{"id":34175,"date":"2017-09-14T06:00:14","date_gmt":"2017-09-13T20:00:14","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=34175"},"modified":"2017-09-13T11:34:54","modified_gmt":"2017-09-13T01:34:54","slug":"sea-5000-less-risk-capability","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/","title":{"rendered":"How to do SEA 5000 with less risk and more capability"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"\"The ADF\u2019s SEA 5000 \u2018Future Frigate\u2019 program faces two important but distinct challenges. The first concerns capability: the plan is to build a new class of warships to replace the Anzac class from the mid-2020s, with an emphasis on anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. The second challenge is industrial: construction of the first of the new frigates is due to commence at the government-owned shipyard in South Australia in 2020. That\u2019s a tight schedule, given that the basic ship design won\u2019t be selected until 2018.<\/p>\n

The two aspects of the program are in competition. Completing detailed design work on a platform that meets Australia\u2019s capability requirements will take time, but industrial concerns, especially workforce continuity, have driven the program towards an aggressive start date<\/a>. The most likely outcomes are a delay in beginning construction, concessions on capability, or both. None of those outcomes would be palatable for the government, but there may be a compromise with a net positive effect.<\/p>\n

The best way forward for SEA 5000 may be to split the program into two classes, with an initial build of three vessels of one type before transitioning to a mature continuous production run of another. To maximise continuity and reduce project risk, the class of three could be based on the AWD. The follow-on class would be based on one of the SEA 5000 design contenders: either the BAE Global Combat Ship (Type 26) the Fincantieri ASW FREMM, or possibly a more highly modified Navantia F-5000<\/a>, pending a decision from government. A decision on the second class of vessels could still be made in 2018, after which several years of risk reduction would begin. Or the decision could then be deferred until a later date when the risk landscape has changed.<\/p>\n

For example, construction on the first of eight Type 26 frigates for the UK Royal Navy has just recently begun\u2014deferring a decision until the first of class is delivered would reduce risk if it\u2019s selected for the RAN. The Type 26 and the FREMM-IT are also being considered for the Canadian surface combatant program, and the FREMM is one of only a few foreign designs under consideration by the US Navy<\/a> for its FFG(X) program. A deferred decision by Australia could provide opportunities for international collaboration on design work\u2014and potentially even component exports during production.<\/p>\n

Building more AWDs would give the RAN an option to field a sea-based ballistic missile defence (BMD) capability sooner than current plans would allow, and in greater numbers. Defence has the option of adding BMD capability to the AWDs during an upgrade in the second half of the 2020s. Even if the threat from North Korea subsides, the need for a naval BMD capability is likely to increase in the coming years as anti-ship ballistic missiles proliferate.<\/p>\n

A second tranche of AWDs under the SEA 5000 program could bring BMD-capable vessels into service as soon as 2023\u201324. Installing newer systems into the third Hobart-class<\/a> AWD, HMAS Sydney<\/em>, during fit-out would introduce BMD capability even sooner, in 2019\u201320, but no plan exists to do so and the window of opportunity may have closed, depending on the availability of long lead-time components.<\/p>\n

If the AWD design remains mostly unmodified for the follow-on three vessels, construction could begin as soon as the workforce capacity and materials are available, perhaps even in 2019\u2014a year ahead of the currently planned start date of 2020. That would help avoid the \u2018valley of death\u2019 and remove the need for split OPV construction<\/a>.<\/p>\n

An unmodified design might be controversial when it comes to the choice of radar: while the Australian-made CEAFAR radar is reputedly superior to the AWD\u2019s SPY-1D radar in performance, and is the radar of choice for SEA 5000, using the SPY-1D would allow us to reap the benefits of the US Navy\u2019s integration testing regime. That\u2019s particularly important for BMD capability: while it\u2019s likely that the CEAFAR radar can be integrated with the SM-3 ballistic-missile interceptor, it would need to be developed and tested over a long period of time.<\/p>\n

The only sacrifice would be a reduced ASW capability in that six of the RAN\u2019s 12 surface vessels in service as of 2040 will be specialised for ASW instead of nine. But all of the RAN\u2019s major surface combatants will continue to be general-purpose warships, designed to perform a broad range of missions, including ASW, to varying degrees of performance. The shortfall in ASW capability can be made up for with smaller platforms, including unmanned systems<\/a> or ASW-specialised corvettes<\/a> (not unlike the 1,800-ton OPVs), and more ASW aircraft (which are more likely to matter more<\/a> than the ships themselves). Delivering additional naval BMD capability to the fleet later would be more difficult.<\/p>\n

There are multiple emerging opportunities for international collaboration on designing and building surface combatants to mutual benefit. But even if Australia decides to produce a wholly orphan design, a \u2018three then the rest\u2019 build program would mean that detailed design work for the later SEA 5000 vessels wouldn\u2019t need to be completed for several years. And rushing into a decision to accommodate industrial concerns wouldn\u2019t be necessary; splitting SEA 5000 into two classes would be beneficial for both industrial and capability reasons.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The ADF\u2019s SEA 5000 \u2018Future Frigate\u2019 program faces two important but distinct challenges. The first concerns capability: the plan is to build a new class of warships to replace the Anzac class from the mid-2020s, …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":392,"featured_media":34176,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[788,1429,304,579,289],"class_list":["post-34175","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-anti-submarine-warfare","tag-future-frigate","tag-royal-australian-navy","tag-shipbuilding","tag-us-navy"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nHow to do SEA 5000 with less risk and more capability | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"How to do SEA 5000 with less risk and more capability | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The ADF\u2019s SEA 5000 \u2018Future Frigate\u2019 program faces two important but distinct challenges. The first concerns capability: the plan is to build a new class of warships to replace the Anzac class from the mid-2020s, ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2017-09-13T20:00:14+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-09-13T01:34:54+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/09\/20170706usa0000000_052-1.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"820\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"537\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"James Mugg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"James Mugg\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"4 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/09\/20170706usa0000000_052-1.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/09\/20170706usa0000000_052-1.jpg\",\"width\":820,\"height\":537,\"caption\":\"The amphibious transport dock USS Green Bay (LPD 20) (bottom), the amphibious assault USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) (left), the military sealift command underway replenishment oiler USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) (middle), and the Royal Australian Navy frigate helicopter HMAS Anzac (FFH 150) (right) prepare to conduct a multi-ship replenishment-at-sea and vertical replenishment during Talisman Saber 17. Green Bay, part of a combined U.S. -Australia-New Zealand expeditionary strike group, is undergoing a series of scenarios that will increase naval proficiencies in operating against blue-water adversarial threats and in its primary mission of launching Marine forces ashore in the littorals. Talisman Saber is a biennial U.S. -Australia bilateral exercise held off the coast of Australia meant to achieve interoperability and strengthen the U.S. -Australia alliance. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Sarah Myers\/Released) *** Local Caption *** The Talisman Saber series of exercises is the principal Australian and United States Military Training activity focused on the planning and conduct of mid-intensity \u0091high end\u0092 war fighting. Exercise Talisman Saber is the largest combined, joint military exercise undertaken by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and provides invaluable experience to ADF personnel to improve combat training, readiness and interoperability, exposing participants to a wide spectrum of military capabilities and training experiences. The biennial exercise was conducted for the seventh time in 2017, involving more than 30,000 US and Australian participants, operating in the maritime, land and air environments.\"},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/\",\"name\":\"How to do SEA 5000 with less risk and more capability | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2017-09-13T20:00:14+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-09-13T01:34:54+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/31d8b441ededde7cfcfe2a0a880574cf\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"How to do SEA 5000 with less risk and more capability\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/31d8b441ededde7cfcfe2a0a880574cf\",\"name\":\"James Mugg\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/fe09781e45ce32d9611a0870da85dbfa?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/fe09781e45ce32d9611a0870da85dbfa?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"James Mugg\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/james-mugg\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"How to do SEA 5000 with less risk and more capability | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"How to do SEA 5000 with less risk and more capability | The Strategist","og_description":"The ADF\u2019s SEA 5000 \u2018Future Frigate\u2019 program faces two important but distinct challenges. The first concerns capability: the plan is to build a new class of warships to replace the Anzac class from the mid-2020s, ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2017-09-13T20:00:14+00:00","article_modified_time":"2017-09-13T01:34:54+00:00","og_image":[{"width":820,"height":537,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/09\/20170706usa0000000_052-1.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"James Mugg","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"James Mugg","Est. reading time":"4 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/09\/20170706usa0000000_052-1.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2017\/09\/20170706usa0000000_052-1.jpg","width":820,"height":537,"caption":"The amphibious transport dock USS Green Bay (LPD 20) (bottom), the amphibious assault USS Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) (left), the military sealift command underway replenishment oiler USNS Rappahannock (T-AO 204) (middle), and the Royal Australian Navy frigate helicopter HMAS Anzac (FFH 150) (right) prepare to conduct a multi-ship replenishment-at-sea and vertical replenishment during Talisman Saber 17. Green Bay, part of a combined U.S. -Australia-New Zealand expeditionary strike group, is undergoing a series of scenarios that will increase naval proficiencies in operating against blue-water adversarial threats and in its primary mission of launching Marine forces ashore in the littorals. Talisman Saber is a biennial U.S. -Australia bilateral exercise held off the coast of Australia meant to achieve interoperability and strengthen the U.S. -Australia alliance. (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Sarah Myers\/Released) *** Local Caption *** The Talisman Saber series of exercises is the principal Australian and United States Military Training activity focused on the planning and conduct of mid-intensity \u0091high end\u0092 war fighting. Exercise Talisman Saber is the largest combined, joint military exercise undertaken by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and provides invaluable experience to ADF personnel to improve combat training, readiness and interoperability, exposing participants to a wide spectrum of military capabilities and training experiences. The biennial exercise was conducted for the seventh time in 2017, involving more than 30,000 US and Australian participants, operating in the maritime, land and air environments."},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/","name":"How to do SEA 5000 with less risk and more capability | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2017-09-13T20:00:14+00:00","dateModified":"2017-09-13T01:34:54+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/31d8b441ededde7cfcfe2a0a880574cf"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/sea-5000-less-risk-capability\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"How to do SEA 5000 with less risk and more capability"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/31d8b441ededde7cfcfe2a0a880574cf","name":"James Mugg","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/fe09781e45ce32d9611a0870da85dbfa?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/fe09781e45ce32d9611a0870da85dbfa?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"James Mugg"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/james-mugg\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34175"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/392"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=34175"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34175\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":34177,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/34175\/revisions\/34177"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/34176"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=34175"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=34175"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=34175"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}