Defence Act 1903<\/em> in conjunction with s.119 of the Constitution which allows a state to request assistance from the Commonwealth to protect it from \u2018domestic violence\u2019. The Commonwealth may agree if it\u2019s satisfied that the state can\u2019t defend itself.<\/p>\nCoroner Michael Barnes SC rightly found, in this regard, that the threshold for call out hadn\u2019t been met \u2018because the NSWPF considered it had the capacity to respond effectively to Monis\u2019 actions and did not advise the NSW government otherwise\u2019. While Mr Barnes made a series of findings on shortcomings in the police response, he didn\u2019t find they lacked the capacity to have responded effectively.<\/p>\n
One telling finding that should give pause for review, however, is that tactical police told the inquest they didn\u2019t know how to seek the support of the Army\u2019s east coast Tactical Assault Group (TAG East). This isn\u2019t because the police specialist response units and TAGs don\u2019t work together\u2014on the contrary, they are closely engaged through exercises, briefings and a range of other activities\u2014but because the call-out decision itself isn\u2019t well-practised. And for a matter involving constitutional powers, this shouldn\u2019t be left to the operators alone: appropriate authorities at all levels of government need to truly understand, through experience, how this works.<\/p>\n
There\u2019s a need for regular and realistic decision-making exercises for all authorities involved in the response to a terrorist incident. These need to simulate the ambiguity and fluidity of a developing possible terrorist scenario, and to require hard decisions to be made. Each Cabinet in Australia should be knowledgeable, familiar and practised in that form of emergency decision making, including linking in to counterparts across the federation. That type of decision-making exercise is different from roundtable briefings on generic responses\u2014which do occur\u2014as it pushes authorities and agencies to make difficult decisions and to encounter assumptions and problems. The exercise\u2019s value is in teaching responders how to deal with a crisis in a safe environment, and how to identify and work through issues.<\/p>\n
A real crisis isn\u2019t the time to learn about crisis decision-making.<\/p>\n
The coroner also went a step further to ask whether<\/em> the ADF should have been called out, concluding only that the forthcoming Defence review provided an opportunity to consider this. Indeed, if the benchmark for ADF response to a terrorism incident is the Lindt siege, then this raises serious questions about Australia\u2019s overall CT capability. After all, the siege involved a single armed offender in the CBD of Australia\u2019s largest city and home to Australia\u2019s largest and best-equipped police force. TAG-E happens to be located in the same city, but its proximity isn\u2019t replicated around Australia.<\/p>\nThe terrorist threat to Australia includes coordinated mass-casualty, multiple-location explosives and firearms, and our first responders need to be prepared for that, as well as lower-level and single actor attacks such as what occurred at the Lindt caf\u00e9.<\/p>\n
There\u2019s a role for the ADF TAGs and other elements to provide supplementary support, but this must be balanced with a reasonable expectation about how they would complement the police role and, in extremis<\/em>, be the last resort for use of lethal force.<\/p>\nWhile ADF tactical response through call out has received the most attention, the coroner highlights shortcomings in other areas of Defence support that will require the government\u2019s focus. Part IIIAAA refers to unspecified \u2018support\u2019, not just tactical response, and the coroner notes a range of areas where there was, or could have been, contact with Defence, where additional support could have helped the police. The report suggests this support was either not forthcoming, or was otherwise deficient.<\/p>\n
The police plan for \u2018deliberate action\u2019 (DA) is a key focus for the inquest. The coroner was scathing about both police DA planning capability and the decision to not carry out a DA to resolve the siege. The DA plan was shared with TAG-E, which advised that the DA was \u2018technically feasible\u2019. The coroner found that Defence could and should have provided greater assistance to the police by identifying vulnerabilities in the DA and advising improvements. Throughout the siege the police understood Monis had explosives, and the coroner stated Defence could have provided additional support on that threat, through the Special Operations Engineer Regiment located with TAG-E.<\/p>\n
An ADF Liaison Officer\u2014with supporting staff\u2014was embedded with the NSW police, but the inquest showed there appeared to be little understanding about the officer\u2019s role beyond keeping TAG-E informed of what the police were doing. The coroner suggests the liaison role might be better used to facilitate Defence support to the police.<\/p>\n
The picture emerging from the inquest is one of two very separate entities\u2014NSW police and TAG-E\u2014joined only by tactical-level information being passed from the incident site to keep the special forces unit aware of developments. There\u2019s no sense of a broader understanding by any parties of Defence support beyond the TAG-E. The complexities of the current and emerging security environment calls for best and complementary use of all capabilities available. The Defence CT support review should look broadly to the range of capabilities it could provide to assist in preventing and responding to terrorism. Of concern in an environment of widespread debate about use of call out powers\u2014even including calls to change the legislation\u2014there\u2019s no mention of any consideration of the decisions and mechanisms for call out at higher levels of authority in the NSW and Commonwealth governments. Before considering changing legislation, we should look at whether decision-makers and operators are both educated and trained in how the existing legislation works.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
ADF \u2018call out\u2019 was a headline issue from the coronial inquest into the Lindt caf\u00e9 siege. Counsel assisting the coroner raised it during hearings in May last year, speculating that ADF special forces might have …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":408,"featured_media":32415,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[44,273,1083],"class_list":["post-32414","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australian-defence-force","tag-counterterrorism","tag-sydney-siege"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\n
The Lindt caf\u00e9 siege: lessons from the coronial inquest (part two) | The Strategist<\/title>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\n\t\n\t\n\n\n\n\n\n\t\n\t\n\t\n