{"id":37194,"date":"2018-02-08T14:30:49","date_gmt":"2018-02-08T03:30:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=37194"},"modified":"2018-02-08T12:15:28","modified_gmt":"2018-02-08T01:15:28","slug":"lament-us-national-defence-strategy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/","title":{"rendered":"The lament of the US national defence strategy"},"content":{"rendered":"
<\/figure>\n

The US national defence strategy<\/a> exudes more than a wistful sense of loss and more than regret at the inability of US economic and military power to sustain its hegemony. It\u2019s a lashing out at and resentment of the fact that, perversely, the preponderant power it wielded over the past six decades has led to the rise of strategic rivals.<\/p>\n

A longing for what is irreversibly passing isn\u2019t a sound basis for strategic assessment. Building a policy on an attempt to regain lost influence is a mistake. Halting the retreat from postwar primacy is at the heart of the strategy. \u2018Failure to meet our defense objectives will result in decreasing US global influence, eroding cohesion among allies and partners.\u2019<\/p>\n

China is depicted as an adversary in this environment. The strategy laments the \u2018increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based international order\u2019. And it says that China is now undermining the international order \u2018from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles\u2019. But this interpretation fails to recognise the growing number of other, and possibly more consequential, factors at work\u2014including the Trump administration itself.<\/p>\n

One of those key factors is the failure of the liberal international order to deliver better wealth equality<\/a>, job security and wages growth to many citizens. In Europe<\/a>, in particular, the obvious waning of state sovereignty and the perceived erosion of local cultural values and norms have given rise to nativism, nationalism and far-right ideologies that are antithetical to liberal values and the globalised world. Brexit is just one example.<\/p>\n

The effect of President Donald Trump\u2019s veneration of the primacy of the nation-state, disregard for multilateralism and advocacy of economic nationalism is as deleterious as anything else. Doug Stokes<\/a> has labelled the Trump world view \u2018transactional bilateralism\u2019. He describes Trump\u2019s foreign policy as combining \u2018elements of isolationism with cost\u2013benefit bilateralism\u2019 and \u2018a deep ambivalence towards the liberal international regimes that America has helped bring to birth and sustain since the end of the Second World War\u2019. \u00a0\u2018Trump\u2019, he says, \u2018may well do irreparable damage to the liberal order and thus, more broadly, to the West.\u2019<\/p>\n

The strategy\u2019s reliance on \u2018a robust constellation of allies and partners\u2019 stands in stark, and ironic, contrast to Trump\u2019s ambiguity about multinational arrangements\u2014as evidenced in his contrary approach to Israeli\u2013Palestinian peace negotiations, his withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement and his reluctance to continue with the Iranian nuclear deal.<\/p>\n

Moreover, the Europeans don\u2019t see China in the same menacing terms<\/a>. Visiting China, UK Prime Minister Theresa May said<\/a> she was pleased \u2018to take further forward the global strategic partnership that we have established\u2019. Shortly before that, French President Emmanuel Macron\u2019s visit<\/a> to China evinced no concerns about China as a military threat or a dangerous revisionist power. Mutual trade was his priority.<\/p>\n

Although the European Union will potentially derive great benefits from lying at the western terminus<\/a> of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), issues of transparency and sustainability standards are still impediments to major EU direct involvement. There are also concerns about China\u2019s perceived influence on EU members through its foreign direct investment<\/a> in Europe, which increased<\/a> to \u20ac35 billion in 2016 (up 77% from 2015). Those concerns have recently led to proposals for closer analysis of strategic acquisitions by China<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Nevertheless, after considering the European Commission\u2019s \u2018Elements for a new EU strategy on China<\/a>\u2019, the Council of the European Union<\/a> stated that it welcomed opportunities to work with China \u2018to promote global public goods, sustainable development and international security, and to address global and regional challenges within the multilateral system\u2019. In addition, the council \u2018expects the EU\u2019s relationship with China to be one of reciprocal benefit in all respects\u2019. It also anticipates \u2018China’s constructive and active participation in providing security as a global public good\u2019.<\/p>\n

Strategic assessments need to be accurate, comprehensive, objective, balanced and useful. When they are, their judgements will be shared by all informed observers. The concepts and language employed can predetermine the outcome of the debate over policy options. In matters of strategic and defence policy, the consequences can be serious. It\u2019s certainly not the case that the \u2018great strength<\/a>\u2019 of the strategy \u2018is the realistic geopolitical picture it paints of the world\u2019.<\/p>\n

China is a large, established, internationally recognised state and a permanent member of the Security Council. It\u2019s a revisionist power<\/a>. The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the New Development Bank and the BRI shows that China is trying to reshape some international institutions and trade patterns. A senior industry figure<\/a> at the latest Davos gathering predicted that the BRI \u2018is going to be the new WTO\u2019. This trend cannot be changed.<\/p>\n

Communist, atheist China<\/a> and oligarchic, orthodox Russia<\/a> don\u2019t share \u2018an authoritarian model\u2019, and their political economies and foreign policy<\/a> approaches are fundamentally different. Yes, domestically their regimes are oppressive and neither government privileges the same democratic freedoms, or civil and human rights, that are generally guaranteed in Western polities. However, across the world<\/a>, China is viewed more favourably than the US, and its now substantial development aid has clear beneficial effects in participating nations<\/a>. The US approach to foreign aid seems far less neutral<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The reality of China\u2019s international engagement with the world doesn\u2019t conform with the strategy\u2019s ominous account, and its presentation of prevailing global dynamics is deeply inadequate. The document\u2019s adversarial and confrontational tone, bristling with umbrage at lost privilege, and lamenting that the US no longer enjoys \u2018uncontested or dominant superiority in every operating domain\u2019, is as disturbing as it is unhelpful.<\/p>\n

Australia needs its own clear-eyed and realistic appreciation of this complex, nuanced and evolving world.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

The US national defence strategy exudes more than a wistful sense of loss and more than regret at the inability of US economic and military power to sustain its hegemony. It\u2019s a lashing out at …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":103,"featured_media":37195,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[1],"tags":[2047,1920,2070],"class_list":["post-37194","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-general","tag-australia-us-relations","tag-belt-and-road-initiative","tag-us-foreign-policy"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nThe lament of the US national defence strategy | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The lament of the US national defence strategy | The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:description\" content=\"The US national defence strategy exudes more than a wistful sense of loss and more than regret at the inability of US economic and military power to sustain its hegemony. It\u2019s a lashing out at ...\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"The Strategist\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2018-02-08T03:30:49+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-02-08T01:15:28+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/alanya-591651_640.jpg\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"640\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"480\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Mike Scrafton\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@ASPI_org\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Mike Scrafton\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"5 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\",\"name\":\"The Strategist\",\"description\":\"ASPI's analysis and commentary site\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":\"required name=search_term_string\"}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\"},{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/#primaryimage\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/alanya-591651_640.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/alanya-591651_640.jpg\",\"width\":640,\"height\":480},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/\",\"name\":\"The lament of the US national defence strategy | The Strategist\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website\"},\"primaryImageOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/#primaryimage\"},\"datePublished\":\"2018-02-08T03:30:49+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-02-08T01:15:28+00:00\",\"author\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/b76db306b735df519ebfadd4907e399f\"},\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The lament of the US national defence strategy\"}]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/b76db306b735df519ebfadd4907e399f\",\"name\":\"Mike Scrafton\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-AU\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/eb3a07a7266023a543a391575d4853e5?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/eb3a07a7266023a543a391575d4853e5?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Mike Scrafton\"},\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/mike-scrafton\/\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The lament of the US national defence strategy | The Strategist","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The lament of the US national defence strategy | The Strategist","og_description":"The US national defence strategy exudes more than a wistful sense of loss and more than regret at the inability of US economic and military power to sustain its hegemony. It\u2019s a lashing out at ...","og_url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/","og_site_name":"The Strategist","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/ASPI.org","article_published_time":"2018-02-08T03:30:49+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-02-08T01:15:28+00:00","og_image":[{"width":640,"height":480,"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/alanya-591651_640.jpg","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Mike Scrafton","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@ASPI_org","twitter_site":"@ASPI_org","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Mike Scrafton","Est. reading time":"5 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/","name":"The Strategist","description":"ASPI's analysis and commentary site","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":"required name=search_term_string"}],"inLanguage":"en-AU"},{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/#primaryimage","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/alanya-591651_640.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-content\/uploads\/2018\/02\/alanya-591651_640.jpg","width":640,"height":480},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/","url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/","name":"The lament of the US national defence strategy | The Strategist","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#website"},"primaryImageOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/#primaryimage"},"datePublished":"2018-02-08T03:30:49+00:00","dateModified":"2018-02-08T01:15:28+00:00","author":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/b76db306b735df519ebfadd4907e399f"},"breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-AU","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/lament-us-national-defence-strategy\/#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The lament of the US national defence strategy"}]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/b76db306b735df519ebfadd4907e399f","name":"Mike Scrafton","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-AU","@id":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/eb3a07a7266023a543a391575d4853e5?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/eb3a07a7266023a543a391575d4853e5?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Mike Scrafton"},"url":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/author\/mike-scrafton\/"}]}},"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37194"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/103"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37194"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37194\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":37196,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37194\/revisions\/37196"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37195"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37194"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37194"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37194"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}