"width":600,"height":400,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/05\/web_130320-N-FG395-130.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Mark Thomson","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Mark Thomson","Est. reading time":"5 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/05\/web_130320-N-FG395-130.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/05\/web_130320-N-FG395-130.jpg","width":600,"height":400,"caption":"130320-N-FG395-130 KINGS BAY, Ga. (March 20, 2013) The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Rhode Island (SSBN 740) returns to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay after three months at sea. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 1st Class James Kimber\/Released)"},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/","name":"Australia and War To-Day (part 2) | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2017-05-22T02:22:47+00:00","dateModified":"2017-05-22T02:24:49+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/cea5301d66288d1e898acb13e48f40cd"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-war-day-part-2\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Australia and War To-Day (part 2)"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/cea5301d66288d1e898acb13e48f40cd","name":"Mark Thomson","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/bd29fe5d57ace7a0cb6fea66808c7e20?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/bd29fe5d57ace7a0cb6fea66808c7e20?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Mark Thomson"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/mark-thomson\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31978"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/7"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=31978"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31978\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":31988,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/31978\/revisions\/31988"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/31979"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=31978"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=31978"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=31978"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}