{"id":3727,"date":"2013-02-01T13:45:36","date_gmt":"2013-02-01T03:45:36","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/?p=3727"},"modified":"2013-06-28T13:52:14","modified_gmt":"2013-06-28T03:52:14","slug":"avoiding-a-final-showdown-with-north-korea","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.aspistrategist.ru\/avoiding-a-final-showdown-with-north-korea\/","title":{"rendered":"Avoiding a \u2018final showdown\u2019 with North Korea"},"content":{"rendered":"
\"Final<\/a><\/figure>\n

After the UN Security Council tightened existing sanctions against North Korea<\/a> this month (adding four organisations and six individuals to its blacklist) the North responded by warning that it would carry out additional rocket launches and a third nuclear test. In recent days, the North has ramped up its histrionic rhetoric<\/a> saying that a third nuclear test is the \u2018demand of the people\u2019 and that it has \u2018no other option but to push forward towards the final showdown\u2019.<\/p>\n

Against this backdrop, there\u2019s no doubt that we’re in the middle of another cycle of North Korean nuclear brinkmanship. Intelligence reports, including images of activity around the Punggye-ri nuclear test site<\/a>, suggest that a third nuclear weapon test is imminent\u2014another step in Pyongyang\u2019s typical escalatory ladder. For instance, in April 2009 it began by conducting a rocket launch, which prompted the UNSC to tighten sanctions. This led Kim Jong-Il to retaliate by authorising a second nuclear test. It wouldn\u2019t be surprising to see the same pattern repeated, especially in the context of the North\u2019s current threat levels, South Korea\u2019s successful rocket launch<\/a>, and because South Korea is due to assume the UNSC presidency in February.<\/p>\n

Looking back, North Korea\u2019s first nuclear test was widely considered to be a failure<\/a> and its second too small to be an unqualified success<\/a>. But analysts now fear that a third might produce a yield of between 12\u201320 kilotonnes, which would indicate that North Korea has managed to resolve some or all of its technical difficulties.<\/p>\n

If there is a third successful test in the near future, we can expect the usual response from the international community. The unfortunate reality is that the North Korea nuclear challenge has developed into a seemingly unsolvable conundrum, and in the absence of any clear solution, the international community will respond much the same way as it has in the past\u2014probably with the same results.<\/p>\n

First, there\u2019ll be the usual diplomatic outcry, as it will have become clear that Kim Jong-un has established his country as a fully-fledged nuclear power and proved that he\u2019s just as willing as his father to engage in strategic brinkmanship. Following the initial outcry, the UNSC will roll out further condemnation, with another resolution tightening existing sanctions or\u2014if a more far-reaching deal can be reached with China\u2014new sanctions.<\/p>\n

There\u2019s also likely to be some soul-searching over what steps might have a chance of stabilising the increasingly volatile situation in Northeast Asia. Once the initial furore dies down, one option that might gain greater traction is a more concerted effort to engage North Korea in regional dialogue, possibly via a diplomatic process involving some or all of the countries that were involved in the Six Party Talks<\/a>. (An initiative involving China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States which ran from 2003\u20132008,and which led to some constructive dialogue and concrete progress in disarmament). At least initially, the aim of these talks would need to be less ambitious than the previous Six Party Framework; it could simply focus on opening channels of communication and de-escalating the current standoff.<\/p>\n

This idea would inevitably attract support from China, which provided much of the momentum behind the Six Party Talks. Even so, getting a regional process off the ground wouldn\u2019t be easy. In the clearest statement that it has made to date, North Korea\u2019s foreign ministry claimed<\/a> that the Six Party Talks and the joint September 19 statement are \u2018null\u2019 and the denuclearisation of the Korean peninsula has been \u2018put to an end.\u2019<\/p>\n

But the Obama administration hasn\u2019t shown any enthusiasm for the resumption of regional dialogue and, for any multilateral initiative to work, it will need the United States. At a 12 December press conference, US Ambassador to the UN, Susan Rice, stated<\/a> that Pyongyang would have to \u2018demonstrate clearly and without equivocation [its] commitment to denuclearization\u2019 as a foundation for a \u2018credible resumption\u2019 of the Six-Party process. A rocket launch followed by a declaration of nuclear defiance (and possibly a nuclear test) hardly meets those criteria, and the understandable desire of the Obama administration is to avoid any initiative that could be interpreted as rewarding North Korea\u2019s provocations.<\/p>\n

However, it would be unwise to prolong the current isolation of North Korea (including from its only ally, China), which gives it little incentive to change its behaviour. Sanctions are a necessary and important part of the international community\u2019s response to nuclear brinkmanship, but they need to be backed by other measures that facilitate dialogue and reduce tension. But what we have is a fragmented approach. The Obama administration\u2019s policy of \u2018strategic patience\u2019 (waiting for Pyongyang to show a willingness to negotiate in good faith while relying on sanctions for damage limitation) is strong on principle but we need something more\u2014particularly in the context of the growing instability in East Asia and the potential for conflict escalation. More than the UNSC efforts, we need pro-active diplomatic engagement, through coordinated bilateral and multilateral efforts among those with the greatest stakes in maintaining peace and stability in Northeast Asia. We also still lack a strong state to lead in Northeast Asia on non-proliferation and disarmament issues<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Australia\u2019s role in all of this is relatively limited in comparison with the most significant players, China and the US. Australian diplomats in New York have contributed to the sanctions regime<\/a> through last week\u2019s unanimous vote in favour of tightening existing Security Council sanctions, and will no doubt support further sanctions in the event of a third North Korean nuclear test. However, Australia could use its diplomatic influence to engage Pyongyang bilaterally\u2014a process that should be facilitated by the planned opening of a North Korean embassy in Canberra<\/a>.<\/p>\n

Tanya Ogilvie-White is a senior analyst and Hayley Channer is an analyst at ASPI. Image courtesy of Flickr user kalleboo<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

After the UN Security Council tightened existing sanctions against North Korea this month (adding four organisations and six individuals to its blacklist) the North responded by warning that it would carry out additional rocket launches …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":52,"featured_media":3730,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"closed","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_mi_skip_tracking":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[479],"tags":[17,206,86,172,85,149],"class_list":["post-3727","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-nonproliferation","tag-australia","tag-non-proliferation","tag-north-korea","tag-nuclear-security","tag-nuclear-test","tag-united-nations-security-council"],"acf":[],"yoast_head":"\nAvoiding a \u2018final showdown\u2019 with North Korea | The Strategist<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" 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