{"id":37179,"date":"2018-02-07T14:30:00","date_gmt":"2018-02-07T03:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=37179"},"modified":"2018-02-07T13:55:56","modified_gmt":"2018-02-07T02:55:56","slug":"us-nuclear-posture-review-quiet-eastern-front","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/us-nuclear-posture-review-quiet-eastern-front\/","title":{"rendered":"The US Nuclear Posture Review: all quiet on the eastern front"},"content":{"rendered":"
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The Trump administration\u2019s Nuclear Posture Review<\/a> (NPR) has received mixed reviews. Some see it as a dramatic move away from a long-term US policy of reducing the size and salience of its nuclear arsenal, and a commitment to a long-term nuclear competition\u2014the German foreign minister calls it an \u2018arms race<\/a>\u2019\u2014with Russia and China. Others insist that the document represents a throwback to the days of the Cold War<\/a>\u2014and we can count the Chinese foreign ministry<\/a> among the supporters of that line. The Washington Post<\/em>\u2019s editorial board decries Trump\u2019s request for even more nuclear weapons as \u2018flawed overkill<\/a>\u2019. And many argue that Trump is lowering the threshold for nuclear use, some claiming that new low-yield nuclear warheads constitute a \u2018gateway drug for nuclear war<\/a>\u2019.<\/p>\n

In contrast, administration officials, when launching the document, went out of their way to emphasise the elements of continuity between this NPR and its predecessors. The Obama administration\u2019s negative security assurance\u2014that the US won\u2019t use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are in good standing with their NPT obligations\u2014remains unchanged. The threshold for US nuclear use, similarly, remains unchanged. The bulk of the strategic modernisation program is the one sketched out in the final years of the Obama presidency. Even the aggregate size of the arsenal seems unlikely to grow much. The new low-yield warhead for the Trident D5 SLBM will simply entail modifying a small number of existing warheads. And, at this stage, the proposed new sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) is no more than a gleam in the eye\u2014it\u2019s entirely possible that it\u2019ll never be built.<\/p>\n

But, from Australia\u2019s point of view, it\u2019s worth looking more closely at what, if anything, has actually changed in terms of \u2018tailoring\u2019 US assurances to its allies and partners in Asia. That means having a look at pages 36\u201337 of the NPR, in particular at the section called \u2018Strengthening deterrence in Asia\u2019.<\/p>\n

To anyone reading that text, it\u2019s apparent there\u2019s less change in this NPR than some are suggesting. Much of the section is devoted to the several ways in which the Asian strategic environment is different from the European one, and therefore that the US nuclear posture in the two regions is also different. In Asia, there are no forward-deployed nuclear weapons, nor any dual-capable aircraft of the sort based in Europe under existing NATO arrangements. As the NPR states, \u2018the United States currently relies almost exclusively on its strategic nuclear capabilities for nuclear deterrence and the assurance of allies in the region\u2019.<\/p>\n

The US commits itself to doing four things \u2018to maintain credible extended deterrence and thus effective assurance in this complex environment\u2019:<\/p>\n