{"id":36616,"date":"2018-01-01T06:00:07","date_gmt":"2017-12-31T19:00:07","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=36616"},"modified":"2018-01-03T08:58:02","modified_gmt":"2018-01-02T21:58:02","slug":"keating-suharto-security-treaty","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/keating-suharto-security-treaty\/","title":{"rendered":"The National Archives releases (part 1): the Keating\u2013Suharto security treaty"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"\"<\/figure>\n

In Jakarta\u2019s presidential palace in December 1995, Australia\u2019s Prime Minister Paul Keating stood with Indonesia\u2019s President Suharto as their two foreign ministers signed a security treaty.<\/p>\n

Keating was ebullient. Here was Australia as a regional insider, able to strike a unique bilateral deal with the delphic Javanese leader at the centre of Southeast Asia.<\/p>\n

The Agreement on Maintaining Security secretly negotiated with Suharto was a singular achievement that became a failed leap of faith. The mix of bravado and aspiration in the treaty\u2019s creation made it a deal between two extraordinarily different people\u2014Suharto and Keating\u2014more than an agreement between two extraordinarily different peoples.<\/p>\n

The announcement of the treaty a few days before the signing ceremony shocked the rest of Southeast Asia as much as it surprised Canberra\u2014and it blindsided the military elite around Suharto.<\/p>\n

At the signing ceremony in Jakarta, Australia\u2019s deputy prime minister, Kim Beazley, went up to a group of Indonesian generals he\u2019d come to know when serving as Australia\u2019s defence minister (1984\u201390) and cheerfully greeted them: \u2018Hello, allies!\u2019<\/p>\n

The treaty was an uncharacteristic moment for proudly non-aligned Indonesia, marking a moment of sublime acceptance for Keating. And three months later, when Labor was swept from power by Australia\u2019s voters, it became his final grand international gesture. Keating left politics expressing confidence that the security agreement would endure as a monument to Australia\u2019s rightful place in Asia.<\/p>\n

On the flight back to Canberra after the signing, Keating confided to Beazley his fear that the treaty would be his last \u2018big picture\u2019 moment as prime minister. As Beazley recalls that conversation with Keating: \u2018He said to me, \u201cYou know, Kim, I think we are going to lose [the federal election].\u201d Which was not good news to a deputy about to fight an election two or three months after that.\u2019<\/p>\n

The Liberals had been in opposition for a dozen years, and Keating told Beazley: \u2018I think they can do some very silly things. I want to put in place as much ballast that they can live on while they bring themselves up to speed.\u2019<\/p>\n

Just as Keating had built his personal relationship with Suharto to achieve the APEC summits, so the treaty was the ultimate expression of friendship between two leaders whose closeness emphasised all their contrasts. As Gough Whitlam jested about Keating\u2019s commitment to Suharto: \u2018Paul always preferred older men.\u2019<\/p>\n

Beazley reflects that Keating had \u2018enormous admiration for the old man\u2019. Indeed, says Beazley, Keating \u2018loved Suharto, and Suharto loved him. Suharto regarded him as a son and was enormously protective of him\u2019.<\/p>\n

Beazley was speaking ahead of the release by the National Archives of the 1994 and 1995 cabinet records of the Keating Labor government.<\/p>\n

The submission Keating put to his cabinet for approval of the deal (with the draft press release to go out immediately after cabinet agreed) is a classic bit of prime ministerial fait accompli. And it\u2019s classic Keating on Indonesia:<\/p>\n

There is no country more important to Australia than Indonesia. Australian territory can in effect be directly threatened with military force only from or through Indonesia and Papua New Guinea. Bilaterally, this agreement will:<\/p>\n

\u2022 provide reassurance that Australia and Indonesia recognise that each has a fundamental interest in the security of the other;
\n\u2022 commit each to cooperating with the other in ensuring their own security and that of the region;
\n\u2022 demonstrate that each has confidence in the intentions of each towards the other; and
\n\u2022 complement the progress that has been made in other areas of the relationship.<\/p>\n

It will have, therefore, an important and positive effect on the attitudes of the public in each country towards the other. Through the agreement Indonesia is making a clear statement that it is not a threat to Australia and is committing itself to cooperating with us.<\/p>\n

Standing in the presidential palace reporting the signing ceremony, I spent most of my time on the then common ASEAN obsession: staring at Suharto to check his movements and speech and health. The age-old problem of one-man rule is old age. Australia shared the region\u2019s obsession with what would come after the strongman lost his strength. The issue of Suharto\u2019s eventual departure was the justification for the agreement Keating never used in public. But his cabinet submission was explicit:<\/p>\n

Whether or not the succession to President Suharto goes smoothly and what direction Indonesia\u2019s policies will take are difficult to predict. While this agreement will not in itself obviate problems for us, it could well help us deal with that period. This agreement is an important long-term structure which will consolidate Australia\u2019s place in the region, reinforce the stability of our region, and help reduce the uncertainties in our future.<\/p>\n

Suharto fell in 1998, after 31 years in power, consumed by Asia\u2019s financial crisis. By September 1999 the treaty was gone, abrogated by Indonesia\u2019s military as Australian soldiers entered East Timor at the head of a multinational force to stop the slaughter that followed Timor\u2019s vote for independence.<\/p>\n

Ultimately, the logic of the security deal reasserted itself. In November 2006, Australia and Indonesia signed the Lombok treaty\u2014an Agreement on the Framework for Security Cooperation\u2014a broader and more detailed version of what Suharto and Keating attempted. It was among the last big foreign policy wins of John Howard\u2019s government\u2014a rare bit of Howard\u2013Keating symmetry.<\/p>\n

But there\u2019s one crucial difference: the Lombok treaty is an agreement between two democracies, not just between two leaders.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

In Jakarta\u2019s presidential palace in December 1995, Australia\u2019s Prime Minister Paul Keating stood with Indonesia\u2019s President Suharto as their two foreign ministers signed a security treaty. Keating was ebullient. 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