{"id":34979,"date":"2017-10-23T06:00:41","date_gmt":"2017-10-22T19:00:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=34979"},"modified":"2017-10-23T08:59:25","modified_gmt":"2017-10-22T21:59:25","slug":"australia-solomon-islands-and-ramsi","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/australia-solomon-islands-and-ramsi\/","title":{"rendered":"Australia, Solomon Islands and RAMSI"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

Australia spent years saying no to a central role in the mounting crisis in Solomon Islands. Then, in 2003, Canberra did a huge U-turn and led the intervention that ran for 14 years and ended in June this year.<\/p>\n

Here are two interpretations of Australia\u2019s 2003 decision:<\/p>\n

Oz academic orthodoxy<\/strong>\u2014Australia was driven by the US alliance and the \u2018war on terror\u2019. Australia\u2019s \u2018new interventionism\u2019 was a mix of neo-liberal dreaming about fixing weak states and security fears about the South Pacific \u2018arc of instability\u2019.<\/p>\n

Canberra official story<\/strong>\u2014The Solomons was a failing\/failed state pleading for help. As regional leader, Australia responded. The Pacific Islands Forum embraced \u2018cooperative intervention\u2019.<\/p>\n

The interpretations cover the same ground, but clash. In seeing how Australia thinks about the South Pacific<\/a>, the regional assistance mission RAMSI<\/a> is a rich study.<\/p>\n

The official story tells some truth while glossing over much. The academic orthodoxy is a bleak understanding, seeing Australia\u2019s South Pacific policy as not actually derived from the South Pacific.<\/p>\n

The academic logic is that if 9\/11 hadn\u2019t happened to the US, Canberra would have stood back, watching the Solomons slide into hell; no push from Washington, no Pacific action from Oz. Two examples from academic journals:<\/p>\n