{"id":32633,"date":"2017-06-30T11:00:30","date_gmt":"2017-06-30T01:00:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=32633"},"modified":"2017-06-30T11:10:05","modified_gmt":"2017-06-30T01:10:05","slug":"hong-kongs-handover-hangover","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/hong-kongs-handover-hangover\/","title":{"rendered":"Hong Kong\u2019s handover hangover"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Earlier this month, an estimated 100,000 Hong Kong residents gathered in Victoria Park<\/a>, to mark the 28th anniversary of China violent repression of pro-democracy protesters in Beijing\u2019s Tiananmen Square. As the South China Morning Post<\/em> noted, the event in Hong Kong was the only large-scale public commemoration<\/a> of June 4, 1989, permitted on Chinese soil. And, to the attendees, the Hong Kong demonstration reflected growing frustration, not only with China\u2019s leaders, but also with their own.<\/p>\n On the surface, little has changed since the United Kingdom returned Hong Kong to China 20 years ago. But, in reality, China now exercises near total control over Hong Kong\u2019s management.<\/p>\n China no longer believes that local leaders can competently govern the Hong Kong \u2018special administrative region,\u2019 no matter how sympathetic they are to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China learned that lesson from the tenure of Tung Chee-hwa as Hong Kong\u2019s chief executive from 1997 to 2005, and that of Leung Chun-ying from 2012 to 2017. Neither was able to earn the support of Hong Kong\u2019s residents.<\/p>\n In Leung\u2019s case, a first term riddled with crisis and scandal caused China to lose confidence in his ability to lead. In December 2016, three months before the 1,193-members Election Committee was to vote for a new chief executive, China told him not to stand for a second term<\/a>. Despite being seen as a pro-China \u2018hawk\u2019 and a staunch supporter of the CCP, Leung was deemed unfit. Carrie Lam, a former chief secretary of the Hong Kong civil service, and at the time, Leung\u2019s number two, was pushed into the candidacy.<\/p>\n Her election marked the second time since the handover from the British that a deputy replaced a CCP loyalist. The first time was when Tung, Hong Kong\u2019s first chief executive, resigned midway through his second term, in favor of his second in command, Donald Tsang, after Tung\u2019s unpopular policies and divisive personality provoked unprecedented mass demonstrations.<\/p>\n China originally assumed that Tung, a shipping tycoon educated in England who was well known among elites in Hong Kong and Western capitals, would be an ideal successor to the last British governor, Chris Patten<\/a>. But Tung was a tone-deaf political leader. He chose to ignore the fact that Hong Kong was built by refugees from China, comfortable with British rule, and was always fidgety about China\u2019s politics.<\/p>\n Tung (and later, his prot\u00e9g\u00e9, Leung) also misunderstood his mission. China\u2019s leaders didn\u2019t want another compliant \u2018patriotic Chinese City\u2019 on China\u2019s soil. They had plenty of those already. They wanted to retain Hong Kong as a dynamic capitalist showcase\u2014one that remained as politically quiescent as before the handover.<\/p>\n It is not clear who\u2014Tung or Leung\u2014was a more divisive leader. Both claimed, without providing evidence, that \u2018hostile\u2019 foreign forces, seeking to pry Hong Kong away from China, were behind the city\u2019s many troubles.<\/p>\n Tsang\u2019s administration was calmer, but his cozy relationships with real-estate tycoons resulted in an unusually restrictive zoning policy that exacerbated Hong Kong\u2019s housing-price problem. He currently is on bail, appealing a conviction<\/a> for accepting favors from a developer.<\/p>\n Hong Kong\u2019s leadership vacuum has only widened the city\u2019s political, economic, and generational fault lines. Today, many young people, feeling ignored by the China-friendly leadership, are openly discussing independence and self-rule, alarming the CCP.<\/p>\n Who can blame them? Sky-high property prices, the result of years of policy failures, have destroyed any chance for educated young people to buy homes. Meanwhile, many parts of the mainland have economically surpassed Hong Kong, which, in 1997, was China\u2019s most advanced, modern city.<\/p>\n That inertia is clearly visible in Hong Kong\u2019s economic statistics. For example, income inequality in 2016, as measured by the Gini coefficient, was the ninth worst in the world, only one notch better than Zambia. Mainland China, meanwhile, ranks in the middle of the pack, at 90th place<\/a>.<\/p>\n Even when compared to Singapore\u2014traditionally dismissed by Hong Kong residents as an excessively taxed authoritarian city-state, compared to their own low-tax laissez-faire economy\u2014Hong Kong comes up short. The most recent World Economic Forum report<\/a> lists Singapore as the world\u2019s second-most competitive economy; Hong Kong ranks ninth. Moreover, in 2016, Singapore\u2019s per capita <\/em>GDP, measured by purchasing power parity, was $87,100, or about 50% higher than Hong Kong\u2019s.<\/p>\n