{"id":32868,"date":"2017-07-13T14:30:38","date_gmt":"2017-07-13T04:30:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=32868"},"modified":"2017-07-13T14:29:36","modified_gmt":"2017-07-13T04:29:36","slug":"defence-sustainment-low-profile-important","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/defence-sustainment-low-profile-important\/","title":{"rendered":"Defence sustainment: low profile, but very important"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/p>\n
Defence spent $8.3 billion on sustaining its equipment in 2016\u201317, compared with $9.3 billion on new capital equipment. But most of the words written on defence procurement (including mine) are about acquisition projects. Thankfully the Australian National Audit Office decided to take a look at the decidedly unfashionable world of defence materiel sustainment in the performance audit<\/a> that hit the streets this week. As is usually the case, there\u2019s a mixture of low-hanging fruit\u2014the sprawling Department of Defence can always be counted on for a free kick or two\u2014and more considered, deeper analysis of the department\u2019s processes and structures.<\/p>\n The overall message is fairly reassuring: the auditors describe the fundamentals of Defence\u2019s framework for managing materiel sustainment as \u2018fit for purpose\u2019. But they also note that there\u2019s scope for Defence \u2018to improve its performance monitoring, reporting and evaluation activities to better support the management and external scrutiny of materiel sustainment\u2019.<\/p>\n I agree about there being scope for better and clearer reporting. The last time the department reported detailed sustainment costs for the full suite of outputs was in an extensive series of tables in its 2006\u201307 annual report. That information was invaluable for those of us tasked with providing well-informed advice about defence capability planning and management. For example, the force structure costings in ASPI\u2019s 2008 Strategic choices<\/em><\/a> paper were based on those tables. And a comparison of sustainment spending on Collins submarines and Anzac frigates provided an early indicator that all was not well in the maintenance of our submarines<\/a>.<\/p>\n In recent years, public information has become more aggregated, sparser and less revealing<\/a>, despite Defence having significantly better internal data management mechanisms than was the case a decade ago.<\/p>\n A clear example of problems in reporting the efficiency and effectiveness of sustainment activities is Defence\u2019s quarterly performance reports. As the name suggests, the reports cover a three-month period, yet they take two months to produce. And, worse, in the ANAO\u2019s view they\u2019re \u2018neither complete nor reliable\u2019 and don\u2019t include information Defence possesses that would be helpful in providing the reader with a clearer picture.<\/p>\n The audit report includes a case study to illuminate the problems. Annex 3 is the April\u2013June 2016 quarterly sustainment report for the perennially low-hanging Tiger armed reconnaissance helicopter<\/a>. The figures show us that 100% of the annual sustainment budget of $134 million was expended, but only 68% of planned flying hours were achieved. Yet the report\u2019s \u2018traffic lights\u2019 were either green or amber, and the reader could be excused for thinking things were tracking well enough. The ANAO observes that the problem is that the report\u2019s traffic lights<\/p>\n focus attention on the measures contained in contractual and intra-Defence agreements (for example, aircraft \u2018availability\u2019) and not the measures that matter to Army, the end-user (aircraft actually able to be flown).<\/p><\/blockquote>\n It\u2019s all a little reminiscent of Yes, Minister<\/em>\u2019s efficient National Health Service hospitals, which met all sorts of performance indicators<\/a>\u2014except for treating sick people.<\/p>\n The audit notes that Defence\u2019s \u2018sustainment gate reviews\u2019\u2014a relatively recent practice\u2014allow management attention to be drawn to issues that might otherwise escape notice. However, the output of those reviews doesn\u2019t find its way into the quarterly reports. Joining up those activities would seem to be an easy improvement to make. The ANAO recommends that Defence institute a \u2018risk-based quality assurance process\u2019 for information included in the quarterly performance report. It\u2019s just to be hoped that the new step doesn\u2019t take more than an extra month to complete \u2026<\/p>\n