{"id":36936,"date":"2018-01-30T06:00:51","date_gmt":"2018-01-29T19:00:51","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=36936"},"modified":"2018-01-29T15:42:31","modified_gmt":"2018-01-29T04:42:31","slug":"contested-skies-uncertain-air-superiority-future","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/contested-skies-uncertain-air-superiority-future\/","title":{"rendered":"Contested skies: our uncertain air superiority future"},"content":{"rendered":"
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In war, there\u2019s a constant to and fro. At times defence dominates, at other times offence. Technologies arise and fall. Disruption rules. This is noticeably so in today\u2019s arcane world of air superiority. While much investment has gone into the ADF\u2019s air superiority capabilities\u2014with more coming with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter\u2014the operational environment isn\u2019t standing still.<\/p>\n

The skies are increasingly contested. Emerging threats are making our tanker and AEW&C (airborne early warning and control) aircraft more vulnerable<\/a>, and advanced surface-to-air missiles<\/a>, stealth-fighter technology, long-range ballistic <\/a>and cruise missiles and even hobbyist drones<\/a> are proliferating. The US Air Force (USAF) recently studied <\/a>what all this means in practice and determined that its \u2018projected force structure in 2030 is not capable of fighting and winning against [the expected] array of potential adversary capabilities\u2019. If the USAF\u2019s force structure is becoming stretched so, surely, is ours.<\/p>\n

Some warn<\/a> that the 2030 date may mislead, asserting that \u2018Integrated Air Defence Systems covering areas in the Western Pacific \u2026 may now be able to deny access to all but the stealthiest of aircraft\u2019. The \u2018stealthiest of aircraft\u2019 refers to the flying wing B-2 Spirit stealth bombers and forthcoming B-21 Raiders. It seems that F-35s with their vertical tails have some vulnerabilities<\/a> to emerging multiband digital radars. A RAND study<\/a>\u00a0echoes these concerns about current and growing air-superiority shortcomings.<\/p>\n

Even so, 2030 isn\u2019t far away in defence terms. It\u2019s only seven years after Australia\u2019s F-35 fleet will have\u2014hopefully<\/a>\u2014reached final (or full) operational status. That\u2019s not long in the planned 25- to 30-year life of the aircraft.<\/p>\n

Australia has committed to its major air superiority investments, which makes them a good starting point to discuss the strategic impacts of known and emerging changes in the air superiority operational environment. In my new paper published by ASPI titled Contested skies<\/em><\/a>, I use current air superiority force structure plans to develop three practical strategic options to address these changes.<\/p>\n

Two of these options require modifying the current plans. That may worry some, but strategic \u2018ends\u2019 can\u2019t be determined independently of the capability \u2018means\u2019. The two are interdependent. When the means are fixed, it makes sense to discuss alternative \u2018ways\u2019 that might reasonably bring strategic ends into alignment.<\/p>\n

The three options are:<\/p>\n