{"id":32132,"date":"2017-05-30T11:00:40","date_gmt":"2017-05-30T01:00:40","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=32132"},"modified":"2017-05-30T16:30:34","modified_gmt":"2017-05-30T06:30:34","slug":"australian-leadership-new-technologies-warfare","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australian-leadership-new-technologies-warfare\/","title":{"rendered":"Australian leadership on new technologies of warfare"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Since 2015 Australia\u2014partnering with Switzerland\u2014has built support among 36 countries<\/a> to address concerns about military and police forces\u2019 interest in the use of highly toxic chemicals, such as anaesthetic and sedative agents, as weapons for law enforcement. This is a great achievement on an issue first brought forward<\/a> by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 2003, and on which there has been scant multilateral progress. Particularly so given that in recent years the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons has been focused on efforts to dismantle Syria\u2019s chemical weapons and put a halt to the repeated use of chemical weapons in Syria and Iraq<\/a>.<\/p>\n This development signals two important characteristics of Australia\u2019s approach: a willingness to tackle threats to international law and civilian protection, even where there are significant differences in viewpoints among countries; and an ability to remain attentive to emerging risks, even while embroiled in an ongoing crisis.<\/p>\n Such international leadership is urgently needed in other areas where science and technology collide with international law and humanitarian concerns.<\/p>\n The ICRC, for its part, has always pressed for a realistic assessment of new technologies of warfare to ensure they are not employed prematurely if respect for the law cannot be guaranteed. And so I\u2019m pleased to be in Australia this week to take part in the Symposium on the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Emerging Military Technologies<\/a> at Melbourne Law School.<\/p>\n At the UN, efforts to address the implications of increasing autonomy in weapon systems have moved forward slowly. General agreement<\/a> among States that \u2018views on appropriate human involvement with regard to lethal force and the issue of delegation of its use are of critical importance<\/em>\u2019 has been an important outcome of three, week-long, informal discussions at the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). However, this work now needs to step up a gear.<\/p>\n Here there are opportunities for constructive proposals\u2014based on states\u2019 obligation to uphold international humanitarian law<\/a> (IHL) and minimise risks to civilians and to combatants no longer taking part in hostilities.<\/p>\n Australia\u2019s efforts<\/a> to promote better implementation of the legal obligation, and policy necessity, for countries to conduct national<\/em> legal reviews of new weapons prior to their acquisition or use, are very welcome. It\u2019s something the ICRC has long advocated<\/a>. However the ICRC believes there is a critical need to achieve an understanding at the international<\/em> level on how to ensure that humans remain in control of weapon systems and the use of force while making the necessary legal decisions on targeting in armed conflict.<\/p>\n What\u2019s needed now is state-driven work by the newly established CCW Group of Government Experts<\/a> to start answering the difficult questions. Recognising the critical importance of human \u2018involvement\u2019, \u2018control\u2019 and \u2018judgement\u2019 in the use of force in armed conflict, the ICRC has suggested<\/a> that states now determine the type and degree of human control necessary to ensure compliance with IHL, and ethical acceptability. Switzerland\u2019s IHL \u2018compliance based\u2019 approach<\/a> has gained significant support, in particular from Brazil, Chile, Finland, Netherlands, Republic of Korea, South Africa, and Sweden, at the CCW Review Conference in December 2016. Here again, Australia might consider the benefits of joining Switzerland and other concerned States.<\/p>\n Similar arguments for foresight and unity could be made for international debates about other new technologies of warfare. Recently, discussions about robotic weapon systems that are not autonomous but remain remote controlled have focussed on transparency in armed drone operations<\/a>. With the rapid proliferation of military drones to over 90 countries, and non-State armed groups starting to employ improvised versions, the implications for IHL compliance and humanitarian consequences could evolve considerably. Could a move towards reliance on robotic weapon systems on land lead to new risks for civilian populations?<\/p>\n Elsewhere, international discussions on cyber warfare\u2014notably through another UN GGE<\/a>, which Australia chaired from 2012-13\u2014have been considering the applicability of international law in cyberspace.\u00a0 Australia has stressed<\/a> the importance of \u2018elaboration of how international law applies to states\u2019 behaviour in cyberspace especially in non-conflict situations.\u2019<\/p>\n Nevertheless, there is also a need to consider the potential humanitarian consequences of the use of cyber weapons in armed conflict and constraints that may be needed in future on cyber weapons development, acquisition and use. Some ideas are also emerging from industry, for example Microsoft\u2019s recent proposal for a \u2018Digital Geneva Convention<\/a>\u2019 for peacetime, which might influence the debate in situations of armed conflict.<\/p>\n The risks from weapons targeting space systems are also of increasing concern. Although the recurring UN General Assembly Resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space has almost universal support, there are different views among major powers on the means of prevention. Given these realities, Australia has called for greater focus on voluntary transparency and confidence building measures<\/a>.<\/p>\n From the ICRC\u2019s perspective, the ever-increasing military attention to the contested domains of cyber and outer space, and the reliance of civilian infrastructure and services on these interconnected networks, bring with them a particular need to consider the potential humanitarian consequences.<\/p>\n There\u2019s much work to do.\u00a0 Australia\u2014with its government, think-tank, and academic expertise\u2014is well placed to play a greater role.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" Since 2015 Australia\u2014partnering with Switzerland\u2014has built support among 36 countries to address concerns about military and police forces\u2019 interest in the use of highly toxic chemicals, such as anaesthetic and sedative agents, as weapons for …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":651,"featured_media":32137,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,391,1166,332],"class_list":["post-32132","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-cyber","tag-future-of-warfare","tag-technology"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n