{"id":32317,"date":"2017-06-07T14:30:04","date_gmt":"2017-06-07T04:30:04","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=32317"},"modified":"2017-06-07T14:11:34","modified_gmt":"2017-06-07T04:11:34","slug":"shotgun-marriage-blank-cheque-political-economic-trends-east-timor","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/shotgun-marriage-blank-cheque-political-economic-trends-east-timor\/","title":{"rendered":"A shotgun marriage and a blank cheque: political and economic trends in East Timor"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
On 26 October 2015, East Timor\u2019s Audit Chamber vetoed the largest contract in the country\u2019s history\u2014worth US$719 million dollars\u2014for \u2018non-compliance with basic standards in force in Timor-Leste<\/a>\u2019. This contract was part of a highly ambitious \u2018resource corridor\u2019 intended to span the country\u2019s entire south coast.<\/p>\n That a project of this magnitude didn\u2019t go through the most basic due diligence checks is significant for what it tells us about the East Timorese government\u2019s current political and economic trajectory.<\/p>\n While a number of recent political developments have generated considerable discussion, the increasing centralisation of power is a constant undercurrent. In early 2015, the incumbent Prime Minister, Kay Rala \u2018Xanana\u2019 Gusm\u00e3o, stepped down and appointed former Frente Revolucion\u00e1ria de Timor-Leste Independente <\/em>(FRETILIN) Health Minister Dr Rui Maria de Ara\u00fajo in his place, and a number of other FRETILIN members to key roles and positions.<\/p>\n While that move took most observers by surprise, it had long been rumoured. In some respects it\u2019s a welcome rapprochement. Personal enmity between Gusm\u00e3o and the leader of FRETILIN, Mari Alkatiri, was one of the key drivers of the 2006 violence. Elections became a bitter theatre for historical enmities between the two camps thereafter. De Ara\u00fajo is also widely respected as a competent technocrat and there are indications he\u2019s embarked on a modest reform mission in the civil service.<\/p>\n It isn\u2019t such a victory for democracy. East Timor\u2019s governance system was already highly centralised before this new arrangement. Major spending decisions were made by Gusm\u00e3o and a small coterie of unelected confidantes<\/a>, largely bypassing any regulatory oversight.<\/p>\n Now, rather than stepping aside as such a move would suggest, Gusm\u00e3o has actually increased his control. His new self-designed role as Minister of Planning and Strategic Investment retains almost total power over the capital budget, embracing all major infrastructure planning and investment and oversight of the two main regulatory bodies.<\/p>\n The incorporation of senior FRETILIN leaders into government posts has also removed the only effective source of opposition. With Ministerial appointments filled by Gusm\u00e3o loyalists, there are currently few sources of dissent\u2014the National Parliament, for example, unanimously approved the last budget.<\/p>\n A new president has also just been elected, the FRETILIN member Francisco Guterres \u2018Lu-Olo\u2019, but his success can be clearly attributed to Gusm\u00e3o\u2019s endorsement. Guterres was quick to indicate that he won\u2019t rock the boat. Gusm\u00e3o remains the unofficial president, albeit with executive powers not detailed anywhere in the Constitution.<\/p>\n Such a centralisation of power has far reaching implications. The government has embarked on a raft of ambitious but increasingly controversial mega-projects. One is the south coast project, which includes an autobahn-like highway, a refinery, an airport and dedicated port\u2014with the ill-fated sea wall. In the isolated Oecusse enclave, construction for a Special Zone for Social Market Economy (ZEESM) (headed by Alkatiri) is already well underway. Drastically under costed and with little regard for detailed feasibility studies, those projects have the potential to bankrupt the state.<\/p>\n The Tase Mane project, for example, is premised on Timor winning the majority of the Greater Sunrise gas field. Without the skilled workforce or extant industrial sector to benefit from such a massive investment, the economic justification alone is so tenuous this investment should never have been countenanced. Given the likelihood that Greater Sunrise may not be developed for at least ten years\u2014if at all\u2014and, that Timor is by no means guaranteed a lion\u2019s share of that field under current median line negotiations, Tase Mane should be shelved indefinitely.<\/p>\n According to local NGO La\u2019o Hamutuk<\/a>, the Oecusse ZEESM project has already received almost $500 million in public funds over the last three years. While its project documents list a range of risible fantasies such as a \u2018Centre for Excellence in Ethical Investment\u2019, the centerpiece of this project is a planned light manufacturing hub. A 2016 World Bank<\/a> report commissioned by the ZEESM Authority comprehensively rebutted government feasibility arguments.<\/p>\n Oecusse isn\u2019t on an international shipping route, for example, and it\u2019s highly unlikely that the enclave will ever generate sufficient industrial output to change that. This fact in itself should be enough to stop the project in its tracks. As with the South Coast project, investors have not been queuing up. Nonetheless, work continues, for example, on construction for a planned international airport. Where the passengers will come from is unknown, but like many other such ventures, economic or development outcomes seem to be a distant secondary consideration.<\/p>\n In July this year, East Timor will go into its third full parliamentary election. Despite a strong challenge from the nascent reform-minded People\u2019s Liberation Party, the dominance of Gusm\u00e3o\u2019s Congresso Nacional da Reconstru\u00e7\u00e3o Timorense<\/em> (CNRT) and FRETILIN is unlikely to change. Neither, therefore, is the nation\u2019s current spending regime.<\/p>\n Petroleum revenues are estimated to end around 2021, yet the government has consistently withdrawn funds from the Petroleum Fund at more than a sustainable rate. As a consequence, East Timor is likely to run out of money within the next decade.<\/p>\n