{"id":34022,"date":"2017-09-05T12:30:37","date_gmt":"2017-09-05T02:30:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=34022"},"modified":"2017-09-05T11:36:38","modified_gmt":"2017-09-05T01:36:38","slug":"clearing-backlog-look-future-not-past","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/clearing-backlog-look-future-not-past\/","title":{"rendered":"Clearing the backlog: look to the future not the past"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Last month, Kate Grayson provided us<\/a> with a good descriptive analysis of the problems faced by public sector agencies that rely on the Australian Government Security Vetting Agency (AGSVA)<\/a> to process applications for Top Secret Positive Vetting<\/a> (TS(PV)) clearances. I\u2019m a big supporter of Kate\u2019s perspective that \u2018the long delays in security vetting for some of our key intelligence agencies are clearly unacceptable\u2019. I also think that Michael L\u2019Estrange and Stephen Merchant were on the money in the 2017 Independent Intelligence Review<\/a> when they recommended that \u2018ASIO receive additional resourcing to allow it to second staff to AGSVA as soon as possible\u2019 and that \u2018the situation with AGSVA TS(PV) clearances be reviewed in early 2018 to allow time for the current remediation program to have effect\u2019.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, I would argue that Kate\u2019s recommendation to \u2018reinstitute the model of individual entities managing their own security vetting based on Australian government policy requirements\u2019 will worsen, rather than remediate, the problem. Decentralisation will do little more than permit contracted vetting service providers to increase the per unit price (which has already risen by 35% in six years\u2014see here<\/a> and here<\/a>) of clearances by creating a competitive market with limited suppliers.<\/p>\n

To find policy options to address this issue, it\u2019s worth considering the historical and economic factors that have shaped today\u2019s challenges. The backlog has its origins in a series of events starting in the late 1990s from which Australia\u2019s TS(PV) clearance providers have never been unable to recover.<\/p>\n

Until the late 1990s, Australia had a rather modest number of public servants and Australian Defence Force personnel with TS(PV) clearances: for the most part those serving in the intelligence community. During that period, processing of TS(PV) applications was generally completed within six months of submission.<\/p>\n

In 1999, it was discovered that former Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) staff member Jean-Philippe Wispelaere<\/a> had managed to steal 1,382 classified documents. Then, in 2001, DIO analyst Simon Lappas<\/a> provided classified documents to a Canberra-based prostitute to sell to a foreign government. Shortly after those incidents, Australia\u2019s TS(PV) process was drastically strengthened<\/a> with regard to initial clearance and ongoing monitoring of personnel. With precious additional funding, the processing time slowed down markedly under the weight of a major review of all current clearances. By the end of 2002, the average wait time for a TS(PV) clearance had increased to 12 months.<\/p>\n

With the September 11 terror attacks, the need for the global exchange of nationally classified intelligence increased dramatically. The 16-year war on terror has increased the numbers of intelligence staff who need security clearances (in 2013\u201314, more than 33,000 clearances were granted, compared with 15,000 ten years before). At the same time, the number of non-intelligence agency staff with a need to access classified information has grown even more rapidly. That created a second balloon impact on the waiting time for TS(PV) clearances, which is still being felt today.<\/p>\n

Following Edward Snowden\u2019s extensive unauthorised disclosure of US classified material in 2013, the TS(PV) environment changed again<\/a>. In an effort to remediate the vulnerabilities exposed by Snowden, the number of Australians requiring TS(PV) clearances rose dramatically. Furthermore, the requirements for TS(PV) clearances were tightened to align with the minimum standard that our allies would recognise.<\/p>\n

The Gillard government established AGSVA within the Department of Defence in October 2010 as a remediation measure. There should be no doubt that over time AGSVA has improved the consistency of vetting practices. Nevertheless, the government of the day\u2019s expectation<\/a> that \u2018centralised vetting would: result in a more efficient vetting process; \u2026 and deliver $5.3 million in annual cost savings\u2019 was simply naive when vetting numbers and standards were in a period of rapid change. In a matter of months in 2015, the number of active TS(PV) cases managed by AGSVA jumped by 29%<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The government\u2019s assumption was flawed from the start:<\/p>\n